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Abstract
The dissertation consists of four chapters. The ﬁrst two chapters are devoted to
exploring information acquisition and disclosure in contests. The third chapter is
devoted to exploring how risk attitude aﬀects bidding behavior in all-pay auctions.
The last chapter is devoted to exploring behavioral biases in advice-giving.
In Chapter 1, I study player's incentive to spy on opponents' private information
in contests. I show that each player's equilibrium eﬀort is non-decreasing (non-
increasing) in the posterior probability that the opponent has the same (a diﬀerent)
valuation. Accounting for the cost of spying, players are strictly better oﬀ than not
spying on each other at all.
In Chapter 2, I focus on how a contest organizer should disclose information in
order to achieve certain objectives. In particular, I compare private signals with pub-
lic signals. I show that there is no general ranking of the two signals in terms of the
performance of maximizing players' expected payoﬀ, but public signals outperforms
private signals in maximizing expected eﬀort.
In Chapter 3 (co-authored with David Ong and Ella Segev), we extend previous
theoretical work on n-players complete information all-pay auction to incorporate
heterogeneous risk and loss averse utility functions. We provide suﬃcient and neces-
sary conditions for the existence of equilibria with a given set of active players with
any strictly increasing utility functions and characterize the players' equilibrium
mixed strategies.
Finally, in Chapter 4 (co-authored with Tobias Gesche), we show experimental
evidence that a one-oﬀ incentive to bias advice has a persistent eﬀect on advisers'
own actions and their future recommendations.
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Chapter 1
Spying in Contests
Abstract Two players compete for a prize and their valuations are private infor-
mation. Before the contest, each player can covertly acquire a costly, noisy and
private signal regarding the opponent's valuation. In equilibrium, each player's ef-
fort is non-decreasing in the posterior probability that the opponent has the same
valuation. Accounting for the cost of spying, players are strictly better oﬀ spying
when the spying technology is partially but not perfectly informative. Suppose in-
stead that each player can, at no cost, ex ante commit to disclose a signal about
her valuation to the opponent, but cannot observe realizations of the signal. Then
every equilibrium involves non-disclosure by at least one player, even though some
disclosure by each player would beneﬁt both.
1
1.1 Introduction
Winner-take-all contests, like rent-seeking contests for monopoly rights, patent races,
lobbying, political campaigns and competitions for promotion, burden participants
with the prospect that their investments may yield no reward. The eﬀorts, time and
resources invested in competing for the prizes are unrecoverable, and typically, only
the participant with the highest investment reaps the rewards of the contest. Thus,
anticipating the rivals' intentions becomes particularly valuable; learning that rivals
will invest little can save on the investment to win the prize, and, conversely, learning
of an excessive investment outlay by rivals would lead a ﬁrm to avoid investing in
a lost cause. This paper studies players' incentives of acquiring information about
the opponents prior to winner-take-all contests.
In competing for a procurement contract, for example, suppliers spend enormous
time, resources and eﬀorts to prepare proposals for a buyer to evaluate.1 This process
is even costlier when it also involves bribing the procurement agent (Celentani and
Ganuza, 2002; Burguet and Che, 2004). Since each supplier may value the contract
diﬀerently, their willingness to commit resources to win the contract or to bribe the
procurement agent may diﬀer. Gathering intelligence on the opponent's valuation
can prove particularly valuable. To obtain these intelligence, suppliers may hire
hackers to steal information from rival supplier's computer, investigators to search
through oﬃce trash or detectives to steal ﬁles from oﬃce safe, etc.2
The existing literature suggests that players will overall not beneﬁt from such
spying. Kovenock et al. (2015) show that the payoﬀs to players are the same when
valuations are commonly known and when they are private information. However,
perfect information about the opponent is extremely hard  if not impossible  to
acquire in reality.
In this paper, we model the action of information acquisition as a continuous
variable which allows players to acquire partial information. In this novel set up,
we seek to answer the following questions: What's the impact of partial intelligence
about opponents on a player's competitive behavior in contests? What's the implica-
1Airbus and Boeing spent 10 years in competing for the U.S. Air Force tanker contract and
their proposals included several thousand pages (Kovenock et al., 2015).
2On the one hand, acquisition of intelligence can be illegal. Detectives hired by Larry Ellison,
the head of Oracle, bribed the cleaning staﬀ at Microsoft's oﬃce to gather sensitive information
from the oﬃce trash until the year when the scandal was exposed by the media. In 2001, staﬀs
of Procter&Gamble were found searching the garbage of Unilever  its competitor in the hair-
care market  for "the Organics and Sunsilk brands of shampoo" which contains commercially
sensible information. On the other hand, intelligence may also be acquired through legal and
organized methods. Large companies usually hire competitive intelligence agencies to study their
competitors; some major multinational ﬁrms like General Motors, Kodak and BP even set up their
own separate competitive intelligence units (Billand et al., 2016).
2
tion of such spying behavior on social welfare and allocative eﬃciency? In addition,
a large set of contests are welfare destroying in the sense that resources invested by
players are wasted (Tullock, 1967; Posner, 1974), as these resources only determine
the winner but do not contribute to value creation.3 For instance, the estimated
social cost of rent-seeking for the US is 22.6 percent of GNP in 1985 (Laband and
Sophocleus, 1988); and it is been long argued (since (Wright, 1983)) that patent
races generate wasteful duplication of eﬀort. So how do spying activities aﬀect total
eﬀorts in such wasteful contests?4
Section 1.2 presents a model of a contest with one indivisible prize and two players
who have independent private valuations (IPV) for the prize. In particular, each
player's valuation can be either high or low. Before participating in the contest,
each player covertly acquires a costly, noisy and private spying signal about her
opponent's valuation. The spying signal can be drawn from an arbitrarily large set of
distribution functions. In acquiring the spying signal, she chooses a level of accuracy
for it ranging from completely uninformative to perfectly informative.5 She then
observes both her valuation and the spying signal and exerts eﬀort in the contest.
The player who exerts more eﬀort wins. This payoﬀ structure is the same as in a ﬁrst
price all-pay auction. For example, in competitive procurement each supplier may
have a high or low valuation of the contract, according to its estimation of proﬁt
which depends on its own production cost. The supplier can obtain intelligence
regarding the opponent's valuation from its pre-existing competitive intelligence
unit, and then decides how much eﬀort to invest in the competition.
In Section 1.3.1 we consider a simpliﬁed setting where the accuracy of the spy-
ing signal is ﬁxed and the signal costless. When the signals are partially infor-
mative, eﬀort by each player in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the contest
is stochastically increasing in her valuation. Furthermore, spying has a motiva-
tion/demotivation eﬀect on a player (Proposition 1): when the player's valuation
is high, her equilibrium eﬀort is non-decreasing in the posterior likelihood that the
opponent's valuation is also high ("motivation eﬀect" of spying); instead, when her
valuation is low then her eﬀort is non-increasing in such a likelihood ("demotivation
eﬀect" of spying). As a result, players increase their eﬀorts when they are perceived
to be evenly matched. In competitive procurement process, a supplier only devotes
more resources, eﬀorts and time after learning the opponent might have the similar
production cost, and thus a similar valuation for the procurement contract. A ﬁrm
would increase investments in R&D after learning that the opponent in the patent
3 See Congleton et al. (2008) for the overview of rent-seeking contests.
4The results are also applicable to other contests where eﬀorts are productive.
5Accuracy is deﬁned by rotation order (Johnson and Myatt, 2006) for tractability.
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race owns a research team with the similarly background as the ﬁrm does.
Section 1.3.2 considers endogenous acquisition of spying signals. In the symmet-
ric equilibrium, each player acquires a partially informative spying signal. Account-
ing for the cost of spying, players are strictly better oﬀ than not spying on each other
at all (Proposition 3). Meanwhile, the total expected eﬀort in the contest is strictly
lower. Therefore, spying in wasteful contests actually contributes to social welfare
by reducing duplication of eﬀorts or other resources wasted in the competition. In
procurement contests, money spent on bribery and eﬀorts exerted in the process are
lower if suppliers hack into each others' computers or steal ﬁles from rivals' oﬃces
for information. This result is particularly important because public procurement is
a hotbed for bribery among OECD countries (Ehlermann-Cache and Others, 2007)
which creates social ineﬃciencies and is hard to detect. When suppliers spy on each
other, such costs are reduced without actually detecting the bribing behavior.6 In-
terestingly, the same welfare outcome is not achievable if the cost of spying is zero,
as then players would acquire a perfect signal about the opponent. As mentioned
earlier, players' payoﬀs in this situation are the same as when they do not spy at
all.
Spying maybe prohibitively costly (or illegal). The previous result suggests, how-
ever, that players would beneﬁt if they were to disclose to each other a noisy signal
of their valuation. This raises the question: would such disclosure be supported
in equilibrium? To address the question, Section 1.4 considers a twist of the main
model in which each player commits to disclose a signal about her own valuation to
the opponent before the contest.7 In doing so, she chooses an accuracy for the signal
which the opponent will receive. Neither disclosing nor receiving the signal incurs
any cost to any player. This corresponds to each supplier choosing its security level
of oﬃce buildings or ﬁrewall.8 Should suppliers loosen their security measures to
make it easier to steal sensible ﬁles or downgrade its ﬁrewall so it is easier to hack
into the computers?
Section 1.4.2 considers the case when players set up an agreement to disclose
6There is a similar implication to rent-seeking and lobbying contests: bribes to politicians are
social costs and spying in these contests improves welfare. In the patent race example, if ﬁrms ac-
tively acquire intelligence about the opponents', say, research budgets, capabilities, breakthroughs
as well as data of the new products, then there will be less duplicated investments in R&D.
7Most of information disclosure in contest literature often take a centralized view and analyze
how a contest organizer should disclose information to players in order to maximize total eﬀort (Lu
et al., 2016; Zhang and Zhou, 2016; Chen, 2016; Serena, 2015; Denter et al., 2014). The current
paper, however, takes a decentralized view and considers players disclose information to each other.
8Alternatively, in the patent race example, information disclosure corresponds to providing the
opponent, for instances, a prototype of the new product, or samples of a new drug. Given such
a piece of hard evidence (i.e. a given accuracy), the opponent ﬁrm can test the product and test
results are unavailable to the ﬁrm who discloses the information.
4
signals to each other. If players agree to disclose partially informative signals to
each other, then both players are strictly better oﬀ (Proposition 6). This is in
contrast to Kovenock et al. (2015) which restricts attention to binary disclosure, i.e.
non-disclosure or full disclosure, and shows that full disclosure has no impact on
players' expected payoﬀs.9 However, Section 1.4.3 shows that disclosing a partially
informative signal is weakly dominated by disclosing an uninformative signal for
each player (Lemma 7). Even though partial disclosure by both players lowers ex
ante expected eﬀorts and increases payoﬀs, each player can do better by adding
noise to the signal disclosed to the opponent, as then the evenly matched opponent
is more likely to be demotivated. Therefore, there does not exist any equilibrium in
which both players disclose any partially informative signals (Proposition 7). This
provides one reason for suppliers seldom sharing private information to each other
in real procurement competitions or any other winner-take-all contests.
These results suggest that social welfare can be improved through mandatory,
albeit imperfect, disclosure between players. In a patent race, the government can
require all participating ﬁrms to disclose information about their research teams,
or their research budget, or any other related information which aﬀects their R&D
investments. In lobbying competitions, lobbyists should be required to disclose their
estimation of proﬁt when their preferable policy is implemented. The results also
provide a nice interpretation of why we observe spying/espionage but information
disclosure/sharing in reality.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, the clandestine nature of
spying is captured in the model as both spying signal realizations and accuracy of the
signal are private information to each player. Microsoft was unaware of whether or
how the detectives hired by Oracle acquired any information and was also unaware
of what kind of information Oracle had obtained. Interestingly, the results suggest
spying on each other may improve both players welfare as they receive additional
information about each others' strategy and thus, are able to coordinate. Second,
Section 1.3.1 of the current paper considers the all-pay auction with an information
structure between incomplete information (Lu and Parreiras, 2014; Konrad, 2004;
Amann and Leininger, 1996) and complete information setting (Baye et al., 1996;
Ellingsen, 1991; Hillman and Riley, 1989). By varying the accuracy of the spying
signal from completely uninformative to perfectly informative, the current paper
characterized the equilibrium in an arbitrarily large set of information structure
between incomplete and complete information.10 Third, this paper provides the
9Yet, the allocative eﬃciency is compromised and the total expected eﬀort in the contest is
reduced.
10There has been some recent progresses in all-pay auction with common valuation and aﬃliated
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ﬁrst analytical framework of all-pay contests with endogenous information structure.
The model is applied to study endogenous information acquisition (spying) and
endogenous information sharing (disclosure) in the current paper, and is applicable
to other endogenous information settings, including overt information acquisition,
centralized information disclosure and discriminatory information acquisition, etc.
There are few studies on spying/information acquisition in contests. The paper
most related to the current paper in the economics literature is Baik and Shogren
(1995) who compare covert information acquisition with overt acquisition in contests.
However, the paper does not model contests as a game of incomplete information and
is subject to the criticism for "the negligence of strategic interdependency between
the two players" (Bolle, 1996).11 Alternatively, Zhang (2015) considered one-sided
private information setting in which the public player spies on the private player in
both all-pay auction and Tullock contest (Tullock, 1967). The author shows that
espionage is more common in a more discriminatory contest and can be discour-
aged by the increasing probability of spying detection. The current paper does not
consider detection of spying or double agent. Another closely related strand of lit-
erature is the information acquisition in winner-pay auction literature (Miettinen,
2013; Shi, 2012; Persico, 2000; Matthews, 1984). In all-pay auctions, Morath and
Münster (2013) considers players' incentive to acquire information about their own
valuation, and the decision of information acquisition is binary. Alternatively, Fang
and Morris (2006) from which the research idea of the current paper was originated
shows a numerical example of acquiring information about the opponent in a ﬁrst
price winner-pay auction. Built on Fang and Morris (2006), Tian and Xiao (2007)
studies endogenous information acquisition on the opponent's valuation in the ﬁrst
price auction. Finally, in the IO literature, spying/espionage are also considered in
entrant deterrence (Barrachina et al., 2014; Solan and Yariv, 2004), in price and
quantity competition in duopoly (Kozlovskaya, 2016; Wang, 2016; Whitney and Ga-
isford, 1999), and in multi-market competitions (Billand et al., 2016).
The remainder of the paper are organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the
preliminaries of the main model of spying in contests. Section 1.3 shows the results
on spying  endogenous information acquisition  in contests, and Section 1.4 on
information disclosure. Section 1.5 concludes.
signals (Rentschler and Turocy, 2016; Chi et al., 2015), as well as with interdependent valuations
(Siegel, 2013; Krishna and Morgan, 1997). These studies assume players can learn some information
regarding the opponent from the signal about their own valuations, because of common valuation
or interdependent value assumption. The current paper is diﬀerent from this line of research in the
independence between the information regarding the bidder's own valuation and the information
regarding the opponent.
11See discussions in Baik and Shogren (1995), Bolle (1996) and Baik and Shogren (1996)
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1.2 The model
There are two risk neutral players, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, who compete in a contest
with one indivisible prize for which they have independent private valuations (IPV).
Player i (i = 1, 2) may value the prize at θh with probability ph ∈ (0, 1) or at θl with
probability pl = 1− ph, where θh > θl > 0. Players know only their own valuations,
and the distributions of opponents' valuations. We refer to a generic player i as
"she" and her opponent, player j, as "he".
Information acquisition (spying): Player i can acquire additional information
regarding the opponent by receiving a private spying signal (hereafter "signal")
about the opponent's valuation. The possible signal realization pii is drawn from a
compact set [pi, pi]. Player i acquires information about θj by choosing from a family
of joint distributions over [pi, pi]× {θh, θl}
{F (pii, θj|αi)}αi∈[α,α]
indexed by αi ∈ [α, α]. We refer to F (pii, θj|αi) the signal, αi the accuracy (deﬁned
shortly) of the signal and pii the realization of the signal. Since the conditional
distribution of pii depends only on θj, and the prior distribution of θi is independent
of the distribution of θj, pii is thus independent of pij.
Let F (·, αi) denote the marginal distribution of pii with corresponding density
f(·, αi), given any αi. Furthermore, denoted by Fh(·, αi) (Fl(·, αi) ) the conditional
cumulative distribution of pii given θj = θh (θj = θl). Let fh(·, αi) and fl(·, αi) be
the corresponding probability density functions, and assume both are diﬀerentiable
on both arguments. We assume w.l.o.g. the marginal distribution of pii, F (pii, αi) is
uniform on [0, 1] for every given αi,
12 i.e.,
phFh(pii, αi) + plFl(pii, αi) = pii (1.1)
phfh(pii, αi) + plfl(pii, αi) = 1 (1.2)
given any αi ∈ [α, α]. Thus, pi = 0, pi = 1.
Spying cost: Player i's cost of acquiring the signal is captured by Ci(αi), and Ci(·)
12For any alternative signals, the marginal cumulative distribution as a random variable is always
uniformly distributed. For example, if player i's, i = 1, 2, signal realization si is drawn from
F (s|θh, α) (F (s|θl, α)) conditional on player j's (j = 2, 1, respectively) valuation being θh (θl), then
we can always deﬁne an alternative signal with realizations: pii = phF (si|θh, α)+plF (si|θl, α), being
the probability integral transformation of the original signal. Thus, pii is the percentile function of
si, which is always distributed uniformly in [0, 1].
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is assumed to be convex and increasing in αi for i = 1, 2, with Ci(α) = 0. Let
MCi(α) =
∂Ci(α)
∂α
> 0 be the marginal cost of acquiring the signal with accuracy α.
Posterior belief: Observing pii leads player i to update her belief on θj according
to Bayes' rule. Denote player i's posterior belief that player j has valuation θh upon
receiving pii by µ(pii, αi), thus
µ(pii, αi) =
phfh(pii, αi)
phfh(pii, αi) + plfl(pii, αi)
According to (1.2), µ(pii, αi) = phfh(pii, αi) and 1 − µ(pii, αi) = plfl(pii, αi). For the
rest of the paper, we assume:
Assumption 1. Monotonic likelihood ratio property (MLRP): Given any α ∈ [α, α],
fh(pi,α)
fl(pi,α)
is non-decreasing in pi ∈ [pi, pi].
Assumption 1 implies µ(pii, αi) is non-decreasing in pii ﬁxing αi.
Information order: To rank signals by accuracy, we adopt the rotation order
which was ﬁrst introduced by Johnson and Myatt (2006), and was applied to auction
settings by Shi (2012).13
Deﬁnition 1 (Rotation order). The family of distributions F (pii, αi) is rotation-
ordered if there exists a point pi+ ∈ [0, 1] such that: ∂fh(pii,αi)
∂αi
≷ 0 if pii ≷ pi+, for all
αi ∈ [α, α].
When αi increases, fh(pii, αi) rotates counter clockwise around pi
+, which implies
the updated belief µ(pii, αi) becomes steeper. Meanwhile, fl(pii, αi) rotates clockwise
around pi+, which implies the updated belief 1− µ(pii, αi) also becomes steeper.
Let us consider an example with two information acquisition choices, α′ < α′′. By
deﬁnition, it must be true that fh(pi, α
′) > fh(pi, α′′) when pi < pi+ and fh(pi, α′) <
fh(pi, α
′′) when pi > pi+; and that fl(pi, α′) < fl(pi, α′′) when pi < pi+ and fl(pi, α′) >
fl(pi, α
′′) when pi > pi+. This example is shown in the Figure 1.1 and 1.2.
When player i chooses αi = α, i.e. to acquire a completely uninformative signal
about θj, then any realization of the signal does not convey any information about
the opponent. In this case, fh(pii, α) = fl(pii, α) = 1 for all pii ∈ [pi, pi], see Figure 1.9.
When player i chooses αi = α, i.e. to acquire a perfectly informative signal about θj,
then each realization conveys perfect information about the opponent. In this case,
13See Ganuza and Penalva (2010) for thorough discussion on signal ordering by precision which
is deﬁned by dispersion of the distribution of posterior estimation.
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fh(pi, α)
pipi+
fh(pi, α
′)
fh(pi, α
′′)
Figure 1.1: Increasing α means counter
clockwise rotation of fh(pi, α)
fl(pi, α)
pipi+
fl(pi, α
′)
fl(pi, α
′′)
Figure 1.2: Increasing α means clockwise
rotation of fl(pi, α)
fh(pii, α) = 0 if pii 6 pl and fh(pii, α) = 1ph if pii > pl, see Figure 1.4. Throughout the
paper, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 2. All signals are rotation ordered around pi+ = pl.
pi+ = pl is the only rotation point such that all signals indexed from α to α are
ordered.
fh(pi, α)
pi
1
1
fh(pi, α)
Figure 1.3: Completely uninformative
signal α
fh(pi, α)
pi1pi+ = pl
1
ph
fh(pi, α)
Figure 1.4: Perfectly informative signal α
Eﬀort in the contest: Player i decides her eﬀort after observing θi and pii. Thus,
the contest stage of the game is a Bayesian game with two-dimensional types, and
the eﬀort of player i is a two-to-one mapping:14 b : {θh, θl} × [0, 1]→ R+.
14The two-to-one mapping strategy in the contest creates complications in analysis, especially in
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Payoﬀs in the contest: Players choose their eﬀorts in the contest simultaneously.
The player who exerts higher eﬀort wins the prize, whereas the losing player's eﬀort
is unrecoverable. Ties are broken with equal probabilities. Thus, player i with
valuation θi exerting eﬀort bi earns a payoﬀ:
U(bi, bj, θi) =

−bi, if bi < bj
θi − bi, if bi > bj
1
2
θi − bi, if bi = bj
A contest with the above payoﬀ function, U(bi, bj, θi), is also known as a ﬁrst price
all-pay auction.15
Timing: The timing of spying in the contest game is shown in Figure 1.5. Firstly,
player i chooses the accuracy αi for the signal to be acquired on the opponent.
Secondly, Nature determines the valuation proﬁle according to the prior distribution
and player i observes θi. Thirdly, according to θj and αi, Nature determines a signal
realization pii observed by player i. Finally, player i chooses her eﬀort bi according
to her private information (θi, pii).
chooses αi player i observes θi player i observes pii chooses bi
Player i Nature determines and Nature determines and Player i
Figure 1.5: Timing of spying in the contest (i = 1, 2)
Social welfare and allocative eﬃciency: In the contest environment considered
in this paper, eﬀorts are wasted and thus, are not accounted as a part of social
characterizing the equilibrium strategy. In the previous studies involving two-to-one mapping in
auctions, either the model was set up in a way that the auction has an equilibrium bidding strategy
monotonically increasing with both dimensions (Tan, 2016), or the two-dimensional signal can be
translated into a summary statistic which is positively correlated with the value with an assumption
on the distributions of signals (Goeree and Oﬀerman, 2003). Auctions with bi-dimensional types
were considered in Fang and Morris (2006) where the authors studied a model of independent
private value ﬁrst-price auction in which players' valuations are drawn from a binary distribution,
and each player receives a noisy two-valued signal about the opponent's valuation (with exogenous
accuracy). The authors also characterized the equilibrium bidding strategy which is a two-to-one
mapping. However, it is well known in the literature that the equilibrium strategy in auctions
with multidimensional types are diﬃcult to characterize, due to the fact that "monotonicity is not
naturally deﬁned" (Tan, 2016) or even non-existence of equilibrium (Jackson, 2009).
15Another type of model used in the contest literature is "Tullock contest" (Tullock, 1967) where
player i's winning probability increases in her eﬀort continuously instead of discontinuously as in
U(bi, bj , θi) above. This type of model is sometimes called the imperfectly discriminating contest,
whereas the all-pay auction is a perfectly discriminating contest in the sense that player i wins
with probability one as long as her eﬀort is larger than the opponent. See Konrad (2009) for survey
of the literature.
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welfare. Formally, social welfare is deﬁned as the following:
Deﬁnition 2. Social welfare is the total expected payoﬀ of players: Σ2i=1 [Vi(αi, αj)− Ci(αi)],
where Vi(αi, αj) is player i's equilibrium expected payoﬀ in the contest where the pro-
ﬁle of information acquisition choice is (αi, αj).
In the context of competitive procurement, suppliers' total expected proﬁt (net
of spying cost) is the social welfare, as the eﬀort spent in competing for the contract
is unproductive. The allocative eﬃciency is formally deﬁned as the following:
Deﬁnition 3. An equilibrium of the contest is allocative eﬃcient if the type (θh, s)
player's eﬀort is higher than type (θl, t) player's eﬀort with probability one for any
s, t ∈ [0, 1].
Deﬁnition 3 follows from standard deﬁnition of allocative eﬃciency in auction
literature. A competition for procurement contract is allocative eﬃcient if suppliers
with lower production cost always gets the contract.
1.3 Spying in contests
1.3.1 The contest with exogenous accuracy
In this section we ﬁrst study a simpliﬁed model where both players exogenously
receive a free, noisy and private spying signal about the opponent's valuation with
the same accuracy, i.e. α1 = α2 = α ∈ [α, α]. The accuracy α is common knowledge.
Equilibrium eﬀort in the contest
Denoted by bl(pi, α) and bh(pi, α) the eﬀort strategy of types (θl, pi) and (θh, pi),
respectively.
Lemma 1. Given any α ∈ [α, α], then in any symmetric, allocative eﬃcient, pure
strategy equilibrium of the contest, the following must be true:
1. Monotonicity: the type (θh, pi) of player i's eﬀort is non-decreasing in pi and
the type (θl, pi) of player i's eﬀort is non-increasing in pi;
2. Continuity: both players' strategies are continuous without any atom;
3. Initial conditions: bl(1, α) = 0 and bl(0, α) = bh(0, α).
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Lemma 1 states that the eﬀorts are monotonic in pi ﬁxing valuations in any
allocative eﬃcient equilibrium of the contest. Lemma 2 below provides the nec-
essary condition for existence of any symmetric allocative eﬃcient, pure strategy
equilibrium.16
Lemma 2 (Eﬃciency). Given that α ∈ [α, α], there exists a symmetric, allocative
eﬃcient, pure strategy equilibrium in the contest only if fh(pi,α)
fl(pi,α)
> θl
θh
for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Note that the necessary condition given in Lemma 2 imposes a lower bound on
the likelihood ratio. Thus, this is a restriction on the accuracy of the signal.
Deﬁnition 4. Denoted by α̂ the highest possible accuracy of a signal which satisﬁes
fh(pi,α)
fl(pi,α)
> θl
θh
for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, Lemma 2 indicates that any symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium must
have α ∈ [α, α̂].17. To understand the necessary condition in Lemma 2, recall the
monotonicity property given by Lemma 1. When the type (θh, pii) of player i chooses
her equilibrium eﬀort bh(pii, α), then she wins against a high valuation type oppo-
nent with probability
∫ pii
0
fh(t, α)dt. If she instead chooses type (θl, pii)'s equilib-
rium eﬀort, bl(pii, α), then she loses to a low valuation opponent with probability∫ pii
0
fh(t, α)dt. Therefore, an increase of eﬀort from bl(pii, α) to bh(pii, α) earns type
(θh, pii) of player i a gain of
θh
[
µ(pii, α)
∫ pii
0
fh(t, α)dt+ [1− µ(pii, α)]
∫ pii
0
fh(t, α)dt
]
= θh
∫ pii
0
fh(t, α)dt
Similarly, the gain for type (θl, pii) from the same increase of eﬀort is θl
∫ pii
0
fl(t, α)dt.
Allocative eﬃciency requires the gain of increasing the eﬀort for type (θh, pii) out-
weighs the cost, whereas the cost of increasing the eﬀort outweighs the gain for type
(θl, pii). Since the cost are the same across the two types, this necessary condition
is equivalent of θh
∫ pii
0
fh(t, α)dt > θl
∫ pii
0
fl(t, α)dt for any pii ∈ [0, 1], which implies
θhfh(pi, α) > θlfl(pi, α). Thus, we have the condition given in Lemma 2.
In light of Lemma 1 and 2, we now derive the equilibrium strategy for the sym-
metric, pure strategy equilibrium with eﬃcient allocation, assuming the condition
given in Lemma 2 is satisﬁed. The expected payoﬀs of types (θl, pi) and (θh, pi) of
player i when choosing b, given that player j plays the strategy bh(pi, α) and bl(pi, α),
16In fact, the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix shows that this necessary condition is also
suﬃcient for eﬃciency.
17By MLRP and rotation order, for all α ∈ [α, α̂] the condition in Lemma 2 is satisﬁed for all
pi ∈ [0, 1], and for all α ∈ (α̂, α] the condition is not satisﬁed for at least pi = 0.
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is given by:
U(b|θl, pi) = θl [1− µ(pi, α)]
∫ 1
b−1l (b,α)
fl(Π, α)dΠ− b (1.3)
U(b|θh, pi) = θh
[
[1− µ(pi, α)] + µ(pi, α)
∫ b−1h (b,α)
0
fh(Π, α)dΠ
]
− b (1.4)
where b−1l (b, α) and b
−1
h (b, α) are the inverse of eﬀort strategies by player j. Take
the ﬁrst order derivative w.r.t. b on both (1.3) and (1.4):
∂bl(pi, α)
∂pi
= − [1− µ(pi, α)] fl(pi, α)θl
∂bh(pi, α)
∂pi
= µ(pi, α)fh(pi, α)θh
By the initial conditions given in Lemma 1, bl(1, α) = 0 and bh(0, α) = bl(0, α), the
pure strategy equilibrium with eﬃcient allocation is derived and given in Proposition
1. Furthermore, Proposition 1 also provides the equilibrium strategy when the
allocation is not eﬃcient, i.e. when the condition given in Lemma 2 is not satisﬁed.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 is satisﬁed.
• If α ∈ [α, α̂], then there exists a unique pure strategy, symmetric, allocative
eﬃcient equilibrium:
bl(pi, α) = θl
∫ 1
pi
[1− µ (Π, α)] dFl(Π, α)
bh(pi, α) = θh
∫ pi
0
µ (Π, α) dFh(Π, α) + θl
∫ 1
0
[1− µ (Π, α)] dFl(Π, α)
• If α ∈ [α̂, α], then there exists a unique, symmetric equilibrium in which the
type (θl, pi) and (θh, pi) with pi > pi
∗ play pure strategy:
bl(pi, α) = θl
∫ 1
pi
[1− µ (Π, α)] dFl(Π, α)
bh(pi, α) = θh
∫ pi
pi∗
µ (Π, α) dFh(Π, α)
+ θl
∫ 1
pi∗
[1− µ (Π, α)] dFl(Π, α) + θhθl
phθl + plθh
pi∗;
and type (θl, pi) and (θh, pi) with pi 6 pi∗ mix over [bl(pi∗, α), bh(pi∗, α)] according
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to CDF σl(b|pi, α) and σh(b|pi, α) respectively:
σl(b|pi, α) = σh(b|pi, α)
=
phθl + plθh
θhθlpi∗
(
b− θl
∫ 1
pi∗
[1− µ (Π, α)] dFl(Π, α)
)
where pi∗ is given by
θl
∫ pi∗
0
fl(Π, α)dΠ = θh
∫ pi∗
0
fh(Π, α)dΠ (1.5)
See Figure 1.6 for the allocative eﬃcient equilibrium and Figure 1.7 for the al-
locative ineﬃcient equilibrium. The intuition of the eﬃcient equilibrium can be
understood in competitive procurement process: a supplier would only spend ad-
ditional eﬀort in preparing the proposal or bribing the procurement agent after
learning that the opponent is likely to be equally competitive, e.g., with similar
production cost.
b
pi0 1
bh(pi, α)
bl(pi, α)
Figure 1.6: Allocative eﬃcient
equilibrium
b
pi0 1
bh(pi, α)
bl(pi, α)
σh(b|pi, α) = σl(b|pi, α)
pi∗
Figure 1.7: Allocative ineﬃcient
equilibrium
To gain some intuition on the equilibrium eﬀort strategy, we rewrite type (θl, pi)
of player i's strategy as:
θl
∫ 1
pii
[1− µ(Π, α)] dFl(Π, α) = θlE [(1− µ(pij, α)) |pii 6 pij, θi = θl] (1.6)
Equation (1.6) suggests the type (θl, pii)'s eﬀort is her valuation times her expectation
of the opponent's posterior belief that she has low valuation, conditional on she
indeed has low valuation and she wins (i.e. when pii 6 pij).
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Similarly, the part of a type (θh, pii)'s eﬀort on top of bl(0) can be rewritten in
the same manner:
θh
∫ pii
0
µ(Π, α)dFh(Π, α) = θhE [µ(pij, α)|pii > pij, θi = θh]
This part of the player i's eﬀort is θh times her expectation of the opponent's poste-
rior belief that she has high valuation, conditional on she indeed has high valuation
and she wins (i.e. when pii > pij).
Two observations worth mentioning.
Observation 1. Player i's eﬀort is ﬁrst order stochastically increasing in her val-
uation.
In the allocative eﬃcient equilibrium, the high valuation player's eﬀort is strictly
higher than the low valuation player's eﬀort. In the allocative ineﬃcient equilibrium,
the former is higher than the latter in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance,
as there is an interval over which players with both valuations randomize. In the
ineﬃcient equilibrium, both players' signals are suﬃciently informative. The rela-
tively lower signal realizations (pi < pi∗) credibly reveal that the opponent is a low
valuation type, thus both (θh, pi) and (θl, pi) with pi < pi
∗ are conﬁdent that the
opponent has θl. Furthermore, player i with valuation θl realizes that the opponent
is very likely to receive those lower signal realizations. Therefore, there cannot be
an equilibrium in which type (θl, pi) with pi < pi
∗ plays pure strategy, as then she
loses almost for sure and is better oﬀ to deviate to choose zero eﬀort. This indicates
both types (θh, pi) and (θl, pi) of the opponent with pi < pi
∗ plays mixed strategy as
well.18
In fact, type (pi∗, α) is indiﬀerent between the eﬀort levels bh(pi∗, α) and bl(pi∗, α),
by the deﬁnition of pi∗. This is consistent with the idea behind Lemma 2: only type
(θl, pi) (type (θh, pi)) with pi > pi
∗ ﬁnds the cost (gain) of increasing the eﬀort from
bl(pi, α) to bh(pi, α) outweighs the gain (cost), which is why they play pure strategy
with (θh, pi)'s eﬀort higher than (θl, pi). For types with pi < pi
∗ the condition for
eﬃciency is no long satisﬁed and thus, (θl, pi) and (θh, pi) play mixed strategy in a
common interval, as discussed above.
18The all-pay auction with complete information has only mixed strategy equilibrium (Baye
et al., 1996) for the same reason. To see why, suppose player i with θh plays pure strategy b in
equilibrium against the opponent with θl. Then the opponent would either bid slightly above b,
e.g., b+   if b is lower than θl  or bid zero  if b is no less than θl. In the former, player i would
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to bid slightly higher instead, say b+ 2, suggesting b is suboptimal. In the latter,
player i would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to bid  which, again, suggests b is not optimal. Therefore, the two
players with diﬀerent valuations play mixed strategies in a common interval suggesting a positive
probability that the low valuation player wins. Hence the allocation in equilibrium is ineﬃcient.
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Observation 2. High valuation type of player i's eﬀort is non-decreasing in pi; low
valuation type of player i's eﬀort is non-increasing in pi.
The belief that the opponent is a high valuation player  induced by higher re-
alizations of the signal  encourages the high valuation type of player i to compete
aggressively to increase the odds of winning, and discourages the low valuation type
of player i to compete conservatively to save the cost of competition. In other words,
players compete aggressively when there is higher posterior probability that the op-
ponent has the same valuation, i.e. "motivation eﬀect", and compete conservatively
when there is lower posterior probability that the opponent has the diﬀerent val-
uation, i.e. "demotivation eﬀect". This observation is also true for the allocative
ineﬃcient equilibrium with the same intuition.
Proposition 2 below suggests players are strictly better oﬀ in the equilibrium
given in Proposition 1 with accuracy α ∈ (α, α). Denoted by Vi(α, α) player i's
expected payoﬀ when both players endogenously receive a free signal about the
opponent with accuracy α.
Proposition 2. In the equilibrium given by Proposition 1:
• Player i's expected payoﬀ is higher when α ∈ (α, α) than when α = α:
Vi(α, α) > Vi(α, α).
• Furthermore, the total expected eﬀort is strictly lower when α ∈ (α, α) than
when α = α.
The proof of the proposition is similar to that in Proposition 3 in the next section
and thus, is omitted. The intuition is that the "motivation" and "demotivation"
eﬀects increase each player's marginal return of eﬀort. In particular, a player only
increases her eﬀort when it is worthwhile to do so  when the opponent is more likely
to have the same valuation as she does. In other words, given the same amount of
additional eﬀort, the additional gain of probability to win is higher when players
receive the signal about the opponent.
Some features of the equilibrium
Corollary 1 suggests it is never a good news that the opponent is more likely to have
high value, no matter what the player's valuation is. Denoted by V (θl, pi, α) and
V (θh, pi, α) the equilibrium expected payoﬀ for types (θl, pi) and (θh, pi), respectively.
Corollary 1. In the equilibrium given by Proposition 1, the following must be true:
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(i) For all α ∈ [α, α], both the high and the low valuation types' expected payoﬀs
are non-increasing in pi:
∂V (θl, pi, α)
∂pi
= plθl
∂fl(pi, α)
∂pi
∫ 1
pi
fl(Π, α)dΠ 6 0
∂V (θh, pi, α)
∂pi
= −phθh∂fh(pi, α)
∂pi
∫ 1
pi
fh(Π, α)dΠ 6 0
where the equalities are only satisﬁed when pi = 1.
(ii) The pure strategies are weakly convex in the signal pi:
∂2bl(pi, α)
∂pi2
= −2plθlfl(pi, α)∂fl(pi, α)
∂pi
> 0
∂2bh(pi, α)
∂pi2
= 2phθhfh(pi, α)
∂fh(pi, α)
∂pi
> 0
and the mixed strategies are independent of pi.
When both players' accuracies of signal is increased, i.e. α is increased, the equi-
librium eﬀort strategies are more sensitive to a marginal change of pi, see Corollary
2.
Corollary 2 (Sensitivity). When the signal becomes more informative in rotation
order, then the slopes of bh(pi, α) and bl(pi, α) are decreased for pi < pi
+, and are
increased for pi > pi+. Furthermore, ∂pi
∗
∂α
> 0.
See Figure 1.8 for this result. For realizations lower (higher) than the rotation
point, bh(pi, α) becomes ﬂatter (steeper) while bl(pi, α) becomes steeper (ﬂatter).
Intuitively, when the signal becomes more informative, the high valuation player
would not increase her eﬀort as much as before in response to a marginal increase of pi
in the interval [0, pi+), as this interval more credibly indicates that the opponent has
low valuation. However, she would increase her eﬀort more than before in response
to a marginal increase of pi in the interval (pi+, 1], as this interval more credibly
indicates that the opponent has high valuation. The same intuition can be applied
to explain the change in sensitivity of bl(pi, α). When there is a marginal decrease of
pi in the interval [0, pi+) ((pi+, 1]), the low valuation player would increase her eﬀort
more than before, as this interval more credibly indicates that the opponent has low
(high) valuation.
Corollary 3 shows that the equilibrium given in Proposition 1 replicates the
mixed strategy equilibrium of all-pay auction with independent private value when
α = α.
Corollary 3. When α = α in the equilibrium given in Proposition 1:
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bpi
bh(pi, α1)
bl(pi, α1)
bh(pi, α2)
bl(pi, α2)
Figure 1.8: Rotation and sensitivity: rotation from α1 to α2 decreases the slope of
eﬀort strategies for pi < pi+ and increases the slope for pi > pi+
• The ex ante distribution of equilibrium eﬀort of player i with valuation θh is
uniform in the interval [plθl, plθl + phθh];
• The ex ante distribution of equilibrium eﬀort of player i with valuation θl is
uniform in the interval [0, plθl].
See Figure 1.9 for the equivalence of equilibrium in all-pay auction with IPV and
the equilibrium in Proposition 1 when α = α. The equilibrium with α = α simply
puriﬁes the mixed strategy equilibrium in the IPV setting. In particular, bh(pi, α)
puriﬁes Gh(b) and bl(pi, α) puriﬁes Gl(b).
b
phθh + plθl
plθl
0
Gl(b) =
b
plθl
Gh(b) =
b−plθl
phθh
b
pi0 1
bh(pi, α)
bl(pi, α)
Figure 1.9: Gh(b) and Gl(b) are CDFs of the mixed strategy by each player with
the high and the low valuation respectively in the equilibrium of all-pay auction
with IPV.
Corollary 4 states that the equilibrium strategy with α = α in Proposition 1
replicates the equilibrium of the complete information all-pay auction .
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Corollary 4. When α = α in the equilibrium given in Proposition 1:
• The type (θl, pi) of player i with pi > pi∗ chooses zero with certainty;
• The type (θl, pi) and (θh, pi) of player i with pi < pi∗ mixing over [0, θl] uniformly;
• The type (θh, pi) of player i with pi > pi∗ plays pure strategy bh(pi, α) which is
linear in pi and increases from θl to θh.
See Figure 1.10 and 1.11 for the equivalence of the equilibrium in all-pay auction
with IPV and the equilibrium in Proposition 1 with α = α. In particular, Figure
1.10 corresponds to the case when player i has θl and Figure 1.11 to θh. For example,
when player i with θl competes against an opponent with the same valuation in the
complete information setting (which occurs with probability pl), her equilibrium
mixed strategy is given by Gll(b) in Figure 1.10. This part of the equilibrium is
replicated by σl(b|pi, α) when pi < pi+ (which occurs with probability pl as well).
b
θl
Gll(b) =
b
θl
θj = θl
b
pi0 1pi+ = pl
σl(b|pi, α)
θl
b
Glh(b) =
θh−θl+b
θh
θj = θh
θl
pi∗
Figure 1.10: Gll(b) and Glh(b) are the CDFs of mixed strategy by a player with θl
who encounters an opponent with θl and θh respectively in complete information
all-pay auction.
1.3.2 Information acquisition  spying
In this section we characterize the symmetric equilibrium of spying, i.e. the choices
of α1 and α2. First, deﬁne the marginal expected payoﬀ as the following:
Deﬁnition 5. Let AMR(η, α) be player i's marginal expected payoﬀ from the contest
when she chooses αi = η while player j chooses αj = α and (wrongly) believes that
player i has chosen the same.
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bθl
Ghl(b) =
b
θl
θj = θl
b
pi0 1pi+ = pl
θl
σh(b|pi, α)
b
θl
θj = θhpi
∗
θh
bh(pi, α)
Ghh(b) =
b
θh
θh
Figure 1.11: Ghl(b) and Ghh(b) are the CDFs of mixed strategy by a player with θh
who encounters an opponent with θl and θh respectively in complete information
all-pay auction.
Suppose player j chooses α and believes that player i has also chosen α, then the
distribution of his eﬀort will be exactly the same as in the symmetric equilibrium
given by Proposition 1. Thus, for any η that player i may choose, her choice of eﬀort
is a decision problem instead of a strategic one. Increasing η would improve player
i's estimation of player j's eﬀort distribution and revise her decision accordingly,
and AMR(η, α) is the marginal increase of her expected payoﬀ due to a marginal
increase of η.
Lemma 3. AMR(η, α) > 0 for all η 6 α and η, α ∈ [α, α).
Lemma 3 states that player i can always increase expected payoﬀ in the contest
by increasing η, as long as it is no larger than α.19 It then follows that increasing η
always gives player i a better estimation of player j's valuation and thus, a clearer
idea of his eﬀort distribution. However, suppose player j chooses α and expects
player i to do the same, then player i has no incentive to increase η.
Lemma 4. AMR(η, α) = 0 for all η ∈ [α, α].
Let MR(α) = AMR(α, α) be the marginal expected payoﬀ of player i through
increasing η when both players have chosen α. When the marginal cost function
MC(·) crosses with MR(·) from below, then there must exist an interior solution
at η = α to the problem maxηV (η, α)−C(η), where V (η, α) is player i's maximum
expected payoﬀ from the contest when player j plays the symmetric equilibrium
strategy believing that both players have chosen α.
19When η > α, AMR(η, α) may still be positive, but it is irrelevant to the later results.
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Proposition 3 (Information acquisition). Given any convex spying cost function
C(α) with C(α) = 0, if there exists a symmetric equilibrium (α∗, α∗) where α∗ ∈
(α, α), i.e.
MR(α∗) = MC(α∗),
then each player is strictly better oﬀ than not spying at all:
V (α∗, α∗)− C(α∗) > V (α, α)
Players are better oﬀ by spying on each other, even taking the cost of spying
into account. To see the intuition, recall that in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium all
players correctly anticipate the equilibrium strategy played by each type of other
players. Thus, when players acquire information about the opponent's type, they
in eﬀect acquire information about the strategy that the opponent is likely to play.
This means the behavior of information acquisition has a similar impact as collusion:
Players anticipate their opponents' strategies on expectation and aware that their
own strategies are anticipated by the opponents. The additional rent players extract
through such coordination of strategies is high enough that the cost of spying is
compensated for.
Proposition 3 also shows that the symmetric equilibrium choice of information
acquisition α∗ is within (α, α), i.e. between the incomplete information and complete
information setting, as long as the cost function is convex enough. In fact, such
information acquisition increases the social welfare to the level higher than complete
information setting.
Corollary 5. In any symmetric equilibrium of the information acquisition game as
speciﬁed in Proposition 3, it must be true that V (α∗, α∗)− C(α∗) > V (α, α), where
the equality is satisﬁed when either α∗ = α or α∗ = α.
Corollary 5 follows directly from Proposition 3, as it had been conﬁrmed in the
literature that V (α, α) = V (α, α) (Kovenock et al., 2015). In the complete informa-
tion setting, the loss of eﬃciency cancels the gain from coordination. However, when
each player acquires a noisy signal about the opponent, the gain from coordination
outweighs the loss of eﬃciency. An interesting implication of Corollary 5 is that
social welfare can only be improved by spying when it is costly to do so.
Corollary 6. When both players acquire a partially informative signal, the total
expected eﬀort they exert in the contest is strictly lower than when they do not spy
on each other.
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Corollary 6 follows directly from Proposition 3. The total surplus in the contest
is the sum of eﬀort and players' expected payoﬀs. And such a surplus is equals to
p2l θl+(1−p2l )θh in the eﬃcient equilibrium, and is lower in the ineﬃcient equilibrium.
The fact that both players are better oﬀ after spying on each other implies they cut
a larger share of the surplus than when they don't spy at all.
1.4 Information disclosure in contests
Given the previous results that spying activities improves players' welfare, a question
naturally arises: do players have incentives to disclose their private information to
each other? According to Proposition 3, players are strictly better oﬀ when they
both acquire a partially informative and costly signal about the opponents. Suppose
players simply disclose such partially informative signals to each other, then players'
welfare should be even higher than when they spy on each other because they can
now avoid the cost of spying.
The model in Section 1.2 can be modiﬁed to study information disclosure in
contests where each player commits to disclose a noisy signal about her own valuation
to the opponent. Contrary to the spying situation where player i chooses αi, i.e.
the accuracy of the signal regarding the opponent's valuation θj, in the information
disclosure situation player i chooses the accuracy αj of the signal regarding her own
valuation θi. Players can observe the accuracies of both signals. However, player i
does not observe any realization of the signal she discloses  only her opponent does.
A supplier competing for a procurement contract may allow the opponent to conduct
some independent research/investigation on its production process, materials used
in the proposal, or other information relevant to the bidding process. The supplier
i controls the materials to be shared with the opponent, i.e. αj, but the results of
the investigation is not observable to supplier i, i.e. pij.
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The timing of the information disclosure game is given in the Figure 1.12. In de-
scribing the timing, let i = 1, 2 and j = 2, 1. Firstly, player j chooses the accuracy αi
for the signal to be received by his opponent, player i. Secondly, Nature determines
valuation proﬁle according to the prior distribution and both players observes their
own valuations. Thirdly, Nature determines signal realization pii according to θj and
αi and player i observes it. Finally, player i chooses eﬀort bi based on her private
20In the patent race example, companies may disclose information by allowing each other to
investigate internal research materials, chemicals, run some experiments, or provide a prototype
of their product. The company who discloses the information decides what kind of investigation
the opponent can conduct, yet the result of investigation is not observable to it. In the lobbying
example, lobbying ﬁrms representing diﬀerent companies may disclose the CVs or backgrounds of
their lobbyists to each other, yet they don't know how the opponent will interpret these information.
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information (θi, pii). Note that the diﬀerence between information disclosure and
spying is only in that the accuracy of the signal regarding the opponent is chosen
by the opponent instead of the player.
chooses αi player i observes θi player i observes pii chooses bi
Player j Nature determines and Nature determines and Player i
Figure 1.12: Timing of information disclosure in the contest (i = 1, 2; j = 2, 1)
Since the accuracy proﬁle (αi, αj) is common knowledge, the ﬁrst step of solv-
ing the information disclosure game is to ﬁnd the equilibrium eﬀort when players
exogenously receive signals with diﬀerent accuracies for free. In other words, an
"asymmetric version" of Proposition 1.
1.4.1 The contest with exogenous asymmetric accuracy
Suppose each player receives a signal about the opponent, and the exogenously
given accuracy of player 1's signal is α1 whereas that of player 2's signal is α2, where
α1 6= α2, i.e. the accuracy is asymmetric. Denoted by bil(pi, αi, αj) and bih(pi, αi, αj)
the eﬀorts of type (θl, pi) and (θh, pi) respectively, when player i's accuracy is αi and
the opponent's accuracy is αj. Similar to the symmetric α case, the monotonicity
of player i's eﬀort in equilibrium depends on her valuation, see Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. Suppose α1 6= α2, then in any allocative eﬃcient, pure strategy equilib-
rium of the contest, the following must be true for both players:
1. Monotonicity: the type (θh, pi) of player i's eﬀort is non-decreasing in pi and
the type (θl, pi) of player i's eﬀort is non-increasing in pi;
2. Continuity: both players' strategies are continuous without any atom;
3. Common support: b1l(1, α1, α2) = b2l(1, α2, α1) and b1h(1, α1, α2) = b2h(1, α2, α1);
4. Initial conditions: b1l(1, α1, α2) = b2l(1, α2, α1) = 0 and b1l(0, α1, α2) = b1h(0, α1, α2) =
b2l(0, α2, α1) = b2h(0, α2, α1).
Part 1 of Lemma 5 implies type (θl, 1) of both players chooses the lowest eﬀort, 0,
and type (θh, 1) of both players choose the highest eﬀort, in the allocative eﬃcient,
pure strategy equilibrium. Part 3 of Lemma 5 indicates the upper bound of each
valuation of player must be the same. Part 4 is useful later in solving the equilibrium
eﬀort and in proving the uniqueness of such an equilibrium.
Lemma 6 below provides the necessary conditions for any symmetric, pure strat-
egy and allocative eﬃcient equilibrium to exist.
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Lemma 6 (Eﬃciency). Suppose α1 6= α2, then there exists a symmetric, pure strat-
egy, allocative eﬃcient equilibrium in the contest only if fh(pi,αi)
fl(pi,αi)
> θl
θh
for all pi ∈ [0, 1]
and i = 1, 2.
In fact, this condition is also the suﬃcient condition for the existence of such
an equilibrium, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4. This contest is ex ante
asymmetric in the sense that players' accuracy of signals about the opponent are
diﬀerent. However, this does not mean that the equilibrium eﬀort strategy must be
asymmetric.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to the symmetric, pure strategy and alloca-
tive eﬃcient equilibrium, thus we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3.
fh(pi, αi)
fl(pi, αi)
> θl
θh
, for all pi ∈ [0, 1] and i = 1, 2.
Assumption 3 restricts the accuracy of both players' signal for the similar reason
as the symmetric case, i.e. α1 = α2.
We now derive the equilibrium of the contest given α1 6= α2. Denote b−1il (b, αi, αj)
and b−1ih (b, αi, αj) the inverse eﬀort strategy of the low and the high valuation types
of player i. According to Lemma 5, the expected payoﬀ for type (θl, pi) and (θh, pi)
of player j when choosing an eﬀort b can be written as Uj(b|θl, pi) and Uj(b|θh, pi)
respectively:
Uj(b|θl, pi) = θl[1− µ(pi, αj)]
∫ 1
b−1il (b,αi,αj)
fl(Π, αi)dΠ− b
Uj(b|θh, pi) = θh
[
(1− µ(pi, αj)) + µ(pi, αj)
∫ b−1ih (b,αi,αj)
0
fh(Π, αi)dΠ
]
− b
By the ﬁrst order approach and the initial conditions provided in part 4 of Lemma
5, the equilibrium strategy in the contest can be derived, as shown in Proposition 4
following.
Proposition 4. If Assumption 3 is satisﬁed, then the unique pure strategy, allocative
eﬃcient equilibrium of the contest is given by:
bil(pi, αi, αj) = θl
∫ 1
pi
[1− µ (Π, αi)] dFl(Π, αj)
bih(pi, αi, αj) = θh
∫ pi
0
µ (Π, αi) dFh(Π, αj) + θl
∫ 1
0
[1− µ (Π, αi)] dFl(Π, αj)
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where i = 1, 2 and j = 2, 1.
Recall that 1− µ(·, αi) = plfl(·, αi) and µ(·, αi) = phfh(·, αi), we can then make
the following observation:
Observation 3. The equilibrium eﬀort given in Proposition 4 is symmetric, in
particular:
bil(pi, αi, αj) = bjl(pi, αj, αi) and bih(pi, αi, αj) = bjh(pi, αj, αi)
This also suggests the probability that type (θh, pii) wins against the high val-
uation opponent is equal to the probability of pii > pij, and the probability that
type (θl, pii) wins against the low valuation opponent is equal to the probability of
pii < pij.
To gain some intuition, suppose type (θl, pi) of player i increases her eﬀort from
bil(pi, αi, αj) to bil(z, αi, αj) which costs her an additional eﬀort of θl
∫ pi
z
[1− µ (Π, αi)]
dFl(Π, αj), according to Proposition 4. This increases her probability of winning by
[1− µ(pi, αi)]
∫ pi
z
dFl(Π, αj). At the optimum the cost must be equal to the gain, i.e.
θl
∫ pi
z
[1− µ (Π, αi)] dFl(Π, αj) = θl[1− µ(pi, αi)]
∫ pi
z
dFl(Π, αj) (1.7)
which is only true when z = pi, implies optimality of bil(pi, αi, αj). Similarly, if type
(θh, pi) of player i increases her eﬀort from bih(pi, αi, αj) to bih(z, αi, αj) which costs
her an additional eﬀort of θh
∫ z
pi
µ (Π, αi) dFh(Π, αj). This increases her probability of
winning by µ(pi, αi)
∫ z
pi
dFh(Π, αj). Again, at the optimum the cost of the additional
eﬀort must match the gain:
θh
∫ z
pi
µ (Π, αi) dFh(Π, αj) = θhµ(pi, αi)
∫ z
pi
dFh(Π, αj) (1.8)
which is only true when pi = z, implies optimality of bih(pi, αi, αj).
Based on Proposition 4, the sensitivity of player i's eﬀort to pi depends on both
her own and the opponent's accuracies, αi and αj respectively, see Corollary 7.
Corollary 7 (Sensitivity). When either αi or αj increases, the slope of bih(pi, αi, αj)
and bil(pi, αi, αj) are decreased for pi < pi
+, and are increased for pi > pi+.
When αi increases, player i's eﬀort choice becomes more sensitive to changes of
pi, similar as in Corollary 2. However, when αj increases, that is, player j's signal
becomes more informative, player i's eﬀort choice also becomes more sensitive to pi.
This is because player i also knows αj and thus, anticipates the eﬀect on player j's
eﬀort, so she has to adjust her own eﬀort in response.
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To see the intuition, consider the gain from increasing the eﬀort by type (θl, pi)
of player i, i.e. θl[1−µ(pi, αi)]
∫ pi
z
dFl(Π, αj). When αj increases, i.e. the opponent's
signal becomes more informative, this gain is increased for pi, z ∈ (0, pi+) and is
decreased for pi, z ∈ (pi+, 1), as the probability that the opponent's signal realization,
pij lies in the former interval is larger but the probability that pij lies in the latter
interval is smaller. Since in equilibrium the gain must be equal to the cost, as shown
in (1.7), the cost of additional eﬀort by player i, bil(z, αi, αj) − bil(pi, αi, αj), must
also be increased for pi, z ∈ (0, pi+) and decreased for pi, z ∈ (pi+, 1). Fixing pi−z, the
slope of bil(pi, αi, αj) must be steeper in pi, z ∈ (0, pi+) and ﬂatter in pi, z ∈ (pi+, 1).
The intuition for the sensitivity of bih(pi, αi, αj) is similar and can be derived by
referring back to (1.8).
As one might expect, each player's ex ante expected payoﬀ in this contest with
asymmetric accuracy is again higher than when none of the players receive any signal
about the opponent.
Proposition 5. When α1 6= α2 ∈ (α, α) and suppose Assumption 3 is satisﬁed, then
Vi(αi, αj) > Vi(α, α)
The intuition is similar as in the symmetric exogenous accuracy setting. Next
we turn to the information disclosure of players. We ﬁrst show that if players set
up an information disclosure agreement, then they are both better oﬀ.
1.4.2 Disclosure agreement
The players in an information disclosure agreement commit to simultaneously dis-
close a signal to the opponent with pre-speciﬁed accuracy. Here we focus on the
symmetric agreement where the accuracies of the signals are the same. We refer to
the disclosure agreement where players commit to disclose signals with accuracy α
as the "information disclosure agreement α". The following result suggests that an
agreement to disclose partially informative signals is beneﬁcial to both players.
Proposition 6. Any information disclosure agreement α ∈ (α, α) makes player i
(i = 1, 2) strictly better oﬀ than no disclosure agreement or full disclosure agreement,
i.e. Vi(α, α) > Vi(α, α) = Vi(α, α).
The proof follows directly from that of Proposition 3, thus omitted. When
both players obey the agreement and discloses a partially informative signal to
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the opponent, they can then coordinate the eﬀorts and thus earn higher expected
payoﬀs. Note that the disclosure agreement is only proﬁtable if the signals are
partially informative. This suggests that there is some loss of generality to only
consider full disclosure and full concealment.
Would players obey the disclosure agreement if there is no external enforcement?
In other words, if players choose disclosure strategies to maximize their expected
payoﬀs, do we have the same outcome as in the disclosure agreement equilibrium?
1.4.3 Endogenous information disclosure
To solve the equilibrium disclosure decision, (α∗j , α
∗
i ), note that players' equilibrium
eﬀorts are the ones shown in Proposition 4. Thus, player i chooses αj to maximize
her equilibrium expected payoﬀ in the contest, denoted by Vi(αi, αj), given αi, i.e. αj
is chosen to best response to αi. The best response function of player i is derived by
the ﬁrst order condition of her equilibrium expected payoﬀ in the contest, Vi(αi, αj),
w.r.t. αj:
∂Vi(αi, αj)
∂αj
=
∫ 1
0
[
θh +
θl
pl
θh − θl − fh(Π, αi)
(
θh +
phθl
pl
θh − θl − Π
)
− Fh(Π, αi)
]
∂fh(Π, αj)
∂αj
dΠ = 0
(1.9)
It then follows that no player would obey the information disclosure agreement
α ∈ (α, α̂] as it is strictly dominant to choose α when the opponent chooses α > α.
See Lemma 7 below.
Lemma 7. If player j chooses αi ∈ (α, α̂]21, then player i strictly prefers to choose
αj = α.
Player i wants to avoid the motivation eﬀect and take advantage of the demoti-
vation eﬀect on the opponent. Speciﬁcally, type (θh, pi) of player i ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to lower the accuracy of the signal she discloses, as then the high valuation oppo-
nent is relatively more likely to receive low realizations. Similarly, type (θl, pi) of
player i also ﬁnds it proﬁtable to lower the accuracy of the signal she discloses, as
then the low valuation opponent is relatively more likely to receive high realizations.
Therefore, player i earns higher expected payoﬀ ex ante by decreasing the accuracy
of the signal she discloses to the opponent.
This interpretation can be demonstrated formally. Denoted by Vi(θh, pi, αi, αj)
and Vi(θl, pi, αi, αj) player i's equilibrium expected payoﬀ when she is type (θh, pi) and
(θl, pi), respectively. The intuition of the above result can be shown by rearranging
21Recall that α̂ is the highest possible accuracy given that the equilibrium is allocative eﬃcient.
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Vi(θh, pi, αi, αj):
Vi(θh, pi, αi, αj) = phθh
∫ pi
0
[fh(pi, αi)− fh(Π, αi)] dFh(Π, αj)
−plθl
∫ 1
0
fl(Π, αi)dFl(Π, αj) + plθhfl(pi, αi) (1.10)
By the deﬁnition of rotation order, the larger αi is, the larger gap between fh(pi, αi)
and fh(Π, αi) in (1.10). Fixing αi, this gap is also larger for higher realizations
Π, when Π ∈ [0, pi], see Figure 1.13. It is thus proﬁtable for player i to lower
the distribution of the opponent's signal, Fh(Π, αj), stochastically. In other words,
player i has an incentive to lower the accuracy of the signal she discloses to the
opponent.22 Therefore, it is then optimal for player i to choose αj = α, i.e. to
disclose an uninformative signal to the opponent.
The similar interpretation can be applied to the type (θl, pi) of player i's disclosure
decision. Her equilibrium expected payoﬀ is rewritten as in (1.11):
Vi(θl, pi, αi, αj) = plθl
∫ 1
pi
[fl(pi, αi)− fl(Π, αi)] fl(Π, αj)dΠ (1.11)
The larger αi is, the larger gap between fl(pi, αi) and fl(Π, αi) is. Note that this gap
is larger for higher realizations Π, when Π ∈ [pi, 1]. See Figure 1.14. Thus, ﬁxing
αi > α, it is proﬁtable for player i to increase the distribution of the opponent's
signal, fl(Π, αj), stochastically. Thus, it is optimal for player i to choose αj = α,
i.e. to disclose an uninformative signal to the opponent. When αi = α, i.e. the
fh(Π, αi)
Πpi
fh(pi, αi)
fh(Π, αi)
Figure 1.13
fl(Π, α)
Πpi
fl(pi, αi)
fl(Π, αi)
Figure 1.14
22The second term in (1.10), i.e. −plθl
∫ 1
0
fl(Π, αi)dFl(Π, αj), also becomes larger when αj
decreases as fl(Π, αi) is decreasing in Π when αi > α.
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opponent discloses to player i an uninformative signal, then by (1.10) and (1.11),
Vi(θh, pi, αi, αj) and Vi(θl, pi, αi, αj) becomes constants, and player i is indiﬀerent
about the accuracy of the signal she discloses to the opponent. This suggests when
the opponent discloses an uninformative signal, then player i is indiﬀerent about the
accuracy of the signal she discloses. This result is shown in Lemma 8 below.
Lemma 8. When the player j chooses αi = α, i.e. discloses an uninformative
signal, then the disclosure decision of player i is irrelevant to his own expected payoﬀ,
as Vi(αi = α, αj) = phpl (θh − θl) for all αj ∈ [α, α̂].
Both player's strategy are ex ante uniform. In other words, when player i ob-
serves an uninformative signal, she would expect the distribution of the opponent's
eﬀort is uniformly distributed, the same as in the IPV setting. This implies the best
response of player i is to choose eﬀort as if she is in the IPV setting. This then
explains why her expected payoﬀ is the same as in the IPV setting.
Lemma 7 and 8 jointly imply the following result.
Proposition 7. There does not exist any equilibrium in which both player disclose
an informative signal.
Even though disclosing private information can improve total welfare, the in-
dustry cannot rely on decentralized information disclosure by players. Nevertheless,
the regulator may be able to set up a minimum information disclosure requirement
which speciﬁes the accuracies of signals that players should disclose.
1.5 Conclusion
When players spy on each other, the additional information about the opponent
allows them to coordinate, i.e. only exert higher eﬀort when it is more likely that
the opponent is evenly matched with the player. Such a coordination improves
players' welfare even taking the cost of spying into account. This, however, is only
true when spying is costly so that players acquire partially informative signals. An
information disclosure agreement in which players commit to disclose a partially
informative signal to each other can achieve an even better outcome, as the cost
on spying is saved. However, players would unilaterally deviate by disclosing an
uninformative signal if there is no external power to enforce the agreement. This
is due to the incentive of players to avoid the motivation eﬀect and to induce the
demotivation eﬀect on the opponent.
This paper yields diﬀerential policy implications dependent on nature of contests.
For contests with wasteful eﬀorts, e.g., rent-seeking, patent race and lobbying, it is
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advisable for regulators to impose a minimum disclosure requirement which speciﬁes
the minimum accuracy of signals players disclose to each other. For contests with
productive eﬀorts, e.g., sports tournaments, promotion contests and sales competi-
tions, banning spying and disclosure maximizes total eﬀort.
The model can potentially be extended in diﬀerent directions. Firstly, the distri-
bution of valuations may be generalized to a continuous distribution. Secondly, the
model can be twisted a little to study overt information acquisition in which players
are aware of the accuracy of the opponent's spying signal. Finally, the model can
also be extended to contests with n players, and each player receives n − 1 sig-
nals regarding the opponents' valuations. In order to facilitate the analysis, more
restrictions may be imposed on the signal distribution.
1.6 Appendix: proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Since now we consider α as exogenously given, we simplify the notations
of eﬀort strategy bh(pi, α) and bl(pi, α) into bh(pi) and bl(pi) respectively, and the
posterior belief µ(pi, α) into µ(pi). We start by proving part 1 of the lemma. Suppose
in a symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium with eﬃcient allocation, we have bh(pi1) <
bh(pi2) for pi1 > pi2. Then it must be true that the type (θh, pi1) ﬁnds the cost of
increasing her eﬀort from bh(pi1) to bh(pi2) dominates the gain from such an increase
of eﬀort, formally:
bh(pi2)− bh(pi1) > µ(pi1) Pr{bh(pi1) 6 bj < bh(pi2)}θh.
where bj is the opponent, player j's eﬀort. The cost must outweigh the gain to
prevent type (θh, pi1) from deviating to bh(pi2). However, type (θh, pi2)'s gain must
outweigh her cost of such an increase of eﬀort:
bh(pi2)− bh(pi1) 6 µ(pi2) Pr{bh(pi1) 6 bj < bh(pi2)}θh.
where bj is the opponent's eﬀort. Combining the two conditions, we have µ(pi2) >
µ(pi1) which contradicts the fact that pi1 > pi2, due to Assumption 1. A similar
argument can prove that bl(pi1) 6 bl(pi2) for any pi1 > pi2.
To prove continuity of the strategies, i.e. the part 2 of the lemma, suppose there
exists a discontinuous point on bh(pi), say pˆi ∈ (0, 1), such that bh(pˆi) < bh(pˆi+ ) for
an arbitrarily small . Then type (θh, pˆi+ ) will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate to some
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bˆ ∈ (bh(pˆi), bh(pˆi+ )). Similarly, suppose there exists a discontinuous point on bl(pi),
p˜i ∈ (0, 1), such that bl(p˜i) > bl(p˜i + ) for arbitrarily small . Then type (θl, p˜i) will
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate to some b˜ ∈ (bl(p˜i + ), bl(p˜i)).
To prove that there is no atom on any player's eﬀort, suppose there exists p and
q such that 1 > q > p > 0 and that bh(x) = b where x ∈ [p, q] and b is a constant.
Then type (θh, p− ) will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate to choosing b+ , as the gain
of such deviation will be µ(p − ) ∫ q
p
fh(Π)dΠ and the cost is negligible when  is
arbitrarily small. A similar argument can show that there is no atom on bl(pi).
Finally, for part 3, given part 1 is true, type (θh, 0) chooses the lowest eﬀort
among all types with valuation θh, whereas type (θl, 0) chooses the highest among
all types with valuation θl. If bh(0) > bl(0) then type (θh, 0) will be strictly better
oﬀ by lowering her eﬀort by a small amount  satisfying bh(0) −  > bl(0), thus
bh(0) = bl(0). Again, by part 1, the lowest eﬀort is made by type (θl, 1) among all
types, thus any positive eﬀort is strictly dominated by choosing zero for (θl, 1).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Note that allocative eﬃciency implies bh(pi, α) > bl(pi, α) for all pi ∈ [0, 1]
ﬁxing α, and the probability of tie between a high valuation and a low valuation
player is zero. Then the type (θh, pii)'s incentive compatibility condition such that
she has no incentive to deviate to bl(pii, α), implies that:
bh(pii, α)− bl(pii, α)
6 [µ(pii, α)Pr{bj < bh(pii, α)|(θh, θh)}+ [1− µ(pii, α)]Pr{bj > bl(pii, α)|(θh, θl)}] θh
= µ(pii, α)
∫ pii
0
fh(Π, α)θhdΠ + (1− µ(pii, α))
∫ pii
0
fh(Π, α)θhdΠ
=
∫ pii
0
fh(Π, α)θhdΠ (1.12)
In other words, the cost saved from choosing the lower eﬀort (LHS of (1.12)) must
be less than the gain forgone (RHS of (1.12)). This ensures that type (θh, pii) does
not want to deviate to choosing bh(pi, α). However, type (θl, pii) should ﬁnd her cost
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saved by choosing the lower eﬀort outweighs her gain forgone:
bh(pii, α)− bl(pii, α)
> [µ(pii, α)Pr{bj < bh(pii, α)|(θl, θh)}+ (1− µ(pii, α))Pr{bj > bl(pii, α)|(θl, θl)}θl
= µ(pii, α)
∫ pii
0
fl(Π, α)θldΠ + (1− µ(pii, α))
∫ pii
0
fl(Π, α)θldΠ
=
∫ pii
0
fl(Π, α)θldΠ
Combining the two conditions:∫ pii
0
fh(Π, α)θhdΠ >
∫ pii
0
fl(Π, α)θldΠ
we then have fh(pi,α)
fl(pi,α)
> θl
θh
for all pii ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proposition is proved by checking whether type (θh, pi) ((θl, pi)) would
deviate to any eﬀort outside of their equilibrium support. Here we only show the
idea of the proof by proving that the type (θh, pi) of player i does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to deviate to any eﬀort that the type (θl, pi) might choose in the allocative eﬃcient
equilibrium. The rest of the proofs are available in the online appendix.
We will refer to the interval [bl(1, α), bl(0, α)], i.e. the equilibrium support of low
valuation types, as the "low pure support", and refer to the interval [bh(0, α), bh(1, α)],
i.e. the equilibrium support of high valuation types, as the "high pure support".
Let's start by checking whether the type (θh, pi) of player i ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
deviate to any eﬀort in the low pure support. This requires a comparison of the
type (θh, pi) of player i's expected payoﬀ in the allocative eﬃcient equilibrium:
V (θh, pi, α) = θh
∫ pi
0
[µ(pi, α)− µ(Π, α)] fh(Π, α)dΠ
+
∫ 1
0
{[1− µ(pi, α)] θh − [1− µ(Π, α)] θl} fl(Π, α)dΠ,
to the maximum expected payoﬀ from deviation. When deviating to β ∈ [bl(1, α), bl(0, α)],
the expected payoﬀ of the type (θh, pi) of player i given that the player j plays the
allocative eﬃcient equilibrium bl(pi, α) as given in the proposition is:
U˜ l(β|θh, pi, α) = θh [1− µ(pi, α)]
∫ 1
b−1l (β,α)
fh(Π, α)dΠ− β. (1.13)
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Obviously, among all β ∈ [bl(1, α), bl(0, α)], player i would prefer to deviate to the
optimal eﬀort: β∗ = arg maxβ U˜(β|θh, pi). The optimal deviation eﬀort, β∗, can be
found by the ﬁrst order condition with respect to β. Let the type (θl, t) be the one
who chooses β∗ in equilibrium, i.e. bl(t, α) = β∗. We can ﬁnd t by the FOC of
U˜ l(β|θh, pi) w.r.t β, and rearrange:
1− µ(pi, α) = θl
θh
fl(t, α)
fh(t, α)
(1− µ(t, α)) (1.14)
Note that both sides are decreasing functions of their arguments, pi and t, respec-
tively. Since θl
θh
fl(t,α)
fh(t,α)
6 1, thus pi > t. Then there must exists ŝ ∈ [0, 1] such
that
1− µ(ŝ, α) ≡ θl
θh
fl(0, α)
fh(0, α)
[1− µ(0, α)] (1.15)
For pi < ŝ, the LHS of the equation (1.14) is always strictly larger than the RHS,
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. This implies the ﬁrst order derivative is positive and thus type
(θh, pi) does not want to deviate to the low pure support, whenever pi < ŝ. On the
other hand, if pi > ŝ, there is always a unique interior solution of t ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
equation (1.14) given pi. In this case, we need to directly compare the equilibrium
payoﬀ with the payoﬀ of choosing β∗. The maximum deviation expected payoﬀ can
be calculated by plugging β∗ into (1.13). The ﬁrst order derivative of the diﬀerence
between the equilibrium expected payoﬀ and the maximum deviation payoﬀ, i.e.
V (θh, pi, α)− U˜ l(β∗|θh, pi, α), w.r.t pi, is, in fact, non-negative:
∂
(
V (θh, pi, α)− U˜(β∗|θh, pi, α)
)
∂pi
= θhµ
′(pi, α)
(∫ pi
0
fh(Π, α)dΠ−
∫ t
0
fh(Π, α)dΠ
)
> 0
This suggests this diﬀerence is non-decreasing in pi. By (1.15) it can be proved
that V (θh, ŝ) − U˜(bl(0, α)|θh, pi) = θhµ′(ŝ, α)
∫ ŝ
0
fh(Π, α)dΠ > 0. Thus, V (θh, pi) −
U˜(β∗|θh, pi) > 0 for all pi ∈ [ŝ, 1]. Therefore, type (θh, pi) does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to deviate from equilibrium strategy.
In the ineﬃcient equilibrium, the proof involves checking whether the type who
plays pure strategy ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate to the mixed strategy support and
vice versa. The uniqueness of both the allocative eﬃcient and ineﬃcient equilibrium
are due to the initial conditions given in the Lemma 1.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the corollary is obvious after taking the ﬁrst order derivative
of bh(pi, α) and bl(pi, α) w.r.t α, thus is omitted. Here we show the calculation of
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∂pi∗
∂α
. Rewrite equation (1.5) in Proposition 1 to
∫ pi∗
0
[fl(Π, α)θl − fh(Π, α)θh] dΠ = 0
and take ﬁrst order derivative w.r.t α, we have
∂pi∗
∂α
=
∫ pi∗
0
[
∂fh(Π,α)
∂α
θh − ∂fl(Π,α)∂α θl
]
dΠ
fl(pi∗, α)θl − fh(pi∗, α)θh
Since
∫ pi∗
0
∂fh(Π,α)
∂α
dΠ < 0 and
∫ pi∗
0
∂fl(Π,α)
∂α
dΠ > 0, and by (1.6) we have fl(pi
∗, α)θl −
fh(pi
∗, α)θh < 0 (as pi∗ > pi+ according to (1.5)), it must be true that ∂pi
∗
∂α
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose player j chooses αj = α and (wrongly) believes that player i has
chosen the same, yet player i instead chooses αi = η. Thus, player j plays the
symmetric equilibrium given in Propositions 1. To prove that the marginal expected
payoﬀ from increasing η by player i in this situation is positive, i.e. AMR(η, α) > 0,
we ﬁrst ﬁnd the maximum expected payoﬀ of each type of player i. We will refer
to the interval [bl(1, α), bl(0, α)], i.e. the equilibrium support of low valuation types,
as the "low pure support"; and refer to the interval [bh(0, α), bh(1, α)], i.e. the
equilibrium support of high valuation types, as the "high pure support". Denoted
by Uk(b|θi, pii, η, α) the expected payoﬀ of the type (θi, pii) of player i chooses b in
the equilibrium support of types with θk (k ∈ {h, l}) when player j chooses α and
believes that player i has chosen the same, whereas player i, in fact, chooses η.
Denoted by V k(θi, pii, η, α) where k ∈ {h, l}, the maximum of Uk(b|θi, pii, η, α).
First, we focus on the case when α 6 α̂, i.e. when player j will play the sym-
metric, pure strategy equilibrium with eﬃcient allocation. Note that both the type
(θh, pi) and the type (θl, pi) of player i may choose an optimal eﬀort in either the high
or the low pure support, dependent on which interval would provide them higher
expected payoﬀ.
Speciﬁcally, if type (θh, pi) of player i chooses an eﬀort in the high pure support,
then her expected payoﬀ is:
Uh(b|θh, pi, η, α) = θh
[
1− µ(pi, η) + µ(pi, η)
∫ b−1h (b,α)
0
fh(Π, α)dΠ
]
− b. (1.16)
where b−1h (b, α) is the inverse of the equilibrium pure strategy that player j plays.
By the ﬁrst order condition w.r.t b we know that the type (θh, pi) of player i must
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ﬁnd it optimal to choose bh(s, α) where s satisﬁes fh(pi, η) = fh(s, α), which also
implies fl(pi, η) = fl(s, α). In other words,
s = f−1h (fh(pi, η), α) = f
−1
l (fl(pi, η), α) (1.17)
When η < α, by deﬁnition of rotation order, there always exists an s satisfying
(1.17) for all pi ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the maximum expected payoﬀ for type (θh, pi)
when she chooses the optimal eﬀort in the high pure support is given by:
V h(θh, pi, η, α) = θh
∫ s
0
[µ(pi, η)− µ (Π, α)] fh(Π, α)dΠ + [1− µ(pi, η)] θh
−θl
∫ 1
0
[1− µ (Π, α)] fl(Π, α)dΠ
Suppose instead that type (θh, pi) of player i chooses an eﬀort in the low pure
support, then her expected payoﬀ is:
U l(b|θh, pi, η, α) = θh [1− µ(pi, η)]
∫ 1
b−1l (b,α)
fh(Π, α)dΠ− b (1.18)
where b−1l (b, α) is the inverse of the equilibrium pure strategy that player j will play.
The ﬁrst order condition w.r.t b requires:
fl(pi, η) =
fl(ŝ, α)
fh(ŝ, α)
θl
θh
fl(ŝ, α)
meaning that player i would ﬁnd it optimal to exert an eﬀort bl(ŝ, α) when she
chooses η. Note that fl(s, α) = fl(pi, η) < fl(ŝ, α), thus, s > ŝ. The maximum
expected payoﬀ for the type (θh, pi) when choosing an eﬀort level in the low pure
support is thus,
V l(θh, pi, η, α) = θh [1− µ(pi, η)]
∫ 1
ŝ
fh(Π, α)dΠ− θl
∫ 1
ŝ
[1− µ (Π, α)] fl(Π, α)dΠ
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The diﬀerence between the two maximum expected payoﬀs is
V h(θh, pi, η, α)− V l(θh, pi, η, α)
= θh
∫ s
0
µ(s, α)− µ (Π, α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 fh(Π, α)dΠ
+θh
∫ ŝ
0
[
[1− µ(pi, η)]− [1− µ (Π, α)] fl(Π, α)
fh(Π, α)
θl
θh
]
fh(Π, α)dΠ
> θh
∫ s
0
[µ(pi, η)− µ (Π, α)] fh(Π, α)dΠ + θh
∫ ŝ
0
[µ (Π, α)− µ(pi, η)] fh(Π, α)dΠ
> θh
∫ ŝ
0
[µ(pi, η)− µ (Π, α)] fh(Π, α)dΠ + θh
∫ ŝ
0
[µ (Π, α)− µ(pi, η)] fh(Π, α)dΠ
= 0
Therefore, type (θh, pi) of player i's expected payoﬀ when choosing η is V
h(θh, pi, η, α),
and thus, the marginal expected payoﬀ from increasing η is given by
∂
∂η
V h(θh, pi, η, α) = −phθh∂fh(pi, η)
∂η
∫ 1
s
fh(Π, α)dΠ
Now we turn to the types with the low valuation. If type (θl, pi) of player i chooses
an eﬀort in the low pure support, i.e. [bl(1, α), bl(0, α)], then her expected payoﬀ is:
U l(b|θl, pi, η, α) = θl [1− µ(pi, η)]
∫ 1
b−1l (b,,α)
fl(Π, α)dΠ− b (1.19)
where b−1l (b, , α) is the inverse of the equilibrium pure strategy that player j will
play. By the ﬁrst order condition w.r.t b we know that the type (θl, pi) of player
i should optimally choose bl(t, α) where t satisﬁes fl(pi, η) = fl(t, α), which also
implies fh(pi, η) = fh(t, α). In other words,
t = f−1h (fh(pi, η), α) = f
−1
l (fl(pi, η), α). (1.20)
Note that (1.17) and (1.20) suggests t = s. When η < α, by deﬁnition of rota-
tion order, there always exists t and s satisfy (1.20) and (1.17) for all pi ∈ [0, 1],
respectively. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ for the type (θl, pi) is given by:
V l(θl, pi, η, α) = θl
∫ 1
t
[µ (Π, α)− µ(pi, η)] fl(Π, α)dΠ
Suppose instead that type (θl, pi) of player i chooses an eﬀort in the high pure
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support, i.e. [bh(0, α), bh(1, α)], then her maximum expected payoﬀ is:
V h(θl, pi, η, α) = phθl
∫ t̂
0
[
fh(pi, η)− fh(Π, α)fh(Π, α)
fl(Π, α)
θh
θl
]
fl(Π, α)dΠ
+phθl
∫ 1
0
[fh (Π, α)− fh(pi, η)] fl(Π, α)dΠ
Again, we need to compare the two maximum expected payoﬀ to determine whether
type (θl, pi) of player i should choose an eﬀort in [bl(1, α), bl(0, α)] or [bh(0, α), bh(1, α)].
It turns out that the former earns the type (θl, pi) higher expected payoﬀ:
V h(θl, pi, η, α)
= phθl
∫ t̂
0
[
fh(pi, η)− fh(Π, α)fh(Π, α)
fl(Π, α)
θh
θl
]
fl(Π, α)dΠ
+phθl
∫ t
0
[fh (Π, α)− fh(pi, η)] fl(Π, α)dΠ + phθl
∫ 1
t
[fh (Π, α)− fh(pi, η)] fl(Π, α)dΠ
< phθl
∫ t
0
[
1− fh(Π, α)
fl(Π, α)
θh
θl
]
fh (Π, α) fl(Π, α)dΠ + phθl
∫ 1
t
[fh (Π, α)− fh(pi, η)] fl(Π, α)dΠ
< phθl
∫ 1
t
(fh (Π, α)− fh(pi, η)) fl(Π, α)dΠ
= V l(θl, pi, η, α)
Therefore, type (θl, pi) of player i's expected payoﬀ is V
l(θl, pi, η, α), and thus, the
marginal expected payoﬀ from increasing η is given by
∂
∂η
V l(θl, pi, η, α) = −phθl∂fh(pi, η)
∂η
∫ 1
t
fl(Π, α)dΠ
Now, it can be proved that the ex ante marginal expected payoﬀ from increasing η
is positive:
AMR(η, α) =
∫ 1
0
[
pl
∂
∂η
V l(θl, pi, η, α) + ph
∂
∂η
V h(θh, pi, η, α)
]
dpi
= −ph
∫ 1
0
plθl ∫ 1
t
fl(Π, α)dΠ + phθh
∫ 1
s
fh(Π, α)dΠ︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
 ∂fh(pi, η)∂η dpi
= ph
[
plθl
∫ 1
ν
fl(Π, α)dΠ + phθh
∫ 1
ν
fh(Π, α)dΠ
] ∫ 1
pi+
∂fh(pi, η)
∂η
dpi
−ph
[
plθl
∫ 1
ξ
fl(Π, α)dΠ + phθh
∫ 1
ξ
fh(Π, α)dΠ
] ∫ 1
pi+
∂fh(pi, η)
∂η
dpi
> 0
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where ν ∈ [0, pi+] and ξ ∈ [pi+, 1]. Recall that s = t which is why the third equality is
true. Note that by deﬁnition of rotation order, − ∫ pi+
0
∂fh(pi,η)
∂η
dpi =
∫ 1
pi+
∂fh(pi,η)
∂η
dpi >
0, and also that the term A is decreasing with s and t. Thus, by applying the
intermediate value theorem for integrals, we have the inequality given at the end.
We have proved that AMR(η, α) > 0 given that α 6 α̂. The proof for the part
when α 6 α̂ follows the same idea, i.e. by checking for proﬁtable deviation. This
part of the proof is omitted and is available in the online appendix.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Recall from Section 1.2, when the signals players receive are perfectly in-
formative, we have fh(pii, α) = 0 if pii 6 pl and fh(pii, α) = 1ph if pii > pl; and
correspondingly, that fl(pii, α) =
1
pl
if pii 6 pl and fl(pii, α) = 0 if pii > pl. The
notations of this proof follows from Lemma 3.
When type (θl, pi) of player i chooses an eﬀort in the low pure support, the
expected payoﬀ given that player j playing the symmetric equilibrium in the contest
with exogenously given α is:
U l(b|θl, pi, η, α) = θl [1− µ(pi, η)]
∫ 1
b−1l (b,α)
fl(Π, α)dΠ− b
= 0
When type (θl, pi) of player i chooses an eﬀort in the mixed support, the expected
payoﬀ is
Um(θl, pi, η, α) = θl
∫ 1
pi∗
(µ(pi, η)− µ (Π, α)) fl(Π, α)dΠ
= 0
When the type (θl, pi) of player i chooses an eﬀort in the high pure support, the
expected payoﬀ is:
Uh(b|θl, pi, η, α) = θl
[
1− µ(pi, η) + µ(pi, η)
∫ b−1h (b,α)
0
fl(Π, α)dΠ
]
− b
The ﬁrst order derivative of Uh(b|θl, pi, η, α) w.r.t. b is:
fh(pi, η)fl(ŝ, α)θl
fh(ŝ, α)fh(ŝ, α)θh
− 1 < 0 (1.21)
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Thus, the type (θl, pi) of player i does not want to choose any eﬀort in the high pure
support. She ﬁnds it optimal to choose an eﬀort in the mixed support and thus, her
maximum expected payoﬀ is zero.
Now we turn to type (θh, pi) of player i's optimal eﬀort given she chooses η. When
she chooses an eﬀort in the high pure support, the expected payoﬀ is:
Uh(b|θh, pi, η, α) = θh
(
(1− µ(pi, η)) + µ(pi, η)
∫ b−1h (b,α)
0
fh(Π, α)dΠ
)
− b
and by taking the ﬁrst order derivative w.r.t. b we have fh(t,α)
fh(pi,η)
− 1 = −1 6 0. Thus,
player i does not want to choose any eﬀort in the high pure support and again, she
ﬁnds it optimal to choose an eﬀort in the mixed eﬀort, which earns her zero expected
payoﬀ.
When the type (θh, pi) of player i chooses an eﬀort in the low pure support, the
expected payoﬀ is:
U l(b|θh, pi, η, α) = θh(1− µ(pi, η))
∫ 1
b−1l (b,α)
fh(Π, α)dΠ− b
The ﬁrst order derivative w.r.t b gives
fl(pi, η)fh(t̂, α)
fl(t̂, α)fl(t̂, α)
θh
θl
− 1 = +∞
Thus, the type (θh, pi) of player i does not want to choose any eﬀort in the low pure
support. In other words, the optimal eﬀort is always in the mixed support.
When type (θh, pi) of player i chooses an eﬀort in the mixed support, the expected
payoﬀ is:
Um(b|θh, pi, η, α) = V m(θh, pi, η, α) = plθhfl(pi, η)
∫ 1
pi∗
fh(Π, α)dΠ
The ﬁrst order derivative of V m(θh, pi, η, α) w.r.t η is:
∂V m(θh, pi, η, α)
∂η
= −phθh∂fh(pi, η)
∂η
∫ 1
pi∗
fh(Π, α)dΠ
We are now able to calculate the ex ante marginal expected payoﬀ of player i
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w.r.t η:
AMR(η, α) = ph
∫ 1
0
∂Um(b|θh, pi, η, α)
∂η
dpi
= −p2hθh
∫ 1
0
∂fh(pi, η)
∂η
∫ 1
pi∗
fh(Π, α)dΠ
= 0
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Given that AMR(η, α) > 0 for any η < α ∈ [α, α], it must be true that
MR(α) > 0. Suppose there exists some convex cost function with marginal cost
function MC(·) which crosses MR(·) only once from below, and there is an interior
solution α∗ ∈ (α, α) of MR(α) = MC(α). Then there exists an equilibrium of
the information acquisition game in which both players chooses α∗ and MR(α∗) =
MC(α∗).
We now turn to prove the second part of the proposition. By the ﬁrst order
conditions derived from (1.19) and (1.16) we know that type (θl, pi) of player i who
chose α should choose bl(t, α) when t satisﬁes 1 = fl(pi, α) = fl(t, α), i.e. t = pi.
Type (θh, pi) of player i should choose bh(s, α) when s satisﬁes 1 = fh(pi, α) = fh(s, α)
thus s = pi. The maximum expected payoﬀ for the type (θl, pi) and (θh, pi, ) are given
by:
V (θl, pi, α, α) = phθl
∫ 1
pi
[fh(Π, α)− fh(pi, α)] dFl(Π, α) > 0
V (θh, pi, α, α) = ph
∫ pi
0
[1− fh(Π, α)] [fh(Π, α)θh − fl(Π, α)θl] dΠ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+plθl
∫ 1
pi
[1− fl(Π, α)] fl(Π, α)dΠ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+pl (θh − θl)
This suggests player i's ex ante expected payoﬀ when she chose α given player j plays
symmetric equilibrium in the contest believing both players have chosen α > α, i.e.
V (α, α) =
∫ 1
0
plV (θl, pi, α, α) + phV (θh, pi, α, α)dpi, is larger than when both players
chose α, i.e. phpl (θh − θl). Note that V (α, α) may not be the maximum ex ante
expected payoﬀ of player i, but the fact that the above is larger than phpl (θh − θl)
suggests the optimal must be always larger.
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Since Lemma 3 has shown that AMR(η, α) > 0, suggesting V (η, α) is increasing
in η, it must be true that
V (α∗, α∗)− C(α∗) > V (α, α)− C(α) > V (α, α) = V (α, α)
The inequality equality is due to the optimality of α∗. The inequality is due to
V (α, α) > phpl(θh − θl) = V (α, α) as shown above, and the fact that C(α) = 0.
Therefore, player i's expected payoﬀ in the entire game is strictly higher than
when both players choosing α, i.e. not spying on each other. Furthermore, by
V (α, α) = V (α, α), player i's expected payoﬀ in the game is also higher than when
both players receive a perfect signal about the opponent for free.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. For ease of notation, in this proof we simplify the notations of eﬀort choice
functions bih(pi, αi, αj) and bil(pi, αi, αj) into bih(pi) and bil(pi), respectively. We start
by proving part 1. Suppose in a pure strategy equilibrium with eﬃcient allocation,
we have bih(pi1) < bih(pi2) for some pi1 > pi2. Then type (θh, pi1) of player i must ﬁnd
the cost of increasing her eﬀort from bih(pi1) to bih(pi2) dominates the gain from such
increase, formally:
bih(pi2)− bih(pi1) > µ(pi1) Pr{bih(pi1) 6 bjh < bih(pi2)}θh.
where bjh is player j's eﬀort. The LHS of the above is the cost from increasing
eﬀort from bih(pi1) to bih(pi2), and the RHS is the gain from doing so. The cost must
outweigh the gain to prevent type (θh, pi1) from deviating to bih(pi2). However, type
(θh, pi2) would require her gain outweighs her cost of such increase of eﬀort:
bih(pi2)− bih(pi1) 6 µ(pi2) Pr{bih(pi1) 6 bjh < bih(pi2)}θh.
Combining the two condition, we have µ(pi2) > µ(pi1) which contradicts to pi1 > pi2,
due to Assumption 1. Similar arguments can prove that bil(pi1) 6 bil(pi2) for any
pi1 > pi2.
To prove continuity of eﬀortding strategies in part 2, suppose there exists a
discontinuous point on player i's eﬀort strategy bih(pi), pˆi ∈ (0, 1), such that bih(pˆi) <
bih(pˆi + ) for an arbitrarily small . Then type (θh, b
−1
jh (bih(pˆi + ))) of player j will
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate to some bˆ ∈ (bih(pˆi), bih(pˆi + )), where b−1jh (·) is the
inverse of player j's eﬀort strategy. Similarly, suppose there exists a discontinuous
point on bil(pi), p˜i ∈ (0, 1), such that bil(p˜i) > bil(p˜i + ) for arbitrarily small .
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Then type (θl, b
−1
jl (bil(p˜i))) of player j will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate to some b˜ ∈
(bil(p˜i + ), bil(p˜i)), where b
−1
jl (·) is the inverse of player j's eﬀort strategy.
To prove that there is no atom on any player's eﬀort, suppose there exists p and
q such that 1 > q > p > 0 and that bih(x) = b where x ∈ [p, q] and b is a constant.
Then by continuity there must be a type (θh, b
−1
jh (b − )) of player j who chooses
b− , and he will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate to choosing b + , as the gain of such
deviation will be µ(b−1jh (b− ), αj)
∫ q
p
fh(Π, αi)dΠ > 0 and the cost is negligible when
 is arbitrarily small. A similar argument can show that there is no atom on bil(pi).
For part 3, given part 1 is true, type (θh, 1) of player i chooses the highest eﬀort
among all types in an allocative eﬃcient equilibrium, whereas type (θl, 1) chooses
the lowest eﬀort among all types in an allocative eﬃcient equilibrium. Thus, it
must be true that bil(1) = bjl(1) = 0 as these are the lower bound of equilibrium
support. They must be the same and cannot be positive. It must also be true
that bih(1) = bjh(1) as these are the highest eﬀort exerted by players, and in any
equilibrium the equality is satisﬁed.
Finally, by part 1, type (θh, 0) of player i chooses the lowest eﬀort among all
types with valuation θh, whereas type (θl, 0) chooses the highest among all types
with valuation θl. Suppose bih(0) > bil(0), then it implies that there is a gap in the
equilibrium support of player i's eﬀort. This cannot be part of any equilibrium as
then player j would not choose any eﬀort in [bil(0), bih(0)], which contradicts the
optimality of bih(0), as player i would want to deviate to any b ∈ (bil(0), bih(0)).
Suppose bih(0) < bil(0), then in any equilibrium with eﬃcient allocation, it must
be true that bjl(0) 6 bih(0) < bil(0) 6 bjh(0). But then this implies there is a
gap in the equilibrium support of player j's eﬀort, which we showed above to be
impossible in any equilibrium with eﬃcient allocation. Therefore, in any equilibrium
with eﬃcient allocation, it must be true that bil(0) = bih(0) for i = 1, 2. Now
we prove bil(0) = bih(0) = bjl(0) = bjh(0). Without loss of generality, suppose
bil(0) = bih(0) > bjl(0) = bjh(0), but then this contradicts eﬃcient allocation as
bil(0) > bjh(0). Thus, in any pure strategy equilibrium with eﬃcient allocation, it
must be true that bil(0) = bih(0) = bjl(0) = bjh(0).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. There are two steps to take to prove the proposition. First, we show that
the equilibrium strategies of each valuation type given in the proposition are indeed
the optimal strategy in their equilibrium support. Second, we show that each type
do not want to deviate to any eﬀort level outside of their equilibrium support.
Following the notation in the previous proofs, we refer to the equilibrium support
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of low valuation types as the "low pure support", and refer to the equilibrium support
of high valuation types as the "high pure support".
Given that player j chooses his strategy according to the proposition. Suppose
type (θl, pi) of player i chooses an alternative eﬀort level b = bil(s, αi, αj), then her
expected payoﬀ is
Ui(b|θl, pi, αi, αj) = θl
∫ 1
s
[µ(Π, αi)− µ(pi, αi)]dFl(Π, αj)
Thus,
Vi(θl, pi, αi, αj)− Ui(b, θl, pi, αi, αj) = θl
∫ s
pi
[µ(Π, αi)− µ(pi, αi)]dFl(Π, αj) > 0
regardless of whether pi > s or pi < s.
Suppose type (θh, pi) of player i chooses an alternative eﬀort level b = bih(t, αi, αj),
then her expected payoﬀ is
Ui(b|θh, pi, αi, αj) = θh[(1− µ(pi, αi)) + µ(pi, αi)
∫ t
0
fh(Π, αj)dΠ]
−θh
∫ t
0
µ (Π, αi) dFh(Π, αj)− θl
∫ 1
0
[1− µ (Π, αi)] dFl(Π, αj)
Again, compare this payoﬀ to the equilibrium payoﬀ:
Vi(θh, pi, αi, αj)− Uj(b, θh, pi, αi, αj) = θh
∫ pi
t
[µ(pi, αi)− µ (Π, αi)] dFh(Π, αj) > 0
regardless of pi > t or pi 6 t. Thus, the strategy given in the proposition is indeed
optimal for players if they choose eﬀorts in the equilibrium support.
Now we turn to the case when each valuation type deviates by choosing an eﬀort
in the other valuation type's support, e.g. the high valuation type chooses an eﬀort
in the support of the low valuation type's support. When the type (θh, pi) of player
i deviates to an eﬀort level β in the low pure support of player j, that is β ∈
[0, bjl(0, αj, αi)], then the expected payoﬀ given the opponent playing equilibrium
strategy bjl(pi, αj, αi) is:
U˜i(β|θh, pi, αi, αj) = θh[1− µ(pi, αi)]
∫ 1
b−1jl (β,αj ,αi)
fh(Π, αj)dΠ− β.
Among all the possible deviating eﬀorts player i would prefer to deviate to the eﬀort
level that maximizes the deviation expected payoﬀ, i.e. β∗ = arg maxβ U˜i(β|θh, pi, αi, αj).
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β∗ can be found by the ﬁrst order condition with respect to β:
fl(pi, αi) =
θl
θh
fl(t, αj)
fh(t, αj)
fl(t, αi) (1.22)
where t is given by bjl(t, αj, αi) = β
∗, i.e. type (θl, t) of player j bids β∗ in
equilibrium. It is easy to check that both sides of (1.22) are decreasing func-
tions of their arguments, pi and t, respectively. Furthermore, Assumption 3 implies
fl(pi, αi) 6 fl(t, αi) and thus, pi > t. Then, there must exists some pi satisfying
fl(pi, αi) ≡ θl
θh
fl(0, αj)
fh(0, αj)
fl(0, αi)
If the equality in Assumption 3 is satisﬁed at pi = 0, then pi = 0. For pi < pi, we
always have the LHS of the equation (1.22) strictly larger than the RHS, for all
t ∈ [0, 1]. This implies the ﬁrst order derivative is positive and thus type (θh, pi) of
player i doesn't want to deviate.
For pi > pi, there always exists a unique solution of equation (1.22) given pi.
In this case, we need to directly compare the equilibrium payoﬀ with the payoﬀ
of choosing β∗. The diﬀerence between the equilibrium expected payoﬀ and the
optimal deviation payoﬀ:
Vi(θh, pi, αi, αj)− U˜i(β∗|θh, pi, αi, αj)
= phθh
∫ pi
0
[fh(pi, αi)− fh(Π, αi)] fh(Π, αj)dΠ
+ plθh
∫ t
0
(
fl(pi, αi)− fl(Π, αi)θl
fh(Π, αj)θh
fl(Π, αj)
)
dΠ
is increasing with pi, as its ﬁrst order derivative w.r.t pi is positive (as pi > t):
∂
(
Vi(θh, pi, αi, αj)− U˜i(β∗|θh, pi, αi, αj)
)
∂pi
= ph
∂fh(pi, αi)
∂pi
θh
(∫ pi
0
fh(Π, αj)dΠ−
∫ t
0
fh(Π, αj)dΠ
)
> 0
Note that in the above derivation we applied equation (1.22). Since we also know
that
Vi(θh, pi, αi, αj)−U˜i(β∗|θh, pi, αi, αj) = phθh
∫ pi
0
[fh(pi, αi)− fh(Π, αi)] fh(Π, αj)dΠ > 0
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the diﬀerence is thus, positive. Therefore, type (θh, pi) of player i does not ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to deviate to any eﬀort in [0, bjl(0, αj, αi)].
When a type (θl, pi) of player i deviates to an eﬀort level β in the high pure sup-
port, that is β ∈ [bjl(0, αj, αi), bjh(1, αj, αi)], the expected payoﬀ given the opponent
playing equilibrium strategy bjh(pi, αj, αi) is:
U˜i(β|θl, pi, αi, αj) = θl
[
µ(pi, αi)
∫ b−1jh (β,αj ,αi)
0
fl(Π, αj)dΠ + (1− µ(pi, αi))
]
− β.
Again, we ﬁnd the optimal deviation eﬀort β∗ = arg maxβ U˜i(β|θl, pi, αi, αj) by
the ﬁrst order condition with respect to β:
fh(pi, αi) =
θh
θl
fh(s, αj)
fl(s, αj)
fh(s, αi) (1.23)
where s is given by bjh(s, αj, αi) = β
∗. It is easy to check that both sides are increas-
ing functions of their arguments, pi and s, respectively. Furthermore, Assumption 3
implies fh(pi, αi) > fh(s, αi) and thus, pi > s. Then, there must be some ̂̂pi satisﬁes
fh(̂̂pi, αi) = θh
θl
fh(0, αj)
fl(0, αj)
fh(0, αi)
If the equality in condition (3) is satisﬁed at pi = 0, then we must have ̂̂pi = 0. For
pi < ̂̂pi, we always have the LHS of the equation (1.23) strictly less than the RHS,
for all s ∈ [0, 1]. This implies the ﬁrst order derivative is negative and thus type
(θl, pi) doesn't want to deviate.
For pi > ̂̂pi, there always exists a unique valuation of s satisfying equation (1.23)
given pi. In this case, we need to compare the equilibrium payoﬀ with the payoﬀ of
choosing β∗. The diﬀerence between the two
Vi(θl, pi, αi, αj)− U˜i(β∗|θl, pi, αi, αj)
= plθl
∫ pi
0
[fl(Π, αi)− fl(pi, αi)] fl(Π, αj)dΠ
+ph
∫ s
0
[
fh(Π, αj)θh
fl(Π, αj)θl
fh(Π, αi)− fh(pi, αi)
]
fl(Π, αj)θldΠ
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is positive because its ﬁrst order derivative w.r.t pi is positive:
∂
(
Vi(θl, pi, αi, αj)− U˜i(β∗|θl, pi, αi, αj)
)
∂pi
= phθlf
′
h(pi, αi)
(∫ pi
0
fl(Π, αj)dΠ−
∫ s
0
fl(Π, αj)dΠ
)
> 0
and Vi(θl, ̂̂pi, αi, αj)−U˜i(β∗|θl, ̂̂pi, αi, αj) = plθl ∫ ̂̂pi0 [fl(̂̂pi, αi)− fl(pi, αi)] fl(Π, αj)dΠ >
0. Thus, there is no proﬁtable deviation for any type of player i.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof.
Deﬁnition 6. Let AMR(η, αi, αj) be player i's marginal expected payoﬀ from the
contest by choosing η when player j chooses αj and (wrongly) believes that player i
has chosen αi.
The above deﬁnition of marginal expected payoﬀ from the contest is diﬀerent
from the symmetric case only in the player j's belief of αi. In the current asymmetric
setting, player j chooses αj but believes that player i chooses αi. Thus, j plays
according to the asymmetric equilibrium given in Proposition 4. By the same logic
as in the symmetric case, player i would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to increase η as it provides
a more accurate estimation of j's eﬀort distribution.
First we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 9. AMR(η, αi, αj) > 0 for all η 6 αi and η, αi, αj ∈ [α, α̂).
Given that AMR(η, αi, αj) > 0 for any η < αi ∈ [α, α], it must be true that
AMR(αi, αi, αj) > 0.
If player i chooses η = α, and suppose player j still believes that player i chose
αi and plays the symmetric equilibrium strategy in the contest as given in the
Proposition 4, then type (θl, pi) and (θh, pi) of player i's maximum expected payoﬀ
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are given by:
U li (θl, pi, α, αi, αj) = θl(1− µ(pi, α)) + θl
∫ ̂̂pi
0
µ(pi, α)− µ(Π, αi)θhθl fh(Π, αj)fl(Π, αj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 fl(Π, αj)dΠ
Uhi (θh, pi, α, αi, αj) = ph
∫ pi
0
[1− fh(Π, αi)] [fh(Π, αj)θh − fl(Π, αj)θl] dΠ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+plθl
∫ 1
pi
[1− fl(Π, αi)] fl(Π, αj)dΠ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+pl (θh − θl)
where pi satisﬁes fh(pi, α) = 1 = fh(pi, αi) and ̂̂pi is the solution for t̂ in:
fl(pi, α) = 1 =
fl(t̂, αj)
fh(t̂, αj)
θl
θh
fl
(
t̂, αi
)
Given that AMR(η, αi, αj) > 0, Vi(η, αi, αj) must be increasing in η. This means
Vi(αi, αj) > Ui(α, αi, αj) > Vi(α, α)
where Ui(α, αi, αj) =
∫ 1
0
plU
l
i (θl, pi, α, αi, αj) + phU
h
i (θh, pi, α, αi, αj)dpi. The ﬁrst in-
equality is due to the optimality of αi. The second inequality is due to Ui(α, αi, αj) >
phpl(θh − θl) shown above.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. The marginal ex ante expected payoﬀ when player i increases αj is:
∂Vi(αi, αj)
∂αj
= p2h (θh − θl)
∫ 1
0
θh +
θl
pl
θh − θl − fh(Π, αi)
(
θh +
phθl
pl
θh − θl − Π
)
− Fh(Π, αi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L(Π)
 ∂fh(Π, αj)∂αj dΠ
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Note that the terms inside the bracket, L(Π), is monotonically decreasing with Π as
∂L(Π)
∂Π
= −∂fh(Π, αj)
∂Π
(
θh +
phθl
pl
θh − θl − Π
)
< 0
Thus, applying the intermediate value theorem for integrals can prove that
∂Vi(αi,αj)
∂αj
<
0. Rewrite
∂Vi(αi,αj)
∂αj
for player i into:
∫ pi+
0
L(Π)
∂fh(Π, αj)
∂αj
dΠ +
∫ 1
pi+
L(Π)
∂fh(Π, αj)
∂αj
dΠ
= L(ζ)
∫ pi+
0
∂fh(Π, αj)
∂αj
dΠ + L(ι)
∫ 1
pi+
∂fh(Π, αj)
∂αj
dΠ < 0
where ζ ∈ [0, pi+] and ι ∈ [pi+, 1]. Recall that ∫ pi+
0
∂fh(Π,αj)
∂αj
dΠ+
∫ 1
pi+
∂fh(Π,αj)
∂αj
dΠ = 0,
and since L(ζ) > L(ι), we thus have
∂Vi(αi,αj)
∂αj
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. The interim expected payoﬀ for each type of player i in equilibrium are given
by (1.10) and (1.11) in the main text. Then, the ex ante interim expected payoﬀ for
θh and θl can be found:
Vi(θh, αi, αj) = phθh
∫ 1
0
∫ pi
0
[fh(pi, αi)− fh(Π, αi)] fh(Π, αj)dΠdpi
+pl
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
[fl(pi, αi)θh − fl(Π, αi)θl] fl(Π, αj)dΠdpi
Vi(θl, αi, αj) = plθl
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
pi
fl(pi, αj)fl(Π, αi)dΠdpi − plθl
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
pi
fl(Π, αj)fl(Π, αi)dΠdpi
And thus, the ex ante expected payoﬀ for player i can be calculated by
Vi(αi, αj) = phVi(θl, αi, αj) + plVi(θh, αi, αj)
Let αi = α, i.e. when the opponent shares no information to player i, then player
i's ex ante expected payoﬀ is a constant: Vi(αi = α, αj) = phpl (θh − θl)
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. To prove the proposition, we need to show that the ﬁrst order conditions for
both player 1 and 2 are both satisﬁed given the strategy proﬁles speciﬁed in the
proposition. That is,
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∂V1(α1, α2)
∂α2
= p2h (θh − θl)
∫ 1
0
[
θh +
θl
pl
θh − θl − fh(Π, α1)
(
θh +
phθl
pl
θh − θl − Π
)
− Fh(Π, α1)
]
∂fh(Π, α2)
∂α2
dΠ = 0
∂V2(α2, α1)
∂α1
= p2h (θh − θl)
∫ 1
0
[
θh +
θl
pl
θh − θl − fh(Π, α2)
(
θh +
phθl
pl
θh − θl − Π
)
− Fh(Π, α2)
]
∂fh(Π, α1)
∂α1
dΠ = 0
For the symmetric equilibrium, Lemma 8 has shown that given the opponent
choosing α, player i is indiﬀerent between any α ∈ [α, α̂) as she always receives the
same expected payoﬀ as in the IPV setting without spying. This suggests (α, α) is
a symmetric equilibrium. Lemma 8 also implies the above FOCs are satisﬁed with
(α, α). Now, we prove that this equilibrium is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Suppose both players choose some α1 = α2 = α > α, then Lemma 7 implies, say,
player 1 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate to α2 = α. Thus, there is no symmetric
equilibrium in which α1 = α2 = α > α.
Now we turn to asymmetric equilibria. From Lemma 8 and Lemma 7, it can be
seen that any strategy proﬁle with one player chooses α and the other player chooses
α > α is an equilibrium. Without loss of generality, assume that player i chooses
αj = α and her opponent chooses αi > α. By Lemma 7, player i strictly prefers
to choose αj = α when αi > α. By Lemma 8, player j is indiﬀerent with choosing
any αi ∈ [α, α̂), thus he has no proﬁtable deviation. Therefore, any strategy proﬁle
(α1, α2) with either α1 = α and α2 > α, or α1 > α and α2 = α, is an equilibrium of
the information disclosure game.
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Chapter 2
Information Disclosure in Contests:
Private vs. Public Signals
Abstract Two players with independent private valuations compete in the ﬁrst-price
all-pay auction. Apart from each player's own valuation, she also observes a noisy
signal regarding the opponent's valuation. We characterize the unique symmetric
equilibrium of the contest when the signal is (1) conditionally independent private,
or (2) public. In the former, each player's expected payoﬀ (expected eﬀort) is always
higher (lower) than when they do not receive any signals regarding the opponent.
In the latter, the expected payoﬀ (expected eﬀort) can be either higher or lower
than when they do not receive any signals, and the upper bound of expected payoﬀs
is characterized. Numerical examples show that some private signals may induce
higher expected payoﬀs than the maximum payoﬀ induced by any public signals,
and that some public signals can always induce higher total expected eﬀorts than
the maximum expected eﬀorts induced by any private signals.
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2.1 Introduction
In contests, e.g., rent-seeking, lobbying, promotion, and patent race, the amount
of eﬀort to be invested often hinges on the player's belief about the opponents'
competitiveness. The contest organizer can thus manipulate the belief via disclosing
information about the opponents to manipulate competitive behavior indirectly. The
objective of the organizer may be to increase total eﬀort. For example, the employer
who organizes a promotion contest wish to boost employees' eﬀorts. Alternatively,
the objective may also be to increase players' payoﬀs. For instances, the objective
of a trade association is to protect the interests of member ﬁrms who compete in
the same industry.
In this paper, we study how the organizer should disclose information before
contests to fulﬁll the above objectives. The contest is modeled by the ﬁrst-price
all-pay auction with two players and one prize. Players' private valuations for the
prize are independently drawn from a binary distribution, {vh, vl} with vh > vl. In
addition to their own valuations, they can also observe a binary distributed signal
({h, l}) disclosed by the contest organizer and which contains information about the
opponent's valuation.We consider two classes of disclosure policies: disclosing via
conditionally independent private (hereafter private) signals or via public signals.
In the former, each player receives a signal conditional on the opponent's valuation
and the signal realization is private information to the player. In particular, with
probability q the signal is "correct", i.e. Pr(si = h|v−i = vh) = Pr(si = l|v−i = vl) =
q. In the latter, both players observe a public signal conditional on the valuation
proﬁle. In particular, when both players have vh (vl), they observe the signal h with
probability kh (kl); when players have diﬀerent valuations they observe the signal h
with probability r. For each class of disclosure policies, the contest organizer chooses
these parameters before the contest to fulﬁll her objectives.
We characterized unique symmetric equilibrium in the contest under both classes
of disclosure policies. The equilibrium strategy may be non-monotonic in the sense
that the high valuation player's eﬀort may be lower than that of the low valuation
player. With partially informative private signals, on one hand, each player's ex-
pected payoﬀ is always higher than when they do not receive any signals about the
opponent, and the total expected eﬀort is always lower. The public signals, on the
other hand, can be designed to maximize players' expected payoﬀ and its upper
bound is also strictly higher than when players do not receive any signals about the
opponents. Numerical examples suggest that there is no general ranking between
the two classes of signals in maximizing players' expected payoﬀs. The organizer
can also design the public signals in a way that the total expected eﬀort is strictly
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higher than when players do not receive any signals  thus it is also higher than the
total eﬀort in the contest with any private signals. Therefore, some public signals
dominate all private signals in terms of increasing total expected eﬀort.
The prior literature has shown that the total eﬀort in the contest can be boosted
by concealing all players' private information in all-pay auctions (Fu et al., 2014;
Lu et al., 2016), partially revealing such information to the opponents in Tullock
contest (Serena, 2015), providing reviews (Gershkov and Perry, 2009) of previous
performance or publicly announcing (Aoyagi, 2010) it in multi-stage contests, dis-
closing opponent's previous performance (Sheremeta, 2010) or rent-seeking expen-
diture (Fallucchi et al., 2013) in rent-seeking contests. The study closely related to
the current paper is Lu et al. (2016) who extend the study on the partial informa-
tion disclosure in Tullock contests (Serena, 2015) to the ﬁrst-price all-pay auction.
According to Serena (2015), the partial disclosure policy is a mapping from the
anonymous1 valuation proﬁle, {vh, vh}, {vh, vl} and {vl, vl}, to a binary decision
between Concealing or Disclosing the proﬁle to both players, i.e. C or D. For ex-
ample, {C,C,D} corresponds to the disclosure policy which conceals the valuation
proﬁle {vh, vh}, i.e. both players have high valuation, and {vh, vl}, i.e. when the
players have diﬀerent valuation, and discloses the proﬁle only when it is {vl, vl}, i.e.
both players have low valuation. Such partial disclosure policies are special cases of
public signals considered in the Section 2.4 of the current paper. Lu et al. (2016)
shows that the disclosure policy {C,C,D} maximizes each player's expected pay-
oﬀ, and the maximum is min{ph(vh − vl), phplvh}. Interestingly, this coincides with
the maximum of expected payoﬀs characterized in the current paper. However, the
current paper shows that there exists a broad set of public signals which can induce
this maximum. When the objective is to maximize total eﬀort, Lu et al. (2016)
shows that fully concealing the valuation proﬁle, i.e. {C,C,C}, maximizes the total
expected eﬀort, whereas Section 2.4 of the current paper shows that some public
signals can induce strictly higher eﬀorts.
Fang and Morris (2006) was the ﬁrst to consider the setting in which play-
ers receive conditional independent private signals about opponents in winner-pay
auctions. In the ﬁrst-price auction with binary distribution of valuations, the low
valuation type of player always bid his valuation and the high valuation type of
player's bid increases ﬁrst order stochastically in her signal regarding the opponent.
The authors show that the revenue in the ﬁrst-price auction is lower than in the
second-price auction in which players still bid their own valuations in equilibrium
1The disclosure policy is anonymous in the sense that the policy depends on the type proﬁle
that does not diﬀerentiate the identities of players. See Serena (2015) for more details.
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even when they receive a signal about the opponent. Azacis and Vida (2015) then
generalized the model to any correlated signals and characterized the optimal signal
which maximizes player's expected payoﬀ. This is closely related to the second part
of the current paper which considers public signal. Also built on Fang and Morris
(2006), Tian and Xiao (2007) studied a model in which players endogenously acquire
costly information about their opponent in the ﬁrst-price auction.
In winner-pay auctions, auctioneers may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to selectively disclose
information to bidders (Li and Shi, 2013; Eso and Szentes, 2007; Ganuza and Pe-
nalva, 2010; Bergemann and Pesendorfer, 2007). In the current paper, we show how
a contest organizer can inﬂuence the competitive behavior of players via disclosing
a signal regarding the opponents' private information. This type of information dis-
closure in contests has been studied in one-sided private information setting (Zhang
and Zhou, 2016; Denter et al., 2014), or two-sided private information with disclo-
sure policies (Lu et al., 2016; Serena, 2015) which are special cases of the public
signals considered in the current paper.
Finally, the Bayesian persuasion literature (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011)
has studied how a sender should design signals which reveal information to vot-
ers (Alonso and Câmara, 2016, 2015; Wang, 2013), or to consumers (Anderson and
Renault, 2006; Johnson and Myatt, 2006; Rayo and Segal, 2010), about their payoﬀ
relevant states in order to inﬂuence their behavior.
2.2 Preliminaries
The Contest: Two players compete for an indivisible prize in a contest. Player i's
(i ∈ {1, 2}) private valuation is independently drawn from the binary distribution:
vi = vh with probability ph ∈ (0, 1), and vi = vl with probability pl ∈ (0, 1), where
vh > vl > 0 and ph + pl = 1. In addition to her own valuation, player i also
observes an additional signal, si ∈ {h, l}, regarding her opponent's valuation v−i.
The distribution of the signal will be discussed in detail shortly.
Players choose their eﬀorts, (bi, b−i), simultaneously. The player who chooses
higher eﬀort wins and both players incur the costs of their own eﬀorts. Ties are
broken with equal probability. Thus, the contest is equivalent to the ﬁrst-price all-
pay auction. The player with the valuation vi chooses eﬀort bi earns the following
expected payoﬀ:
Ui(bi, b−i, vi) =

−bi, if bi < b−i
vi − bi, if bi > b−i
1
2
vi − bi, if bi = b−i
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Equilibrium: In the contest as a Bayesian game, each player's type has two di-
mensions, i.e. valuation and signal: (vi, si). Denote by G(vi,si)(b) the cumulative
distribution function of eﬀort in the equilibrium mixed strategy of type (vi, si) of
player i, and denote by Gi(b) player i's ex ante cumulative distribution of equilibrium
eﬀort. Formally, a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is deﬁned as the following.
Deﬁnition 7. A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the contest is a vector of
strategies G = (G1, G2) such that for all bi ∈ supp[G(vi,si)], we have
bi ∈ arg max
b
Ui(b, vi, si;G−i)
In Section 2.3, we consider private signals where the distribution of si is con-
tingent on realizations of the opponent's valuation v−i. In Section 2.4, we consider
public signals where the distribution of si is contingent on realizations of valuation
proﬁle (vi, v−i). Finally, we compare the two signals in terms of players' expected
payoﬀ and total expected eﬀort in Section 2.5.
2.3 Private signals
In the private signals setting, player i's signal is generated as the following:
Pr(si = l|v−i = vl) = Pr(si = h|v−i = vh) = q ∈ [1
2
, 1]
Pr(si = h|v−i = vl) = Pr(si = l|v−i = vh) = 1− q.
That is, q is the probability that player i receives a "correct" signal. The signal
si is player i's private information. Thus, the type space becomes two dimensional
with four types in total: (vi, si) ∈ {vh, vl} × {h, l}. Denote by Pr(v−i|si) the proba-
bility that the opponent's valuation is v−i conditional on player i's signal si. Upon
receiving a signal si, player i updates her belief according to Baye's rule:
Pr(vh|h) = phq
phq + pl (1− q)
Pr(vl|h) = pl (1− q)
phq + pl (1− q)
Pr(vh|l) = ph (1− q)
ph (1− q) + plq
Pr(vl|l) = plq
ph (1− q) + plq
To facilitate later analyzes, we deﬁne the following condition:
54
Condition 1. Pr(vl|h)vh > Pr(vl|l)vl;
Alternatively, we refer to the condition with the opposite inequality, i.e., Pr(vl|h)vh 6
Pr(vl|l)vl, as the Condition ¬1.2
In the above conditions, Condition 1 is equivalent of (1 − q)vh > qvl, i.e., q 6
q∗ ≡ vh
vh+vl
, and Condition ¬1 is equivalent of (1 − q)vh 6 qvl, i.e., q > q∗ ≡ vhvh+vl .
Condition 1, in fact, is the suﬃcient condition for the existence of monotonic strategy
equilibrium (MSE). In all-pay auctions with one dimensional aﬃliated signals, the
existence of MSE depends on whether a "monotonicity condition" is satisﬁed, which
states that the product of the conditional probability of the opponent's signal and
the player's valuation increases in the player's signal (Rentschler and Turocy, 2016;
Chi et al., 2015; Krishna and Morgan, 1997). In such single dimensional settings,
players obtain information regarding both their own valuation and the opponent's
valuation from one signal. In the two dimensional signal setting considered in the
current paper, however, players obtain the two sorts of information from separated
channels. Condition 1 therefore, is the two dimensional version of "monotonicity
condition".
2.3.1 Equilibrium
The following result shows that the structure of equilibrium depends on whether
Condition 1 or ¬1 is satisﬁed.
Proposition 8. If q ∈ [1
2
, 1], then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium
in which all types randomize over connected supports. When the Condition 1 is
satisﬁed, then
• type (vl, h) mixes over [0, b(vl,h)] uniformly according to
G(vl,h)(b) =
pl(1− q) + phq
pl(1− q)2vl b
• type (vl, l) mixes over [b(vl,h), b(vl,l)] uniformly according to
G(vl,l)(b) =
ph(1− q) + plq
plq2vl
b
• type (vh, l) mixes over [b(vl,l), b(vh,l)] uniformly according to
G(vh,l)(b) =
ph(1− q) + plq
ph(1− q)2vh b
2Note that Condition 1 and ¬1 are equivalent when the equalities are satisﬁed simultaneously.
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• type (vh, h) mixes over [b(vh,l), b(vh,h)] uniformly according to
G(vh,h)(b) =
pl(1− q) + phq
phq2vh
b
where
b(vl,h) =
pl(1− q)2vl
pl(1− q) + phq
b(vl,l) = b(vl,h) +
plq
2vl
ph(1− q) + plq
b(vh,l) = b(vl,l) +
ph(1− q)2vh
ph(1− q) + plq
b(vh,h) = b(vh,l) +
phq
2vh
pl(1− q) + phq
When the Condition ¬1 is satisﬁed, then
• type (vh, h) mixes over [b, b(vh,h)] uniformly according to
G(vh,h)(b) =
phq + pl(1− q)
phq2vh
b− phqvh + plvl
phq2vh
(1− q) ,
and mixes over [b, b] according to
G(vh,h)(b) =
1
2q − 1
(
q
vh
− 1− q
vl
)
b− 1− q
2q − 1
pl (1− q)
phq + pl(1− q)
qvl − (1− q) vh
qvh − (1− q)vl
vh − vl
vh
• type (vh, l) and (vl, l) mix over [b, b] uniformly according to
G(vh,l)(b) = G(vl,l)(b) =
1
2q − 1
(
q
vl
− 1− q
vh
)
b− 1− q
2q − 1
pl (1− q)
phq + pl(1− q)
vh − vl
vh
• type (vl, h) mixes over [b, b] uniformly according to
G(vl,h)(b) =
1
2q − 1
(
q
vh
− 1− q
vl
)
b
− 1− q
2q − 1
pl (1− q)
phq + pl(1− q)
qvl − (1− q) vh
qvh − (1− q)vl
vh − vl
vh
− vh − vl
(1− q)vl − qvh
and mixes over [0, b] according to
G(vl,h)(b) =
phq + pl(1− q)
pl (1− q)2 vl
b
56
CDF
b
1
b(vl,h) b(vl,l) b(vh,l) b(vh,h)
vh0
(vl, h) (vl, l) (vh, l) (vh, h)
CDF
b
1
b(vh,h)bb
vh0
(vl, h)
(vl, l) (vh, l)
(vh, h)
Figure 2.1: Example: ph =
1
2
, vh = 2, vl = 1 thus q
∗ = 2
3
. The non-overlapping
equilibrium is given in the left panel, where q = 1
2
; the overlapping equilibrium is
given in the right panel, where q = 3
4
.
where
b(vh,h) =
phqvh + pl(1− q)vl
phq + pl(1− q)
b =
q [phq + (pl − ph)(1− q)] vh − (1− q)2 plvl
[phq + pl(1− q)] [qvh − (1− q)vl] vl
b =
pl (1− q)
phq + pl(1− q)
(1− q) vl
qvh − (1− q)vl (vh − vl)
Speciﬁcally, if Condition 1 is true, the model has a unique non-overlapping equi-
librium in the sense that types play mixed strategies distributed on contagious non-
overlapping intervals, similar to the independent private valuation setting (Konrad,
2004). If, however, Condition ¬1 is true, the model has an overlapping equilibrium
in the sense that the supports of all types intersect at a common interval which
becomes a singleton when Condition ¬1 satisﬁes with equality. This is consistent
with complete information setting (Baye et al., 1996) which corresponding to the
case when q = 1. See Example 1 for the graphical structure of the equilibrium.
Example 1. Suppose ph =
1
2
, vh = 2, vl = 1 thus q
∗ = 2
3
. Thus, when q = 1
2
< q∗
the equilibrium supports of all types are non-overlapping, and the upper bounds are
given by: b(vl,h) = 0.25, b(vl,l) = 0.5, b(vh,l) = 1 and b(vh,h) = 1.5. This equilibrium is
shown in the left panel of Figure 2.1. When q = 3
4
> q∗, the equilibrium supports of
all types are overlapping, and the bounds of supports are given by: b = 0.05, b = 0.85
and b(vh,h) = 1.75. The overlapping equilibrium is shown in the right panel of Figure
2.1.
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2.3.2 Expected payoﬀ and total expected eﬀort
Proposition 9 indicates that both players are better oﬀ with any partially informative
private signals.
Proposition 9. Player i (i = 1, 2) earns strictly higher expected payoﬀ when q ∈
(1
2
, 1) than when q = 1
2
, 1; the total expected eﬀort is strictly lower when q ∈ (1
2
, 1)
than when q = 1
2
, 1.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 are two examples of player i's expected payoﬀ and the total
expected eﬀort. As can be seen from the ﬁgures, the diﬀerence between overlapping
and non-overlapping equilibrium has signiﬁcant impact on the expected eﬀort. The
total expected eﬀort experiences a sudden drop at q = q∗ ≡ vh
vh+vl
during the transi-
tion from the non-overlapping to the overlapping equilibrium. The expected payoﬀ
is, however, continuous at the cutoﬀ value of q.
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1q
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1q
Figure 2.2: Expected payoﬀ when vh = 1 and vl = 0.5: left ph = 0.2; right ph = 0.9
0.44
0.48
0.52
0.56
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1q
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1q
Figure 2.3: Revenue/Total expenditure when vh = 1 and vl = 0.5: left ph = 0.2;
right ph = 0.9
The above example is consistent with Morath and Münster (2008) in the sense
that the total expected eﬀort is lower when q = 1 than when q = 1
2
. The fact
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that players earn higher expected payoﬀ with q ∈ (1
2
, 1) suggests the total expected
eﬀort when q ∈ (1
2
, 1) must be lower than when q = 1
2
, i.e., when players receive
uninformative signals about opponents.
2.4 Public signals
Now we turn to public signals. We focus only on the symmetric distribution of
public signals, which are generated as the following:
kh = Pr(s1 = s2 = h|v1 = v2 = vh)
kl = Pr(s1 = s2 = l|v1 = v2 = vl)
r = Pr(s1 = s2 = h|vi 6= v−i)
where kh, kl, r ∈ [0, 1]. kh (kl) is the probability that a high (low) valuation player
receives the signal realization h (l) conditional on both players having high (low)
valuation. r is the probability that a player receives the signal realization h when
players have diﬀerent valuations. This is summarized in Table 2.1. We refer to the
vector (kh, kl, r) as the "public signal (kh, kl, r)".
(vh, h) (vh, l) (vl, h) (vl, l)
(vh, h) p
2
hkh 0 phplr 0
(vh, l) 0 p
2
h(1− kh) 0 phpl(1− r)
(vl, h) phplr 0 p
2
l (1− kl) 0
(vl, l) 0 phpl(1− r) 0 p2l kl
Table 2.1: Public signal
Denote by Pr(v−i|vi, si) the probability that player −i has value v−i condi-
tional on player i has value vi and receives signal si. Note that Pr(v−i|vi, si) =
Pr(v−i, s−i|vi, si), e.g. Pr(vh, h|vl, h) = Pr(vh|vl, h), since the signal realization is
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common knowledge. Thus, the conditional probabilities can be written down as:
Pr(vh|vl, h) = phr
phr + pl (1− kl)
Pr(vh|vh, h) = phkh
phkh + plr
Pr(vh|vl, l) = ph (1− r)
ph (1− r) + plkl
Pr(vh|vh, l) = ph (1− kh)
ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r)
In order to determine the equilibrium strategies for types of players who receive
signal h, we deﬁne the Conditions 2 and 3:
Condition 2. Pr(vl|vh, h)vh > Pr(vl|vl, h)vl;
Condition 3. Pr(vh|vh, h)vh > Pr(vh|vl, h)vl;
To determine the equilibrium strategies for types (vh, l) and (vl, l), we deﬁne the
Conditions 4 and 5:
Condition 4. Pr(vl|vh, l)vh > Pr(vl|vl, l)vl;
Condition 5. Pr(vh|vh, l)vh > Pr(vh|vl, l)vl
All the above conditions can again be understood in analogous to the "mono-
tonicity condition" in the previous literature. Indeed, as shown in Proposition 10,
Conditions 2-5 ensures the existence of monotonic strategy equilibrium in which
the player with high valuation randomizes in the support higher than and non-
overlapping with the support of the low valuation player. In addition, we also char-
acterized the unique equilibrium when Conditions ¬2-¬5 are satisﬁed, i.e., when the
directions of inequalities in Conditions 2-5 are reversed.3
Before going into the next section, note that Conditions ¬2 and ¬3 cannot be
both satisﬁed, as Condition ¬2 implies
Pr(vh|vh, h)vh = vh − Pr(vl|vh, h)vh > vh − Pr(vl|vl, h)vl > Pr(vh|vl, h)vl
which is in contradiction to Condition ¬3. Similarly, Conditions ¬4 and ¬5 cannot
be both satisﬁed, as Condition ¬4 implies
Pr(vh|vh, l)vh = vh − Pr(vl|vh, l)vh > vh − Pr(vl|vl, l)vl > Pr(vh|vl, l)vl
3For instances, Condition ¬2 is Pr(vl|vh, h)vh 6 Pr(vl|vl, h)vl, and Condition ¬5 is
Pr(vh|vh, l)vh 6 Pr(vh|vl, l)vl.
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which contradicts Condition ¬5.
Therefore, in the equilibrium analysis we need to consider the cases when the
following conditions are satisﬁed: Conditions 2 and 3 (4 and 5), Conditions 2 and
¬3 (4 and ¬5), Conditions ¬2 and 3 (¬4 and 5).
2.4.1 Equilibrium
Proposition 10. When players receive the public signal (kh, kl, r), the unique equi-
librium is symmetric, and all types randomizes over connected supports.
Speciﬁcally, for type (vh, h) and (vl, h):
• If Conditions 2 and 3 are satisﬁed, then type (vl, h) mixes over [0, b(vl,h)] and
(vh, h) mixes over [b(vl,h), b(vh,h)] according to CDF G(vl,h)(b) and G(vh,h)(b),
respectively:
G(vl,h)(b) =
phr + pl (1− kl)
pl (1− kl) vl b
G(vh,vh)(b) =
phkh + plr
phkhvh
b− vl
vh
pl (1− kl)
phkh
phkh + plr
phr + pl (1− kl)
where b(vl,h) =
pl(1−kl)
phr+pl(1−kl)vl and b(vh,h) =
phkh
phkh+plr
vh + b(vl,h).
• If Conditions 2 and ¬3 are satisﬁed, then type (vh, h) mixes over [b(vh,h), vl]
according to CDF G(vh,h)(b):
G(vh,h)(b) =
r (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh − (1− kl) (phkh + plr) vl
ph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl b
− (1− kl) plr + phkh
ph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vh (vh − vl)
while type (vl, h) mixes over [b(vh,h), vl] according to CDF G(vl,h)(b):
G(vl,h)(b) =
−kh (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh + r (plr + phkh) vl
pl (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl b
+r
plr + phkh
pl (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vh (vh − vl)
and mixes over [0, b(vh,h)] according to CDF G(vl,h)(b):
G(vl,h)(b) =
phr + pl (1− kl)
pl (1− kl) vl b
where b(vh,h) =
(1−kl)(plr+phkh)
r(phr+pl(1−kl))vh−(1−kl)(plr+phkh)vl (vh − vl) vl.
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• If Conditions ¬2 and 3 are satisﬁed, then type (vh, h) mixes over [0, b(vl,h)]
according to CDF G(vh,h)(b):
G(vh,h)(b) =
(1− kl) (phkh + plr) vl − r (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh
ph (kh (1− kl)− r2) vlvh b
and mixes over [b(vl,h), vh] according to CDF G(vh,h)(b):
G(vh,h)(b) =
phkh + plr
phkhvh
b− plr
phkh
while type (vl, h) mixes over [0, b(vl,h)] according to G(vl,h)(b):
G(vl,h)(b) =
kh (pl (1− kl) + phr) vh − r (plr + phkh) vl
pl (kh (1− kl)− r2) vhvl b
where b(vl,h) =
pl(kh(1−kl)−r2)vhvl
kh(pl(1−kl)+phr)vh−r(plr+phkh)vl
For type (vh, l) and (vl, l):
• If Conditions 4 and 5 are satisﬁed, then type (vl, l) mixes over [0, b(vl,l)] and
type (vh, l) mixes over [b(vl,l), b(vh,l)] according to CDF G(vl,l)(b) and G(vh,l)(b),
respectively:
G(vl,l)(b) =
ph(1− r) + plkl
plklvl
b
G(vh,l)(b) =
ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r)
ph(1− kh)vh b−
vl
vh
plkl
ph(1− kh)
ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r)
ph(1− r) + plkl
where b(vl,l) =
plkl
ph(1−r)+plklvl and b(vh,l) =
ph(1−kh)
ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r)vh + b(vl,l).
• If Conditions 4 and ¬5 are satisﬁed, then type (vh, l) mixes over [b(vh,l), vl]
according to CDF G(vh,l)(b):
G(vh,l)(b) =
(1− r) (ph (1− r) + plkl) vh − kl (ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r)) vl
ph((1− r)2 − (1− kh) kl)vhvl
b
−kl pl (1− r) + ph (1− kh)
ph((1− r)2 − (1− kh) kl)vh
(vh − vl)
while type (vl, l) mixes over [b(vh,l), vl] according to CDF G(vl,l)(b)
G(vl,l)(b) =
− (1− kh) (ph (1− r) + plkl) vh + (1− r) (pl (1− r) + ph (1− kh)) vl
pl((1− r)2 − (1− kh) kl)vhvl
b
+ (1− r) pl (1− r) + ph (1− kh)
pl((1− r)2 − (1− kh) kl)vh
(vh − vl)
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and mixes over [0, b(vh,l)] according to CDF G(vl,l)(b)
G(vl,l)(b) =
ph(1− r) + plkl
plklvl
b,
where b(vh,l) =
kl(ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r))
(1−r)(plkl+ph(1−r))vh−kl(ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r))vl (vh − vl) vl.
• If Conditions ¬4 and 5 are satisﬁed, then type (vh, l) mixes over [0, b(vl,l)]
according to CDF G(vh,l)(b):
G(vh,l)(b) =
kl (ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r)) vl − (1− r) (ph(1− r) + plkl) vh
ph ((1− kh)kl − (1− r)2) vlvh b
and mixes over [b(vl,l), vh] according to CDF G(vh,l)(b):
G(vh,l)(b) =
ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r)
ph(1− kh)vh b−
pl(1− r)
ph(1− kh)
while type (vl, l) mixes over [0, b(vl,l)] according to CDF G(vl,h)(b):
G(vl,h)(b) =
kh (ph(1− r) + plkl) vh − r (ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r)) vl
pl ((1− kh)kl − (1− r)2) vhvl b
where b(vl,l) =
pl((1−kh)kl−(1−r)2)vhvl
(plkl+ph(1−r))(1−kh)vh−(1−r)(ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r))vl .
See the following for a numerical example for the structure of the equilibrium
when players receive "h". The structure of the equilibrium when players receive "l"
is qualitatively the same.
Example 2. Suppose ph =
1
2
, vh = 2, vl = 1. When (kh, kl, r) = (
2
3
, 2
3
, 1
3
), then
Conditions 2 and 3 are satisﬁed. Thus, the corresponding equilibrium mixed strategy
is given in the left panel of the Figure 2.4. When (kh, kl, r) = (
1
10
, 2
3
, 1
3
), then Condi-
tions 2 and ¬3 are satisﬁed. Thus, the corresponding equilibrium mixed strategy is
given in the middle panel of the Figure 2.4. When (kh, kl, r) = (
2
3
, 2
3
, 1
10
), then Con-
ditions ¬2 and 3 are satisﬁed. Thus, the corresponding equilibrium mixed strategy
is given in the right panel of the Figure 2.4.
2.4.2 Optimal public signal
Given the equilibrium strategy we can identify the optimal information structure
which maximizes each player's expected payoﬀ.
Proposition 11. Player i's maximum expected payoﬀ is min{ph(vh − vl), phplvh}.
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium mixed strategies when vh = 2, vl = 1 and ph = 0.5.
(kh, kl, r): left: (
2
3
, 2
3
, 1
3
); middle ( 1
10
, 2
3
, 1
3
); right: (2
3
, 2
3
, 1
10
).
When phvh ≥ vl the maximum expected payoﬀ is phplvh and when phvh ≤ vl
the maximum expected payoﬀ is ph(vh − vl). See Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 for two
examples of the public signal which maximizes expected payoﬀ of each player.
(vh, h) (vh, l) (vl, h) (vl, l)
(vh, h) p
2
h 0 phpl 0
(vh, l) 0 0 0 0
(vl, h) phpl 0 0 0
(vl, l) 0 0 0 p
2
l
Table 2.2: The optimal public signal
under Conditions 2, 3, 4 and 5
(vh, h) (vh, l) (vl, h) (vl, l)
(vh, h) 0 0 0 0
(vh, l) 0 p
2
h 0 phpl
(vl, h) 0 0 p
2
l 0
(vl, l) 0 phpl 0 0
Table 2.3: The optimal public signal
under Conditions ¬2, 3, 4 and ¬5
There are some common features of the two examples: 1) the high valuation
player only receives one of the signal realizations (in Table 2.2 the high valuation
type only receives h whereas in Table 2.3 the high valuation type only receives l),
and when she does so she cannot diﬀerentiate the valuation of the opponent; 2) the
low valuation type of player either only competes against a high valuation type or
only competes against a low valuation type, i.e., she can diﬀerentiate her opponent's
valuation. This drives the low valuation types to choose zero eﬀort with probability
1 when competing against a high valuation type, and the high valuation player
randomizes in an interval with the lower bound equals zero.
The examples given in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are consistent with the studies concern-
ing the partial disclosure policy {C,C,D} in the all-pay auction (Lu et al., 2016)
and in Tullock contest (Serena, 2015). In particular, such a disclosure policy requires
concealment of valuation proﬁle when it is {vh, vh} or {vl, vl}, and fully disclose the
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proﬁle to both players when it is {vh, vl}.4 Proposition 12 below indicates that there
exists a much broader set of public signals than {C,C,D} or the signals given in
Table 2.2 and 2.3, which maximize each player's expected payoﬀ.
Proposition 12. There exists an open set of public signal (kh, kl, r) which maximizes
player i's (i = 1, 2) expected payoﬀ.
See an example to understand Proposition 12. Suppose Conditions 2, ¬3, 4 and
¬5 are satisﬁed, then the expected payoﬀ of the player is always ph(vh − vl). In the
equilibrium under this combination of conditions, type (vh, h) of player i mixes over
[b(vh,h), vl] and type (vh, l) of player i mixes over [b(vh,l), vl], thus a player with high
valuation earns vh − vl. But a player with low valuation mixes over [0, vl] and thus,
earns zero. Therefore, whenever phvh ≤ vl, we can use any public signal satisfying
Conditions 2, ¬3, 4 and ¬5 to maximize players' expected payoﬀ. Since the values
(kh, kl, r) satisfying these conditions are not unique, the proposition follows.
2.5 Comparing private and public signals
In this section, we compare private and public signals in terms of increasing players'
expected payoﬀs or the total expected eﬀort. We start by showing some numerical
examples which suggest that there is no general ranking between the two signals
in terms of increasing players' expected payoﬀs. On the one hand, the following
example suggests expected payoﬀ can be larger with public than private signals.
Example 3. Suppose ph =
1
2
, vh = 2 and vl = 1. According to Proposition 11,
the maximum expected payoﬀ for player i with public signals is phplvh = ph(vh −
vl) =
1
2
. The expected payoﬀ with private signals in non-overlapping equilibrium
is −5
2
(
q − 13
20
)2
+ 49
160
which takes the maximum at 49
160
< 1
2
when q = 13
20
, and with
overlapping equilibrium is 23
36
− 1
9(3q−1)− 13q which takes the maximum at 1136 < 12 when
q = 2
3
.
On the other hand, the following example suggests the expected payoﬀ with
private signals can be larger than ph(vh − vl), i.e., the maximum expected payoﬀ of
each player with public signals when phvh 6 vl.
Example 4. Suppose ph =
2
10
, vh = 2, vl = 1 and q = 0.7. Firstly, note that
the cutoﬀ value of q is 2
3
, thus with private signals the set of parameters entails
an overlapping equilibrium, thus the expected payoﬀ is 0.2297. Secondly, note also
4Since the disclosure policy they consider is anonymous, {vh, vl} represents any valuation proﬁle
when the two players' valuations are diﬀerent.
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that phvh − vl = −0.6 < 0, thus the maximum expected payoﬀ with public signals is
ph(vh − vl) = 0.2 < 0.2297.
Similarly, the following example suggests the expected payoﬀ with private signals
can be larger than phplvh, i.e., the maximum expected payoﬀ of each player with
public signals when phvh > vl.
Example 5. Suppose ph =
1
2
, vh = 100, vl = 1 and q = 0.7. Firstly, note that
the cutoﬀ value q∗ is 100
101
, thus with private signals the set of parameters entail a
non-overlapping equilibrium, thus the expected payoﬀ is 27.844. Secondly, note also
that phvh − vl = 49 > 0, thus the maximum expected payoﬀ with public signals is
phplvh = 25 < 27.844.
Let us turn to the comparison of signals in terms of increasing total expected
eﬀort. Recall that Proposition 9 indicates that the total expected eﬀort with private
signals when q ∈ (1
2
, 1) is always lower than when q = 1
2
. Thus, if there exists an
example in which the total expected eﬀort with public signals is higher than that
in the IPV setting, i.e., q = 1
2
, then it must be true that public signals outperform
private signals.
Proposition 13. There exists an open set of public signals with which the total
expected eﬀort in the contest is higher than that with any private signal.
Again, we provide an example showing that the total expected eﬀort can be
higher with public signal than in IPV setting.
Example 6. Suppose (kh, kl, r) = (
1
10
, 2
3
, 1
3
) and ph =
1
2
, vh = 2, vl = 1. The total
expected eﬀort in this case is 1.2553, which is larger than the expected eﬀort in the
IPV setting, p2hvh + (1− p2h)vl = 1.25.
Recall that private signals always lower total expected eﬀort, thus the exam-
ple indicates that the public signal dominates private signal in maximizing total
expected eﬀort.
2.6 Conclusion
When players receive additional information regarding the opponent's valuation,
they are always better oﬀ if the information is disclosed through conditional in-
dependent signals. They may be worse oﬀ if the information is disclosed through
public signals. To maximize total expected eﬀort, it is advised to disclose informa-
tion through some public signals.
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There are multiple directions to generalize the current paper. Firstly, the signals
can be partially correlated and/or take more than two values. Since none of the
two information structure considered in the current paper dominants the other, it
can then be expected that a partially correlated signal might perform better. Sec-
ondly, there is an emerging literature on auctions with general information structure
(Bergemann et al., 2015). It is also interesting to consider the lower or upper bound
of players' expected payoﬀ or total expected eﬀort when there is no restrictions on
information structure.
2.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The non-overlapping part is proven by showing that no proﬁtable deviation
exists. Here, we show the process of checking type (vh, h)'s proﬁtable deviation.
The checking of other types' deviation can be done in the same fashion and thus is
omitted.
The expected payoﬀ of type (vh, h) when choosing an eﬀort within her own
equilibrium support, (b(vh,l), b(vh,h)):
pl(1− q) + phq(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phq
2
pl(1− q) + phqG(vh,h)(b)vh − b
Plug in (vh, h)'s mixed strategy G(vh,h)(b), the expected payoﬀ is vh− b¯(vh,h), which is
exactly her equilibrium payoﬀ. Now we check whether type (vh, h) want to deviate
to the supports of other players.
If type (vh, h) deviate to (vh, l) 's support, the expected payoﬀ becomes{
pl(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq +
phq(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phqG(vh,l)(b)
}
vh − b
plug in the equilibrium mixed strategy of (vh, l), G(vh,l), and rearrange, the parameter
of eﬀort, b, becomes
plq + ph(1− q)
pl(1− q) + phq
q
1− q − 1 (2.1)
which is also the ﬁrst order derivative of the above expected payoﬀ function w.r.t
b. If ph 6 pl, that is, expression (2.1) is positive, then type (vh, h) can increase
her payoﬀ by increasing b, until it reaches the upper bound of (vh, l)'s support,
b(vh,l), which is also the lower bound of (vh, h)'s support. This suggests deviating to
(vh, l)'s support is not proﬁtable. If, however, ph > pl and thus (2.1) is negative,
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type (vh, h) should choose the lower bound of (vh, l)'s support, b(vl,l), instead of any
eﬀort higher. Thus we need to check whether the expected payoﬀ of choosing b(vl,l)
is higher than (vh, h)'s equilibrium expected payoﬀ when choosing an eﬀort within
her own support.
Let (vh, h)'s equilibrium expected payoﬀ be pi
∗
(vh,h)
and her payoﬀ from choosing
b(vl,l) be pi(vh,h)(b(vl,l)), then the diﬀerence between the two:
pi∗(vh,h) − pi(vh,h)(b(vl,l)) = ph(1− q)
[
q
phq + pl(1− q) −
1− q
ph(1− q) + plq
]
vh > 0
Thus we have shown that type (vh, h) do not want to deviate to (vh, l)'s support.
An important observation is that the expected payoﬀ from a type deviate to another
type's support is always a linear function of b, due to the all-pay rule. This fact
ensures no strictly proﬁt maximizing eﬀort exists between the boundaries of any
types' support. This means a simpler way of checking the equilibrium is to compare
the equilibrium payoﬀs of each type with the payoﬀs from choosing each types' upper
bounds of their equilibrium supports.
Now the only thing left to check is the proﬁtability of choosing b(vl,h) and zero.
When (vh, h) chooses b(vl,h), the expected payoﬀ is
(1− p)(1− q)q
pq + (1− p)(1− q)vh −
(1− p)(1− q)2
pq + (1− p)(1− q)vl
The gap between her equilibrium expected payoﬀ and the above is:
(1− p)(1− q)
pq + (1− p)(1− q) [(1− q)vh − qvl]
which is positive when (1 − q)vh > qvl. It is trivial to show that choosing zero
cannot be more proﬁtable. Thus it is not proﬁtable for (vh, h) to choose outside of
her equilibrium support.
When qvl > (1−q)vh, the proof, again, consists of showing the indiﬀerence when
choosing an eﬀort inside the equilibrium support, and no proﬁtable deviation exists.
It is easy to check that all types are indiﬀerent when choosing an eﬀort in [b, b], thus
it is omitted. Here, we show that type (vh, h) doesn't ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate
on [0, b] and that type (vh, l) doesn't want to deviate to [b, b(vh,h)].
If type (vh, h) deviate to (0, b), then the expected payoﬀ is
pl(1− q)q
phq + pl(1− q)G(vl,h)(b)vh − b =
qvh − (1− q)vl
(1− q) vl b
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is increasing with b since qvh > (1− q)vl.
If type (vh, l) deviate to (0, b)
plq
2
ph(1− q) + phqG(vl,h)(b)vh−b =
q2((1− q)pl + phq)vh − (1− q)2 (ph(1− q) + plq) vl
vl (q − 1)2 (ph(1− q) + plq)
b
It's increasing because
q2(phq + (1− q)pl)vh − (1− q)2 (ph(1− q) + plq) vl
> q2(phq + (1− q)pl)vl − (1− q)2 (ph(1− q) + qpl) vl
= (2q − 1) (ph(1− q) + phq2 + qpl(1− q)) vl > 0
If type (vl, l) deviate to (0, b), the expected payoﬀ:
ph(2q − 1)
(1− q) (ph(1− q) + plq)b
increasing with b.
If type (vh, l) deviate to (b, b(vh,h)), the parameter of b in the expected payoﬀ
−pl(2q − 1)
q (ph(1− q) + plq)b
decreasing with b.
If type (vl, l) deviate to (b, b(vh,h)), the parameter of b in the expected payoﬀ:
(1− q)2 (phq + pl(1− q)) vl − q2 (ph(1− q) + plq) vh
q2vh (ph(1− q) + plq)
<
(1− q)2 (phq + pl(1− q))− q2 (ph(1− q) + plq)
q2vh (ph(1− q) + plq) vl
= −(2q − 1) (q(ph (1− q) + plq) + (1− q)pl)
q2vh (ph(1− q) + plq) vl < 0
If type (vl, h) deviate to (b, b(vh,h)), the parameter of b in the expected payoﬀ:
(1− q)vl − qvh)
qvh
= −qvh − (1− q)vl
qvh
< 0
Thus no type has proﬁtable deviation. The uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium
is proven in the ﬁrst chapter of this thesis.
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Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. Note ﬁrst that when q = 1
2
, the model is equivalent to the IPV setting and
thus it is well known that the expected payoﬀ of a player is phpl(vh − vl). Note also
that when q = 1, the model is equivalent to the complete information setting, thus
the expected payoﬀ of a generic player is also phpl(vh − vl).
Under non-overlapping equilibrium, that is, when (1− q)vh ≥ qvl, the expected
payoﬀ of each type are the following:
(vh, h)'s payoﬀ:
piove(vh,h) = vh −
phq
2vh + pl(1− q)2vl
phq + pl(1− q) −
plq
2vl + ph(1− q)2vh
ph(1− q) + plq
(vh, l)'s payoﬀ:
piove(vh,l) =
plqvh − plq2vl
ph(1− q) + plq −
pl(1− q)2vl
phq + pl(1− q)
(vl, l)'s payoﬀ:
piove(vl,l) =
plq(1− q)vl
ph(1− q) + plq −
pl(1− q)2vl
phq + pl(1− q)
(vl, h)'s payoﬀ: pi
ove
(vl,h)
= 0
Thus, the ex ante expected payoﬀ of a player is
pi = p((phq + pl(1− q))piove(vh,h) + (ph(1− q) + plq)piove(vh,l)) + pl(ph(1− q) + plq)piove(vl,l)
= phpl(vh − vl) + phpl(2q − 1)[ ph(1− q)(phq + pl(1− q))vh
(ph(1− q) + plq)(phq + pl(1− q))
− (−ph − q − 3phq
2 − p2hq + 2p2hq2 + 4phq + q2)vl
(ph(1− q) + plq)(phq + pl(1− q)) ]
> phpl(vh − vl) + ph(2q − 1) pl(1− q)vl
phq + pl(1− q)
> phpl(vh − vl)
The greater equality used the condition (1− q)vh ≥ qvl. Recall that both SPA and
the non-overlapping equilibrium in the model ensures eﬃcient allocation, thus the
social surplus are the same across the two auctions. The total expected eﬀort is thus
higher in SPA than in APA.
If (1 − q)vh 6 qvl, i.e., under overlapping equilibrium, the expected payoﬀ are
the following:
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(vh, h)'s payoﬀ:
pinon(vh,h) = vh − b(vh,h)
=
pl(1− q)
phq + pl(1− q)(vh − vl)
(vh, l)'s payoﬀ:
pinon(vh,l) =
plq
2
ph(1− q) + plqG(vl,h)(b)vh − b
=
(vh − vl)
qvh − (1− q)vl (
plq
2
ph(1− q) + plqvh −
pl(1− q)2)
phq + pl(1− q)vl)
(vl, l)'s payoﬀ:
pinon(vl,l) =
plq(1− q)
ph(1− q) + plqG(vl,h)(b)vl − b
=
(1− q)vl
qvh − (1− q)vl (
q
ph(1− q) + plq −
(1− q)
phq + pl(1− q))pl(vh − vl)
(vl, h)'s payoﬀ: pi
non
(vl,h)
= 0.
Thus player's surplus
pi = phpl(vh − vl)q(phq + pl(1− q))vh − (1− q)(−ph − 3q + 2phq + 2)vl
(qvh − (1− q)vl)(phq + pl(1− q))
= phpl(vh − vl)(1 + (1− q)(2q − 1)vl
(qvh − (1− q)vl)(phq + pl(1− q)))
> phpl(vh − vl)
This completes the proof of the ﬁrst part of the equilibrium, now we turn to the
second part. The social surplus, SS, is p2l vl + (1 − p2l )vh in the non-overlapping
equilibrium as the allocation is eﬃcient, and is less than that in the overlapping
equilibrium. Proposition 9 shows each player's expected payoﬀ when q ∈ (1
2
, 1) is
higher than when q = 1
2
, 1, i.e., pi(q) > phpl(vh − vl). Thus the total expected eﬀort
equals the social surplus minus the joint expected payoﬀ of players which is
R = SS − 2pi(q)
6 p2l vl + (1− p2l )vh − 2pi
< p2l vl + (1− p2l )vh − 2phpl(vh − vl)
= p2hvh + (1− p2h)vl
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This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10
Lemmas 10, 11, 12 proves that the strategy proﬁle given under the Conditions 2 and
3 is indeed the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 10. When Conditions 2 and 3 are satisﬁed, then types (vh, h) and (vl, h)
randomize in non-overlapping supports. Furthermore, the support of type (vh, h) is
higher than the support of (vl, h).
Proof. For the ﬁrst part of the lemma, suppose both the two types randomize in an
interval, then in this interval it must be true that(
phkh
phkh + plr
G(vh,h) +
plr
phkh + plr
G(vl,h)
)
vh − b = K(vh,h)(
phr
phr + pl(1− kl)G(vh,h) +
pl(1− kl)
phr + pl(1− kl)G(vl,h)
)
vl − b = K(vl,h)
Thus,
G(vh,h)(b) =
r (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh − (1− kl) (phkh + plr) vl
ph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl b
− (1− kl) plr + phkh
ph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vh (vh − vl)
G(vl,h)(b) =
{ −kh(phr+pl(1−kl))vh+r(plr+phkh)vl
pl(r2−kh(1−kl))vhvl b+
r(plr+phkh)(vh−vl)
pl(r2−kh(1−kl))vh , for b ∈ [b(vh,h), vl]
phr+pl(1−kl)
pl(1−kl)vl b, for b ∈ [0, b(vh,h)]
In this case, the slop of G(vh,h)(b) is
r (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh − (1− kl) (phkh + plr) vl
ph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl
= (phr + pl (1− kl)) (phkh + plr)
plr
(phkh+plr)
vh − pl(1−kl)(phr+pl(1−kl))vl
plph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl
In this case, the slop of G(vl,h)(b) is
−kh (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh + r (plr + phkh) vl
pl (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl
= (phr + pl (1− kl)) (plr + phkh)
phr
(phr+pl(1−kl))vl −
phkh
(plr+phkh)
vh
phpl (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl
For the slop of G(vh,h)(b) to be positive and the Condition 2 to be satisﬁed, it must
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be true that (r2 − kh (1− kl)) > 0, for the slop of G(vl,h)(b) to be positive and
the Condition 3 to be satisﬁed, it must be true that (r2 − kh (1− kl)) < 0. Thus,
when Conditions 2 and 3 both satisﬁed, type (vh, h) and (vl, h)'s support cannot be
overlapping.
Now we prove that the support of (vh, h) must be higher than the support of
(vl, h). Suppose instead that the type (vl, h) mixes over the interval [̂b, b˜], but the
type (vh, h) randomizes in the interval [0, b̂], as the lowest possible eﬀort for each
player must be 0. However, this then implies type (vh, h) must earns an expected
payoﬀ of 0, which cannot be true in any equilibrium as she can also deviate by
choosing vl to earn positive payoﬀ.
Lemma 11. When Conditions 2 and 3 are satisﬁed, the mixed strategies given in
the proposition form a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. When Conditions 2 and 3 are satisﬁed, we ﬁrst show that a player with type
(vl, h) is indiﬀerent in the equilibrium support. By plugging in the mixed strategy
G(vl,h)(b) in equilibrium, the expected payoﬀ indeed equals zero:
G(vl,h)(b)
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)vl − b = 0
For type (vh, h), we plug in G(vh,h)(b) and the expected payoﬀ is also constant and
equals the expected payoﬀ given in the proposition:(
plr
phkh + plr
+G(vh,h)(b)
phkh
phkh + plr
)
vh − b = plr
phkh + plr
vh − pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)vl
Note that Condition 2 guarantees the expected payoﬀ of type (vh, h) is non-negative.
Now we check for proﬁtable deviations when each type deviates to choose outside
of her equilibrium support. When type (vh, h) deviate to the support of (vl, h), the
expected payoﬀ becomes
G(vl,h)(b)
plr
phkh + plr
vh − b
=
phr + pl (1− kl)
pl (1− kl) vl b
plr
phkh + plr
vh − b
=
(
r
(1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)
phkh + plr
vh
vl
− 1
)
b
This expected payoﬀ is increasing with b given the Condition 2 is satisﬁed. Thus,
type (vh, h) does not want to deviate to the support of (vl, h). When type (vl, h)
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deviates to the support of (vh, h), the expected payoﬀ is:(
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl) +G(vh,h)(b)
phr
phr + pl (1− kl)
)
vl − b
=
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)vl
+
(
phkh + plr
phkhvh
b− vl
vh
pl (1− kl)
phkh
phkh + plr
phr + pl (1− kl)
)
phr
phr + pl (1− kl)vl − b
=
(
vl
vh
r
kh
phkh + plr
phr + pl (1− kl) − 1
)
b
+ vl
(
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl) −
vl
vh
(1− kl)
kh
plr
rpl + khph
(rph + (1− kl) pl)2
)
This expected payoﬀ is decreasing in b given the condition if Condition 3 is satisﬁed.
Thus, this is not a proﬁtable deviation.
Lemma 12. When Conditions 2 and 3 are satisﬁed, then there is no asymmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. Denote by b1(vh,h) and b2(vh,h) the upper bound of equilibrium support of
player 1 and 2, respectively. From a similar argument from the proof of Lemma
above, for both players the type (vh, h) must choose higher than (vl, h). Thus, it
must be true in any equilibrium that b1(vh,h) = b2(vh,h). If there exists an asymmetric
equilibrium, then it must be true that b1(vl,h) 6= b2(vl,h). Suppose without loss that
b1(vl,h) > b2(vl,h). Since type (vl, h) of player 1 is indiﬀerent between any eﬀort in
[0, b2(vl,h)], thus her expected payoﬀ
pl(1− kl)
phr + pl(1− kl)G2(vl,h)(b)vl − b = 0
which gives
G2(vl,h)(b) =
phr + pl(1− kl)
pl(1− kl)vl b
and b2(vl,h) =
pl(1−kl)vl
phr+pl(1−kl) = b(vl,h) as given in the proposition. Since type (vl, h) of
player 2 is also indiﬀerent between any eﬀort in [0, b2(vl,h)], thus her expected payoﬀ
pl(1− kl)
phr + pl(1− kl)G1(vl,h)(b)vl − b = 0
which then gives
G1(vl,h)(b) =
phr + pl(1− kl)
pl(1− kl)vl b
and it can be shown that G1(vl,h)(b(vl,h)) = 1. Thus, it must be true that b1(vl,h) =
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b2(vl,h).
Lemmas 13, 14, 15 proves that the strategy proﬁle given under the Conditions 2
and ¬3 is indeed the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 13. When Conditions 2 and ¬3 are satisﬁed, then in any equilibrium types
(vh, h) and (vl, h) randomize in overlapping supports. Furthermore, the upper bound
of supports b(vh,h) = b(vl,h). Finally, the expected payoﬀ of (vl, h) must be 0 and the
expected payoﬀ of (vh, h) must be vh − vl.
Proof. Suppose types (vh, h) and (vl, h) randomize in non-overlapping equilibrium.
Then the support of (vh, h) must be higher than (vl, h), thus type (vl, h)'s expected
payoﬀ must be zero. However, by choosing b(vh,h) the type (vl, h)'s expected payoﬀ
must be vl − b(vh,h) = phrphr+pl(1−kl)vl −
phkh
phkh+plr
vh > 0, as the Condition ¬3 is strictly
satisﬁed. Thus, in any symmetric equilibrium it cannot be true that the supports
are overlapping.
In any symmetric equilibrium, it cannot be true that both types earn positive
payoﬀ, as one of the types must have the lower bound of support equals 0. Suppose
both types have lower bound equals 0, then both earn a payoﬀ of 0. In that case,
the indiﬀerence conditions in the overlapping interval of their supports are(
phkh
phkh + plr
G(vh,h)(b) +
plr
phkh + plr
G(vl,h)(b)
)
vh − b = 0(
phr
phr + pl(1− kl)G(vh,h)(b) +
pl(1− kl)
phr + pl(1− kl)G(vl,h)(b)
)
vl − b = 0
and thus
G(vh,h)(b) =
r (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh − (1− kl) (phkh + plr) vl
ph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl b
G(vl,h)(b) =
−kh (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh + r (phkh + plr) vl
pl (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl b
By letting G(vh,h)(b) = G(vl,h)(b) = 1, we have
b(vh,h) =
phpl (r
2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl
(phr + pl (1− kl)) (phkh + plr)
1
plr
(phkh+plr)
vh − pl(1−kl)(phr+pl(1−kl))vl
and
b(vl,h) =
phpl (r
2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl
(phr + pl (1− kl)) (plr + phkh)
1
− phkh
(plr+phkh)
vh +
phr
(phr+pl(1−kl))vl
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thus
b(vh,h) − b(vl,h)
=
phpl (r
2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl
(phr + pl (1− kl)) (phkh + plr)
(
1
plrvh
(phkh+plr)
− pl(1−kl)vl
(phr+pl(1−kl))
− 1
phrvl
(phr+pl(1−kl)) −
phkhvh
(plr+phkh)
)
<
phpl (r
2 − kh (1− kl)) vh
(phr + pl (1− kl)) (phkh + plr)
(
1
plr
(phkh+plr)
− pl(1−kl)
(phr+pl(1−kl))
− 1
plr
(plr+phkh)
− pl(1−kl)
(phr+pl(1−kl))
)
= 0
This means b(vh,h) < b(vl,h). Then it must be true that b(vl,h) 6 vl as any eﬀort above
vl is strictly dominated to type (vl, h). But then type (vh, h) has an incentive to
choose b(vl,h) to earn vh − b(vl,h) > vh − vl > 0. Thus, it cannot be true that both
types have lower bound of support equals 0.
So the only case left is type (vh, h) earns positive expected payoﬀ whereas type
(vl, h) earns 0. Thus, the lower bound of (vh, h)'s support must be positive. It
cannot be true that b(vh,h) < b(vl,h) < vl, as then the expected payoﬀ of (vl, h) would
be positive. It cannot be true that b(vh,h) < b(vl,h) = vl, as type (vh, h) will increase
the eﬀort until b(vl,h) in the interval [b(vh,h), b(vl,h)]. In particular, we have for type
(vl, h) in the interval [b(vh,h), b(vl,h)] that:(
pl(1− kl)
phr + pl(1− kl)G(vl,h)(b) +
phr
phr + pl(1− kl)
)
vl − b = 0
thus
G(vl,h)(b) =
phr + pl(1− kl)
pl(1− kl)
b
vl
− phr
pl(1− kl)
Now if type (vh, h) increase the eﬀort from b(vh,h) to b ∈ (b(vh,h), b(vl,h)) the expected
payoﬀ increases by
plr
phkh + plr
[
G(vl,h)(b)−G(vl,h)(b(vh,h))
]
vh −
[
b− b(vh,h)
]
=
[
plr
phkh + plr
phr + pl(1− kl)
pl(1− kl)
vh
vl
− 1
] [
b− b(vh,h)
]
> 0
According to Condition 2 this is positive. Thus we must have b(vh,h) > b(vl,h). Sup-
pose b(vh,h) > b(vl,h), then in the interval [b(vl,h), b(vh,h)], type (vh, h) must be indiﬀer-
ent (
phkh
phkh + plr
G(vh,h)(b) +
plr
phkh + plr
)
vh − b = pi(vh,h)
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nd thus the mixed strategy is
G(vh,h)(b) =
phkh + plr
phkh
b+ pi(vh,h)
vh
− plr
phkh
If type (vl, l) increases her eﬀort from b(vl,h) to b ∈ (b(vl,h), b(vh,h)) then the expected
payoﬀ increases by
phr
phr + pl(1− kl)
[
G(vh,h)(b)−G(vh,h)(b(vl,h))
]
vl −
[
b− b(vl,h)
]
=
[
phr
phr + pl(1− kl)
phkh + plr
phkh
vl
vh
− 1
] [
b− b(vl,h)
]
> 0
According to Condition ¬3 this is positive. Thus, it must be true that b(vh,h) = b(vl,h).
Consider the interval [b(vh,h), b(vh,h)], where type (vh, h) and (vl, h)'s indiﬀerence con-
ditions must be(
phkh
phkh + plr
G(vh,h)(b) +
plr
phkh + plr
G(vl,h)(b)
)
vh − b = pi(vh,h)(
phr
phr + pl(1− kl)G(vh,h)(b) +
pl(1− kl)
phr + pl(1− kl)G(vl,h)(b)
)
vl − b = 0
and thus
G(vh,h)(b) =
r (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh − (1− kl) (phkh + plr) vl
ph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl b
− (1− kl) plr + phkh
ph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhpi(vh,h)
G(vl,h)(b) =
−kh (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh + r (plr + phkh) vl
pl (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl b+ r
plr + phkh
pl (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhpi(vh,h)
Given that b(vh,h) = b(vl,h) = β, we have G(vh,h)(β) = G(vl,h)(β) = 1, this implies
pi(vh,h) = vh − vl and β = vl.
Lemma 14. When Conditions 2 and ¬3 are satisﬁed, the mixed strategies given in
the proposition form a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. When Conditions 2 and ¬3 are satisﬁed, we show that type (vl, h) and (vh, h)
are indiﬀerent in their equilibrium support. In the interval [b(vh,h), vl], for type (vl, h),
the expected payoﬀ is calculated by plugging in the expression of G(vh,h)(b) and
G(vl,h)(b), the expected payoﬀ is zero:(
G(vh,h)(b)
phr
phr + pl (1− kl) +G(vl,h)(b)
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)
)
vl − b = 0
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Similarly, type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ can be shown to be a constant vh − vl:(
G(vh,h)(b)
phkh
phkh + plr
+G(vl,h)(b)
plr
phkh + plr
)
vh − b = vh − vl
Since only type (vl, h) is choosing an eﬀort in the interval [0, b(vh,h)], by plug the
G(vl,h)(b) in, her expected payoﬀ in this interval is
G(vl,h)(b)
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)vl − b = 0
Now we prove that both types do not want to deviate to any eﬀort outside
of their equilibrium support. When type (vh, h) deviates to [0, b(vh,h)], then her
expected payoﬀ would be
G(vl,h)(b)
plr
phkh + plr
vh − b
=
phr + pl (1− kl)
pl (1− kl) vl b
plr
phkh + plr
vh − b
= b
r (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh − (1− kl) (phkh + plr) vl
vl (1− kl) (rpl + khph)
This is increasing in b.
Lemma 15. When Conditions 2 and ¬3 are satisﬁed, then there is no asymmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. If player 1 has b1(vh,h) = b1(vl,h) = vl, then player 2 must have b2(vh,h) =
b2(vl,h) = vl. To see why, suppose b2(vh,h) < b2(vl,h) = vl, then by the same argument
in the previous lemma, type (vh, h) of player 1 is strictly better oﬀ by reallocating
probability mass from the interval (b2(vh,h), b2(vl,h)) to vl. Similarly, if b2(vh,h) = vl >
b2(vl,h), then the previous lemma indicates that type (vl, h) is strictly better oﬀ by
reallocating probability mass from the interval (b2(vl,h), b2(vh,h)) to vl. Thus, it must
be true that b1(vh,h) = b1(vl,h) = b2(vh,h) = b2(vl,h) = vl, which means the expected
payoﬀ are the same as in the unique symmetric equilibrium.
By G1(vh.h)(b1(vh,h)) = 0, it can be checked that b1(vh,h) = b(vh,h) as in the symmet-
ric equilibrium. Similarly, it can be found that b2(vh,h) = b(vh,h) by G2(vh.h)(b2(vh,h)) =
0. Therefore, b1(vh,h) = b2(vh,h) = b(vh,h) in any equilibrium.
Lemmas 16, 17, 18 proves that the strategy proﬁle given under the Conditions
¬2 and 3 is indeed the unique equilibrium.
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Lemma 16. When Conditions ¬2 and 3 are satisﬁed, then in any equilibrium types
(vh, h) and (vl, h) randomize in overlapping supports. Furthermore, the expected
payoﬀ for both types are zero.
Proof. Suppose (vh, h) and (vl, h) randomize in non-overlapping supports in a sym-
metric equilibrium, then again it must be true that (vh, h)'s support is higher
than (vl, h). This implies type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ must be vh − b(vh,h) =
plr
phkh+plr
vh− pl(1−kl)phr+pl(1−kl)vl 6 0, as Condition ¬2 is satisﬁed. Therefore, the two types
must have overlapping supports.
Again it cannot be true that both types earn positive payoﬀ. Now, suppose type
(vh, h) earns positive payoﬀ and type (vl, h) earns zero. Thus b(vh,h) > b(vl,h) = 0. In
the interval [0, b(vh,h)], type (vl, h)'s indiﬀerence condition is
pl(1− kl)
phr + pl(1− kl)G(vl,h)(b)vl − b = 0
thus
G(vl,h)(b) =
phr + pl(1− kl)
pl(1− kl)
b
vl
Now if type (vh, h) decreases her eﬀort from b(vh,h) to b ∈
(
0, b(vh,h)
)
, her expected
payoﬀ increses by
plr
phkh + plr
[
G(vl,h)(b)−G(vl,h)(b(vh,h))
]
vh −
[
b− b(vh,h)
]
=
[
plr
phkh + plr
phr + pl(1− kl)
pl(1− kl)
vh
vl
− 1
] [
b− b(vh,h)
]
> 0
According to Condition ¬2, the above is positive. Thus, it is proﬁtable for type
(vh, h) to decrease the eﬀort until 0. This then implies the expected payoﬀ of type
(vh, h) must also be 0. This then implies b(vh,h) = vh, as any vh > b(vh,h) suggests
type (vh, h) earns positive expected payoﬀ.
Lemma 17. When Conditions ¬2 and 3 are satisﬁed, the mixed strategies given in
the proposition form a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. When Conditions ¬2 and 3 are satisﬁed, both type (vh, h) and (vl, h) are
indiﬀerent in the equilibrium support [0, b(vl,h)], and they both get zero:(
G(vh,h)(b)
phr
phr + pl (1− kl) +G(vl,h)(b)
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)
)
vl − b = 0(
G(vh,h)(b)
phkh
phkh + plr
+G(vl,h)(b)
plr
phkh + plr
)
vh − b = 0
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Type (vh, h) also get zero when choosing an eﬀort in [b(vl,h), vh] as(
plr
phkh + plr
+G(vh,h)(b)
phkh
phkh + plr
)
vh − b = 0
Type (vl, h) does not want to deviate to [b(vl,h), vh] as(
G(vh,h)(b)
phr
phr + pl (1− kl) +
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)
)
vl − b
=
(
r (plr + phkh)
kh (pl (1− kl) + phr)
vl
vh
− 1
)
b+ vl
(
pl (1− kl)
pl (1− kl) + phr +
r
kh
plr
pl (1− kl) + phr
)
which is decreasing in b. Thus none of the two types want to deviate.
Lemma 18. When Conditions ¬2 and 3 are satisﬁed, then there is no asymmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. Only thing to check is that b1(vl,h) = b2(vl,h). Suppose b1(vl,h) > b2(vl,h). Type
(vh, h) and (vl, h) of player 2's expected payoﬀ is(
phkh
phkh + plr
G1(vh,h)(b) +
plr
phkh + plr
G1(vl,h)(b)
)
vh − b = 0(
phr
phr + pl(1− kl)G1(vh,h)(b) +
pl(1− kl)
phr + pl(1− kl)G1(vl,h)(b)
)
vl − b = 0
when means
G1(vh,h)(b) =
r (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh − (1− kl) (phkh + plr) vl
ph (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl b
G1(vl,h)(b) =
−kh (phr + pl (1− kl)) vh + r (plr + phkh) vl
pl (r2 − kh (1− kl)) vhvl b
Then according to G1(vl,h)(b1(vl,h)) = 1, we have b1(vl,h) = b(vl,h). Similarly we can
ﬁnd G2(vl,h)(b), and according to G2(vl,h)(b2(vl,h)) = 1, we have b2(vl,h) = b(vl,h).
Finally, the part of the proof for types (vh, l) and (vl, l) can be obtained by
exchanging kh with 1− kh, kl with 1− kl and r with 1− r in the above proofs.
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Note ﬁrst that there are 3× 3 possible cases as it is not possible to have ¬2
and ¬3 satisﬁed simultaneously or ¬4 and ¬5 satisﬁed simultaneously.
Case 1: When Conditions 2, ¬3, 4 and ¬5 are satisﬁed, then by the equilibrium
strategy given in the Proposition 3, the expected payoﬀs of each type are: Type
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(vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) = vh − vl; type (vl, h)'s expected payoﬀ:
V(vl,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; and type (vh, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r) = vh − vl;
type (vl, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0.
Thus, player i's expected payoﬀ is ph (vh − vl) for all values of (kh, kl, r) satisfying
Conditions 2, ¬3, 4 and ¬5. Suppose phvh > vl then according to Condition ¬3
phkh
phkh + plr
vh − phr
phr + pl (1− kl)vl
>
(
kh
phkh + plr
− phr
phr + pl (1− kl)
)
vl
And according to Condition ¬5
ph (1− kh)
ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r)vh −
ph (1− r)
ph (1− r) + plkl vl
>
(
(1− kh)
ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r) −
ph (1− r)
ph (1− r) + plkl
)
vl
After rearrange, we have (1− kl) kh 6 phr (r − kh) and kl (1− kh) 6 ph (1− r) (kh − r)
which then implies kh = r. But this is inconsistent with ¬3 and ¬5 since we also
have phvh − phrphr+pl(1−kl)vl >
pl(1−kl)
phr+pl(1−kl)vl > 0 which contradicts ¬3; and since we
also have phvh − ph(1−r)ph(1−r)+plklvl >
plkl
ph(1−r)+plklvl > 0 which contradicts ¬5. Therefore,
it must be true that phvh ≤ vl, and thus, ph(vh − vl) 6 phplvh.
Case 2: When Conditions 2, 3, 4 and 5 are satisﬁed, then the expected payoﬀs
of each type are: Type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) =
plr
phkh+plr
vh −
pl(1−kl)
phr+pl(1−kl)vl; type (vl, h)'s expected: V(vl,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vh, l)'s expected
payoﬀ: V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r) =
pl(1−r)
ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r)vh −
plkl
ph(1−r)+plklvl; type (vl, l)'s expected:
V(vl,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0
Thus, player i's expected payoﬀ is
V (kh, kl, r) = ph (phkh + plr)V(vh,h) + ph (ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r))V(vh,l)
= phplvh −
(
(1− kl) phkh + plr
phr + pl (1− kl) + kl
ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r)
ph(1− r) + plkl
)
phplvl
Note that the expected payoﬀ is maximized if the second term is zero, which is
when kh = kl = r = 1, and the Conditions 2 and 3 now becomes plvh > 0 and phvh−
vl > 0 The Conditions 4 and 5 are irrelevant in this case as the probability of
receiving a signal l is zero for players with vh. Thus, the maximum is phplvh. Note
that Condition 3 implies ph(vh − vl) > phplvh = V (kh, kl, r).
Case 3: When Conditions ¬2, 3, 4 and 5 are satisﬁed, then the expected payoﬀs
of each type are: Type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vl, h)'s
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expected payoﬀ: V(vl,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vh, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r) =
pl(1−r)
ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r)vh −
plkl
ph(1−r)+plklvl; type (vl, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0
Thus, player i's expected payoﬀ is
V (kh, kl, r) = ph (ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r))
(
pl(1− r)
ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r)vh −
plkl
ph(1− r) + plkl vl
)
= phpl(1− r)vh − ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r)
ph(1− r) + plkl phplklvl
and when kl = r = 0, V (kh, kl, r) reaches its maximum phplvh. Check the conditions
when kl = r = 0 in the order of Conditions ¬2, 3, 4 and 5:
−vl 6 0 and vh > 0
pl
ph(1− kh) + pl vh − vl > 0 and
ph (1− kh)
ph (1− kh) + pl vh − vl > 0
Thus Conditions ¬2 and 3 are satisﬁed, but Conditions 4 and 5 impose some re-
strictions on kh: kh ∈ [1 − plph
vh−vl
vl
, 1 − pl
ph
vl
vh−vl ]. Since kh is restricted to be
between zero and one, we need 1 − pl
ph
vl
vh−vl > 0 which implies phvh > vl, thus,
ph(vh − vl) > phplvh = V (kh, kl, r).
Case 4: When Conditions ¬2, 3, ¬4 and 5 are satisﬁed, then the expected payoﬀs
of each type are: Type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vl, h)'s
expected payoﬀ: V(vl,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vh, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r) =
0; type (vl, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0. Thus, player i's ex ante expected
payoﬀ is 0.
Case 5: When Conditions 2, 3, ¬4 and 5 are satisﬁed, then the expected pay-
oﬀs of each type are: type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) =
plr
phkh+plr
vh −
pl(1−kl)
phr+pl(1−kl)vl; type (vl, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vh, l)'s ex-
pected payoﬀ: V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vl, l)'s expected: V(vl,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0
Thus, player i's ex ante expected payoﬀ is:
V (kh, kl, r) = phplrvh − phkh + plr
phr + pl (1− kl)phpl (1− kl) vl
Let kl = r = 1, then it is maximized at phplvh. See below that Conditions ¬4
and 5 are satisﬁed, whereas Conditions 2 and 3 impose some restrictions on kh:
kh > plph
vl
vh−vl :
pl
phkh + pl
vh > 0 and
phkh
phkh + pl
vh − vl > 0
−vl 6 0 and vh − vl > 0
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Since kh has to be between zero and one, we need
pl
ph
vl
vh−vl 6 1 which implies vl 6
phvh, and thus ph(vh − vl) > phplvh.
Case 6: When Conditions ¬2, 3, 4 and ¬5 are satisﬁed, then the expected payoﬀs
of each type are: Type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vl, h)'s
expected payoﬀ: V(vl,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vh, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r) =
vh − vl; type (vl, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0.
Thus, player i's ex ante expected payoﬀ is:
V (kh, kl, r) = ph (ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r)) (vh − vl)
which is maximized at ph (vh − vl) when kh = r = 0. In this case ¬5 implies
phvh 6 vl, then ph (vh − vl) 6 phplvh
Case 7: When Conditions 2, 3, 4 and ¬5 are satisﬁed, then the expected pay-
oﬀs of each type are: Type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) =
plr
phkh+plr
vh −
pl(1−kl)
phr+pl(1−kl)vl; type (vl, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vh, l)'s ex-
pected payoﬀ: V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r) = vh−vl; type (vl, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,l)(kh, kl, r) =
0.
Thus, player i's ex ante expected payoﬀ is:
V (kh, kl, r) = ph (phkh + plr)V(vh,h) + ph (ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r))V(vh,l)
= ph (pl + ph (1− kh)) vh − ph
(
1− phr
phr + pl (1− kl) (phkh + plr)
)
vl
Since the Condition 3 is equivalent of phkhvh − phrphr+pl(1−kl) (phkh + plr) vl > 0,
we thus have V (kh, kl, r) 6 ph (vh − vl). In other words, when the Condition 3 is
binding, the expected payoﬀ reaches its maximum of ph (vh − vl). Thus, any public
signal (kh, kl, r) satisﬁes the Condition 3 when it is binding and satisﬁes Condition
2, 4, ¬5 maximizes the expected payoﬀ.
Suppose phvh > vl, then ¬5 implies 0 6 ph(1−kh)ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r)vh −
ph(1−r)
ph(1−r)+plklvl >(
(1−kh)
ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r) −
ph(1−r)
ph(1−r)+plkl
)
vl and thus,
(1−kh)
ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r) 6
ph(1−r)
ph(1−r)+plkl thus kl (1− kh) 6
ph (1− r) (kh − r). Similarly, 3 implies khphkh+plr 6
phr
phr+pl(1−kl) thus (1− kl) kh 6
phr (r − kh). Thus, it must be true that kh = r. Thus, phvh − ph(1−r)ph(1−r)+plklvl >
plkl
ph(1−r)+plklvl and ¬5 implies kl = 0. But this is inconsistent with 3 binding, as
phvh − phrphr+plvl >
pl
phr+pl
vl > 0. Therefore, we must have phvh 6 vl and thus,
ph (vh − vl) 6 phplvh = V (kh, kl, r).
Case 8: When Conditions 2, ¬3, 4 and 5 are satisﬁed, then the expected pay-
oﬀs of each type are: Type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) = vh − vl;
type (vl, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vh, l)'s expected payoﬀ:
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V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r) =
pl(1−r)
ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r)vh −
plkl
ph(1−r)+plklvl; type (vl, l)'s expected payoﬀ:
V(vl,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0.
Thus, player i's ex ante expected payoﬀ is:
V (kh, kl, r) = ph (phkh + plr)V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) + ph (ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r))V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r)
= ph (phkh + pl) vh − ph
(
phkh + plr +
ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r)
ph(1− r) + plkl plkl
)
vl
It is decreasing with kl, thus let kl = 0, and we have
V (kh, kl, r) = ph (phkh (vh − vl)− plrvl) + phplvh
which is increasing with kh and decreasing with r. Now given that kl = 0, the
conditions become the following (in the order of Conditions 2, ¬3, 4 and 5)
plr
phkh + plr
vh − pl
phr + pl
vl > 0 and
phkh
phkh + plr
vh − phr
phr + pl
vl 6 0
pl (1− r)
ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r)vh > 0 and
ph (1− kh)
ph (1− kh) + pl (1− r)vh − vl > 0
The Condition 5 then implies: ph (vh − vl)− plvl > phkh (vh − vl)− plrvl and thus,
V (kh, kl, r) 6 ph (vh − vl). To reach the maximum, Condition 5 must be binding, i.e.,
ph(1−kh)
ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r)vh = vl. Suppose phvh > vl, then we have vl =
ph(1−kh)
ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r)vh >
(1−kh)
ph(1−kh)+pl(1−r)vl thus kh > r. This then violates Condition ¬3 as
phkh
phkh+plr
vh −
phr
phr+pl
vl >
(
kh
phkh+plr
− phr
phr+pl
)
vl >
(
1− phr
phr+pl
)
vl > 0. Thus, it must be true that
ph (vh − vl) 6 phplvh.
Case 9: When Conditions 2, ¬3, ¬4 and 5 are satisﬁed, then the expected
payoﬀs of each type are: Type (vh, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vh,h)(kh, kl, r) = vh − vl;
type (vl, h)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,h)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vh, l)'s expected payoﬀ:
V(vh,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0; type (vl, l)'s expected payoﬀ: V(vl,l)(kh, kl, r) = 0.
Thus, player i's ex ante expected payoﬀ is:
V (kh, kl, r) = ph (phkh + plr) (vh − vl)
which is maximized at ph (vh − vl) when kh = r = 1. In this case ¬3 implies
ph(vh − vl) 6 phplvh.
Therefore, the maximum expected payoﬀ is min{phplvh, ph(vh − vl)}.
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Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. First, we show that with all possible set of parameters of the all-pay auction,
i.e., any ph ∈ (0, 1) and vh > vl, there exists a public signal which raises at least the
same total expected eﬀort as the IPV setting, which is the highest total expected
eﬀort the all-pay auction can raise with private signal. Suppose kh = r = 1−kl = s,
then it can be easily checked that Conditions 2, 3, 4 and 5 are satisﬁed. Thus,
all types randomize in non-overlapping intervals. Furthermore, player i's expected
eﬀort equals:
pl(phr + pl(1− kl))1
2
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)vl (2.2)
+ ph(phkh + plr)
(
pl (1− kl)
phr + pl (1− kl)vl +
1
2
phkh
phkh + plr
vh
)
(2.3)
+ pl(ph(1− r) + plkl)1
2
plkl
ph(1− r) + plkl vl (2.4)
+ ph(ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r))(
plkl
ph(1− r) + plkl vl +
1
2
ph(1− kh)
ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r)vh
)
(2.5)
where (2.2) is pl(phr + pl(1 − kl)) times the expected eﬀort of type (vl, h), (2.3) is
ph(phkh + plr) times the expected eﬀort of type (vh, h), (2.4) is pl(ph(1− r) + plkl)
times the expected eﬀort of type (vl, l), and (2.5) is ph(ph(1− kh) + pl(1− r)) times
the expected eﬀort of type (vh, l). Let
kh = r = 1− kl = s ∈ [0, 1], (2.6)
then the above becomes p2hvh + (1− p2h)vl which is equivalent of the total expected
eﬀort in the IPV setting, i.e., the maximum total expected eﬀort with the private
signal. Thus, for any value of ph and vh > vl, we can always let the public signal
satisﬁes (2.6). This means using public signal can at least raise a total expected
eﬀort no less than using private signal.
Next, we provide an example in which public signal raises higher total expected
eﬀort.
Example 7. Suppose (kh, kl, r) = (
1
10
, 2
3
, 1
3
) and ph =
1
2
. The total expected eﬀort in
this case is 1.2553, which is larger than the total expected eﬀort in the IPV setting,
i.e., 1.25.
Therefore, using public signal, the all-pay auction can always raise a total ex-
pected eﬀort equals to that in the IPV setting, and with some set of parameters
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(e.g. the open ball centered at the point (kh, kl, r) = (
1
10
, 2
3
, 1
3
)), public signal in-
duces higher expected eﬀort.
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneous Risk/Loss Aversion in
Complete Information All-Pay
Auctions
Zhuoqiong Chen, David Ong and Ella Segev
Abstract We extend previous theoretical work on n-players complete information
all-pay auction to incorporate heterogeneous risk and loss averse utility functions.
We provide suﬃcient and necessary conditions for the existence of equilibria with
a given set of active players with any strictly increasing utility functions and char-
acterize the players' equilibrium mixed strategies. Assuming that players can be
ordered by their risk aversion (player a is more risk averse than player b if when-
ever player b prefers a certain payment over a given lottery so will player a), we
ﬁnd that, in equilibrium, the more risk averse players either bid higher (in terms
of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance of their mixed strategy cumulative distribution)
than the less risk averse players and win with higher ex-ante probability  or they
drop out. Furthermore, while each player's expected bid decreases with the other
players' risk aversion, her expected bid increases with her own risk aversion. Thus,
increasing a player's risk aversion creates two opposing eﬀects on total expected
bid. A suﬃcient condition for the total expected bid to decrease with a player's
risk aversion is that this player is relatively more risk averse compared to the rest of
the players. Our ﬁndings have important implications for the literature on gender
diﬀerences in competitiveness and for gender diversity in ﬁrms that use personnel
contests for promotions.
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3.1 Introduction
Sunk cost contests, where eﬀort is unrecoverable, are pervasive. Especially impor-
tant are those where the winners need only perform slightly better to take all (Frank
and Cook, 2010; Rosen, 1981). These are in eﬀect all-pay auctions in their incen-
tive structure. Indeed, all-pay auctions theory has been used to study many types
of contest and tournaments, e.g., rent seeking contest and lobbying (Baye et al.,
1993; Ellingsen, 1991; Hillman and Riley, 1989), election campaigns (Che and Gale,
1998), R&D races (Dasgupta et al., 1982), college admission (Andreoni and Brown-
back, 2014; Hickman, 2014), and job promotion (Rosen, 1986). In these contests,
the risk of lost eﬀort, opportunities, or resources to individuals can be signiﬁcant.
Furthermore, even contests between organizations, like ﬁrms, can involve signiﬁcant
loss to individuals to the extent that decisions are made by individual CEOs and
managers who care about the consequences of those decisions on their own wel-
fare, through such mechanisms, for example, as options in compensation packages
(Bertrand, 2009), and of course, in promotions and in dismissals based upon relative
performance. However, despite the importance of risk in such contests which can be
modeled as all-pay auctions, the modeling of all-pay auction incentives has generally
been restricted to risk neutral players or to speciﬁc utility functional forms (Par-
reiras and Rubinchik, 2010; Klose and Schweinzer, 2014) or to local approximations
(Fibich et al., 2006)1. Moreover, in the case of gender, the diﬀerence in risk aversion
is observable. Observability is important because there is accumulating evidence of
a gender diﬀerence in risk aversion, where women are found to be more risk averse
than men (Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). These observ-
able gender diﬀerences in risk attitudes and their interactions with all-pay auction
incentives in the business world could contribute to an explanation of the paucity
of women among top executives (Bertrand, 2009), particularly in entrepreneurial
settings (Coates et al., 2009).
In order to ﬁll this gap in the theory of all-pay auctions, we extend Baye,
Kovenock, and De Vries (1996)'s n-player, complete information all-pay auction
model to incorporate heterogeneous risk averse players. We provide suﬃcient and
necessary conditions for any equilibrium to exist and more importantly, closed-form
solutions to the equilibrium strategies for any strictly increasing utility functions,
focusing on weakly concave utility functions as well as loss averse utility function.
After characterizing equilibrium strategies, we derive novel comparative statistics
1Siegel (2009) gives a general framework of ﬁnding equilibria with heterogeneous players, but
does not explicitly characterize the equilibria or provide comparative statics of heterogeneous risk
averse players as we do here.
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for equilibria in which active players randomize continuously from 0 to the common
value of the prize, given that players can be ordered by their risk aversion (player a
is more risk averse than player b if whenever player b prefers a certain payment over
a given lottery so will player a).
We ﬁnd that, in equilibrium, the more risk averse players either bid higher than
the less risk averse players (in terms of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance of their mixed
strategy cumulative distribution) and win with higher ex-ante probability  or they
drop out. When players are homogeneous in their risk aversion, the total expected
bid decreases with their risk aversion. We ﬁnd, surprisingly, in the heterogeneous
risk aversion case, that while each player's expected bid decreases with the other
players' risk aversion, her expected bid increases with her own risk aversion. Thus,
increasing a player's risk aversion creates two opposing eﬀects on total expected
bid. A suﬃcient condition for the total expected bid to decrease with a player's risk
aversion is that this player is relatively more risk averse compared to the rest of the
players.
With only two risk aversion types of players, we show that the total expected
bid decreases monotonically with the share of the more risk averse players, when
the diﬀerence between the two types is not too large. Our ﬁndings have important
implications for the literatures on gender diﬀerences in competitiveness and for gen-
der diversity in ﬁrms that use personnel contests for promotions. We discuss these
implications after the main results.
3.2 The model
There arem players who have a common valuation, v1 = · · · = vm = v for the prize2.
Players compete in an all-pay auction for one prize by submitting a bid (exerting
an eﬀort): xi. The vector of bids is denoted (x1, x2, . . . , xm). The payoﬀ function in
an all-pay auction is given by:
pii(x1, x2, . . . , xm) =
{
−xi if ∃j, xj > xi
vi − xi if xj < xi for all j
.
Moreover, there exists some tie breaking rule to determine the winner in case
there is more than one bidder with the highest bid. Any tie breaking rule is ap-
plicable in our model. We assume that players are risk/loss averse with strictly
2The model we will present can be trivially extended to the case in which one player has
higher valuation, while all other players have the same lower valuation. However, when there are
ﬁnite many possible valuations, the interaction between valuation and risk attitude signiﬁcantly
complicates the model. We leave this for future work.
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increasing utility functions which we denote by U1(x), U2(x), . . . , Um(x). These util-
ities are common knowledge and potentially diﬀerent from each other. We discuss
two cases separately: 1) risk averse and 2) loss averse. For case 1), we assume only
continuity and concavity of the utility functions. For case 2), we assume that the
utility functions take the following form:
Ui(x) =

gi(x) if x > 0
0 if x = 0
li(x) if x < 0
, (3.1)
where the utility from gains, gi(x) is a concave function while the utility from losses,
li(x) is a convex function, and both are continuous in their domains.
In this paper, we focus on mixed strategy equilibria. In any such equilibria, any
active player (a player who bids a positive amount with positive probability) i is
indiﬀerent between all the bids in her equilibrium support. Formally, that means,
ρUi(v − x) + (1− ρ)Ui(−x) = Ui(Epii (x, b−i)) (3.2)
where x is in the support of the player's equilibrium strategy, ρ denotes the proba-
bility that bidder i wins when she bids x, and Epii (x, b−i) is the certainty equivalent
of bidding x given the other players bid b−i. We can rewrite equation (3.2) as:
Pr(i wins|x, b−i) = ρ = Ui(Epii)− Ui(−x)
Ui(v − x)− Ui(−x)
We deﬁne KUi(x) to facilitate the analysis of the mixed strategy equilibria.
KUi(x) =
Ui(0)− Ui(−x)
Ui(v − x)− Ui(−x) ,
In our analysis of equilibria, the equilibrium probability of winning that makes player
i indiﬀerent between bidding x > 0 and bidding zero (since bidding zero yields a
zero payoﬀ for sure) will be equal to KUi(x). We sometimes abuse notation and
write KUi(x) as Ki(x).
In what follows, we will exploit the following important property of KUi(x). Its
magnitude only depends on player i's risk attitude and not on any other players' risk
attitude or bids. This is already evident in the deﬁnition. In fact, we will show that
KUi(x) is monotonic in player i's risk aversion in the lemma below. All proofs are in
the Appendix. We ﬁrst deﬁne increasing risk aversion and increasing loss aversion.
Deﬁnition 8. A concave utility function U(·) represents a more risk averse player
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Figure 3.1: K(x) increases with risk aversion.
than the concave utility function U˜(·), if for any lottery l over a set of prizes Z, the
lottery's certainty equivalent is smaller under U than under U˜ . In that case, we say
that the risk aversion of the player increases from U˜ to U .
Deﬁnition 9. For a player with a utility function U(·) of the form (3.1), a convex
loss averse function l(·) represents a more loss averse player than the convex function
l˜(·), if l (x) < l˜ (x) for all x < 0.
Lemma 19. If Ui (x) is concave, then for any x ∈ (0, v), Ki(x) increases with
player i's risk aversion, i.e., if Ui represents a more risk averse player than U˜i then
KUi(x) > KU˜i(x) for any x ∈ (0, v). When players are both risk and loss averse
as described above by the utility function of the form (3.1), then for any x, Ki(x)
increases with player i's loss aversion.
Note that Lemma 19 above also suggests that the function K(x) of diﬀerent
players will never cross if the players can be ordered by their risk or loss aversions.
The following is an example of the function K(x) when the player has CARA utility
function:
Example 8. If a player has CARA utility function: Ui(c) = 1 − e−βic and v = 1,
then Ki(x) =
1−e−βix
1−e−βi . In this case, player i is more risk averse than player j if
βi > βj. In ﬁgure 3.1 we plot Ki(x) for β = 1 (black solid), 2 (green dotted), and 3
(red dashed).
In fact, the suﬃcient and necessary conditions for the existence of equilibrium
that we ﬁnd below, and the closed-form expressions for the mixed strategies we
provide in the next section, rely only on the assumption that the utility functions
are strictly increasing, i.e., utility functions do not have to be rankable by their
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certainty equivalent. The rest of the results apply to any utility function that is
rankable by their certainty equivalent, irrespective of whether the utility function is
risk averse, loss averse, or even risk seeking. All the results with risk loving players
can be derived analogously, as long as the more risk loving utilities have higher
certainty equivalent than the less risk loving utilities for every lottery. We focus
only on risk and loss averse utilities due to their ubiquity in the literature.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the suﬃcient and necessary conditions for the exis-
tence of any possible equilibrium, and then, we characterize the mixed strategies in
all of these equilibria. We also highlight some interesting features of the equilibria.
In discussing these features, for simplicity, we focus only on the equilibria in which
all active players randomize on the entire interval [0, v].
3.3.1 Existence and closed-form solution
Our ﬁrst proposition, Proposition 14 provides the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for the existence of an equilibrium in which a given subset of players is active. We
start by deﬁning an active player.
Deﬁnition 10. A player is active when she bids zero with a probability strictly less
than 1. A player is inactive when she bids zero with probability 1.
Let B ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} be a set of players. For convenience and without loss of
generality, we assign i = 1, 2, ..., |B| as the index for the active players.
Proposition 14. An equilibrium in which a set B ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} of players is active,
and
1. players i = 1, 2, . . . , h, where 2 6 h 6 |B|, randomize continuously over [0, v],
and
2. players i = h + 1, h + 2, . . . , |B| randomize continuously over [bi, v] and have
an atom at zero, with 0 = bh < bh+1 6 bh+2 6 . . . 6 b|B| 6 b|B|+1 = v, and
3. players j = |B|+ 1, . . . ,m are inactive,
exists if and only if the following conditions hold for all 0 6 t 6 |B| − h:
(I) Incentive Constraints:
∏
l6h+tKl (x) 6 Kh+t−1j (x), for all x ∈ [bh+t, bh+t+1]
and j > h+ t;
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(II) Feasibility Constraints:
∏
l6h+tKl (x) 6 Kh+t−1i (x), for all x ∈ [bh+t, bh+t+1]
and i 6 h+ t.
We now prove the proposition and characterize the equilibrium bidding strate-
gies. We ﬁrst restrict our attention to the case where all the active players in the
equilibrium randomize continuously on [0, v], i.e., bh+1 = bh+2 = . . . = b|B| = 0.
In this case h = |B|, and we can simplify the constraints for the existence of this
equilibrium to:
(i) Incentive Constraints:
∏
l∈BKl (x) 6 K
|B|−1
j (x), for all x ∈ [0, v] and for all
j > |B|;
(ii) Feasibility Constraints:
∏
l∈BKl (x) 6 K |B|−1i (x), for all x ∈ [0, v] and for
all i 6 |B|.
Let player i's mixed strategy cumulative distribution function denoted by Gi (x).
For player i 6 |B| and x ∈ [0, v], we have in equilibrium:
∏
l 6=i,l∈B
Gl(x)Ui(v − x) + (1−
∏
l 6=i,l∈B
Gl(x))Ui(−x) = Ui(0) (3.3)
where Gl(x) is the probability player l 6= i bid lower than x, so
∏
l 6=i,l∈B Gl(x) is
player i's probability of winning when bidding x. Note that by bidding zero the
player's payoﬀ is zero with certainty, and therefore, she must be indiﬀerent between
bidding any x ∈ (0, v] or getting zero. We thus have for all i 6 |B| and x ∈ [0, v]
∏
l 6=i,l∈B
Gl(x) = Ki(x)
We solve this system of |B| equations and get the equilibrium strategy of player
i ∈ B
Gi(x) =
( ∏
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Ki(x)
− |B|−2|B|−1 (3.4)
We are now able to calculate the probability of winning of an inactive player
who deviates to some positive bid x:
∏
i∈B
Gi (x) =
∏
i∈B
( ∏
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Ki(x)
− |B|−2|B|−1
 = ∏
l∈B
Kl (x)
1
|B|−1 (3.5)
Note that if the probability of winning given in equation (3.5) is less than Kj(x),
where j /∈ B, as indicated by the incentive constraint for player j, then player j will
earn an expected payoﬀ less than zero should he bid any positive amount x, which
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makes him worse oﬀ than staying inactive. Therefore, the incentive constraints
ensure that inactive players do not want to deviate to positive bids.
The feasibility constraints guarantee that the mixed strategies played by the
active players are well deﬁned (between zero and one). This can be obtained from
equation (3.4). By restricting Gi(x) 6 1, we have
∏
l∈B
Kl (x) 6 K |B|−1i (x)
which is the feasibility constraint for player i ∈ B. Together we have shown that if
both the incentive and the feasibility constraints on the K functions hold, then the
strategy proﬁle deﬁned by (3.4) constitutes an equilibrium.
The above derivation can be extended to the case with 0 < bh+1 6 bh+2 6 . . . 6
b|B| 6 v. Speciﬁcally, by deﬁnition, there are exactly h+t players (players 1, ..., h+t)
who place bids in the interval [bh+t, bh+t+1], and thus, a system of h + t equations
for any bid x ∈ [bh+t, bh+t+1]. The equilibrium strategy, incentive and feasibility
constraints can then be derived through the same procedure shown above. The
incentive constraints now guarantee not only that an inactive player will not want
to deviate and bid a positive bid but also that an active player will not want to
deviate and bid outside her support. Moreover, none of the players would want to
deviate to any bid above v, as they will earn negative payoﬀ for sure.
We now characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies. Assume an equilibrium
strategy proﬁle as described in Proposition 14, then the equilibrium strategies for
the active players must make each active player indiﬀerent between any point on her
support and a payoﬀ of zero. (Recall that active players have zero in their support
which yields a zero payoﬀ.) Therefore, from (3.3) we must have for ∀x ∈ [b|B|, v]
Gi (x) =
(∏
l∈B
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Ki(x)
−1, (3.6)
where i = 1, . . . , |B|. For t = h+ 1, h+ 2, . . . , |B| − 1; we have for ∀x ∈ [bt, bt+1]
Gi (x) =
(∏
l6tKl(x)∏
l>tGl(bl)
) 1
t−1
Ki(x)
−1 (3.7)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , t; and
Gk(x) = Gk(bk) (3.8)
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where k = t+ 1, . . . , |B|. Finally, for ∀x ∈ [0, bh+1]
Gi(x) =
(∏
l6hKl(x)∏
l>hGl(bl)
) 1
h−1
Ki(x)
−1 (3.9)
where i = 1, 2, . . . , h; and
Gk(x) = Gk(bk) (3.10)
where k = h+ 1, . . . ,m.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
Example 9. Assume there are three players with CARA utility functions Ui (x) =
1 − e−βix and a valuation v = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3. Assume that β3 = 1, β2 = 2,
β1 = 10. Then, there exists no equilibrium in which all three players are ac-
tive and all randomize continuously on [0, 1] since the feasibility constraint is vi-
olated on [0.13035, 1]. Speciﬁcally, we have G3 (x) = (K1(x)K2 (x))
1
2 K3(x)
− 1
2 =(
1−e−2x
1−e−2
1−e−10x
1−e−10
) 1
2
(
1−e−x
1−e−1
)− 1
2
, which is larger than 1 for x > 0.13035. However there
exists an equilibrium in which only players 2 and 3 are active and they randomize
continuously on the interval [0, 1] according to the following strategies: G2 (x) =
K3(x) =
1−e−x
1−e−1 and G3 (x) = K2 (x) =
1−e−2x
1−e−2 since then all the conditions hold.
The incentive constraints determine who participates and who does not. The
inactive players require better odds of winning (higherK(x)) for each positive bid (x)
than what the active players in equilibrium can provide. The feasibility constraints
impose a restriction on active players: they cannot be too diﬀerent in terms of
risk attitudes. This condition restricts the level of heterogeneity of active players.
According to Proposition 1, our model entails multiple equilibria in which diﬀerent
numbers of players are active in equilibrium. However, this fact does not restrict the
power of our theory in making predictions either for empirical or experimental data,
since in reality we can generally observe the number of active players, especially if
players play over multiple rounds.
3.3.2 Some features of equilibria
In real life competitions, it is not uncommon for participants to diﬀer in observable
characteristics like gender, ethnicity, culture...etc. It is then important to examine
whether risk attitudes associated with these characteristics help to explain the dif-
ference in competitive behaviour. For example, women are under-represented in the
elites of many competitive industries (Bertrand, 2009), yet women are also more
likely to achieve academic success (Angrist et al., 2009; DiPrete and Buchmann,
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2013; Fortin et al., 2015)3. Importantly, our results below are consistent with this
empirical evidence.
Corollary 8. If there exists an equilibrium where the set of all active players, B,
randomize continuously on the interval [0, v], and these players can be ranked by
their risk aversions: KB1 (x) > KB2 (x) > . . . > KB|B| (x) for all x ∈ [0, v], then
the cumulative distribution function of player s's strategy ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates that of player t for every t > s and the players' expected bids have the
same ranking as their levels of risk aversion.
Corollary 8 suggests that more risk averse players bid higher in expectation than
less risk averse players among all active players. Given that the more risk averse
a player is, the higher she bids conditional on her being active in equilibrium, one
may expect that her probability of winning is also higher. Corollary 9 indicates that
this conjecture is generally true but is not always the case.
Corollary 9. Assume an equilibrium where the set of all active players, B, random-
ize continuously on the interval [0, v]. For any two active players, s, t ∈ B, if player
s is more risk averse than player t, i.e., Ks(x) > Kt(x) for all x ∈ [0, v], then player
s's probability of winning is higher or equal to that of player t if Kt(x) dominates
Ks(x) in terms of the reverse hazard rate, i.e.,
K′t(x)
Kt(x)
> K′s(x)
Ks(x)
for all x ∈ [0, v].
Note that Ks(x), Kt(x) are also the joint cumulative distributions of opponents'
bids that players s and t are competing against (e.g., Πl∈B,l 6=sGl (x) = Ks (x)),
respectively. Corollary 9 suggests that the more risk averse player s is more likely to
win the contest compared to player t, if in player t's view (as measured by Kt(x)) the
contest is suﬃciently more competitive (i.e., dominates in terms of reverse hazard
rate) than in player s's view (as measured by Ks(x)).
Interestingly, the more risk averse players not only bid higher and win with higher
probability, they are also more likely to dropout in the following sense.
Corollary 10. Assume an equilibrium where the set of all active players, B, ran-
domize continuously on the interval [0, v]. If for some i ∈ B and j /∈ B, we have
Ki(x) > Kj(x) for all x ∈ [0, v], then the existence of the equilibrium with the set B
of active players implies the existence of another equilibrium with the set B˜ of active
players who randomize continuously on the interval [0, v], where B˜ = (B ∪ {j}) \ {i}.
Corollary 10 suggests that the conditions for the existence of the equilibrium
in which a relatively more risk averse player bids actively is suﬃcient for the ex-
istence of the equilibrium in which a less risk averse player bids actively, holding
3See detailed discussion and literature review in section 3.5.
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all other active and inactive players constant, but the opposite is not necessarily
true. This implies that mere diﬀerences in risk attitudes can result in diﬀerent non-
entry/dropouts decisions, without having heterogeneity in valuations or incomplete
information. The player with the higher risk aversion may not participate in the
competition because she ﬁnds that the potential returns from bidding any positive
amount do not suﬃciently compensate her for the risk.
One implication of this ﬁnding is that the well established gender diﬀerence in risk
aversion (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) alone may be suﬃcient to explain diﬀerences
in participation rates found in gender diﬀerences in competitiveness experiments
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007)4, without the need to hypothesize gender diﬀerences
in competitiveness, conﬁdence, or other characteristics.
A question naturally follows: are the dropouts always of the players who are
more risk averse than the active ones? The answer is not necessarily. Example 10
suggests there might exist equilibria in which the intermediary risk aversion players
drop out.
Example 10. Assume there are three players with CARA utility functions Ui (x) =
1−e−βix and a valuation v = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3. Assume also that β1 = 2, β2 = 1, β3 =
1
2
. Then there exists an equilibrium in which only players 1 and 3 are active, while
player 2 is inactive. See (3.11) below for the incentive constraint for player 2 and
(3.12) for the feasibility constraints for player 1 and 3.
Incentive constraint: K1(x)K3(x) =
1− e−2x
1− e−2
1− e− 12x
1− e− 12 6
1− e−x
1− e−1 = K2(x)(3.11)
Feasibility constraints: K1(x) =
1− e−2x
1− e−2 6 1 and K3(x) =
1− e− 12x
1− e− 12 6 1(3.12)
Thus, there exists an equilibrium in which the most and the least risk averse players
are active while the player with the intermediary risk aversion is inactive.
3.4 Comparative statics
We now discuss the eﬀect of increasing players' risk aversion on their expected bids.
Our results in this section are derived for the equilibrium in which all active players
randomize continuously in [0, v]. We ﬁrst show in subsection 3.4.1 that if players
are homogeneous in their risk attitude, then increasing all players' risk aversion
decreases the total expected bid. Then, we show in subsection 3.4.2 that in contrast
4These papers examine entry into what are in eﬀect all-pay auctions to measure gender diﬀer-
ences in competitiveness. See Niederle (2014) for a recent survey.
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Figure 3.2: Homogeneously increasing all players' risk aversion decreases G(x).
in the case with heterogeneous risk aversion, each player's expected bid increases
with her own risk aversion, though it still decreases with other active players' risk
aversions.
3.4.1 Homogeneous risk aversion
The equilibrium strategy with homogeneous risk aversion is a special case of the
equilibrium strategy with heterogeneous risk aversion derived above.
Lemma 20. Assume all the players are homogeneous, and there exists an equilib-
rium where a set B of players randomize continuously on the interval [0, v] and all
other players are inactive. If all the players' risk aversion increases homogeneously,
then their bids and the total expected bid in the equilibrium in which the same set
B of players randomize continuously on the interval [0, v] are decreased in terms of
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
We illustrate Lemma 20 with the following example.
Example 11. Assume there are three players, each with the CARA utility function:
Ui (x) = 1 − e−βx and valuation v = 1. Figure 3.2 shows the unique symmetric
equilibrium strategy when β = 1 (black solid), 5 (green dotted), and 10 (red dashed).
It is clear that as all players become more risk averse, the distribution function of
their bids decreases in terms of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, i.e., the probability
that they bid below x for any x ∈ [0, v] is higher when they are more risk averse.
The total expected bid decreases from 0.812 to 0.357 and then to 0.184.
In the complete information all-pay auction with homogenous risk averse players,
the total expected bid decreases in the players' risk aversion. As they become more
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risk averse, all players require better odds of winning in order to be compensated
for the same risk. To maintain each others' indiﬀerence conditions as required by
equilibrium, all players bid lower in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance to
compensate each other for the disutility of risk.
3.4.2 Heterogeneous risk aversion
In this section, we ﬁrst show in Lemma 21 that each player's expected bid increases
with her own risk aversion, but decreases with other active players' risk aversions.
With the insights from this result, we characterize the suﬃcient condition for the
total expected bid to decrease when the more risk averse players become even more
risk averse in Proposition 15. We again assume that players can be ordered according
to their risk aversion. Without loss of generality, let K1(x) > K2(x) > . . . > Km(x)
for all x ∈ [0, v], so that player 1 is the most risk averse player.
Lemma 21. Assume there exists an equilibrium where a set B of players randomize
continuously on the interval [0, v] and all other players are inactive. Assume, fur-
thermore, that the level of risk aversion for some player i ∈ B has increased, i.e.,
Ki (x) changes to K˜i (x) > Ki (x) for every x ∈ [0, v]. Assume that after this change,
there still exists an equilibrium where the set B of players randomize continuously
on the interval [0, v] , and all other players are inactive. Then, the expected bid of
player i increases with her level of risk aversion, while the expected bid of player k
decreases with player i's level of risk aversion, for k ∈ B, k 6= i.
The following example illustrates this result.
Example 12. Assume there are three players with CARA utility functions Ui =
1 − e−βic with β1 = 1, β2 = 0.5, β3 = 0.1 and valuation v = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3. Then,
player 1 is the most risk averse and K1 (x) > K2 (x) > K3 (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. In
the equilibrium in which all three players are active and randomize continuously on
the interval [0, 1], the equilibrium strategies of the players (the CDFs of their mixed
strategies) are given in the left part of ﬁgure 3.3: G1(x) (black) 6 G2(x) (green)
6 G3(x) (red). Assume now that β1 changes to β˜1 = 1.2, then the players strategies
change to the dashed lines as in the right part of ﬁgure 3.3. It can be seen that player
1's mixed strategy (black) increases to G˜1(x) 6 G1(x) while players 2's (green) and
3's (red) mixed strategy decreases to G˜2(x) > G2(x) and G˜3(x) > G3(x) in the sense
of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, respectively.
Next we discuss the eﬀect of a change in the risk attitude of an active player on
the total expected bid in equilibrium. We ﬁrst interpret the intuition behind Lemma
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Figure 3.3: A player's bid increases with her own risk aversion and decreases with
other players' risk aversions.
21. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, any active player t is made indiﬀerent between
any of his bids by the strategies of the other players. When player t becomes even
slightly more risk averse, the other players will have to lower their bids to ensure
player t stays indiﬀerent (in order for an equilibrium with the same set of active
bidders to continue to exist). Thus, by equilibrium strategy (3.4), increasing t's risk
aversion has two eﬀects on total expected bid, ﬁxing the same set of active players:
1. Player t bids higher, since the CDF of her new equilibrium strategy ﬁrst or-
der stochastically dominates the CDF of her equilibrium strategy before she
became more risk averse;
2. The rest of the players bid lower, since their CDF decrease in the sense of ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance when Kt(x) increases.
The net eﬀect on total expected bids is not obvious. We provide in Proposition
15 a suﬃcient condition for the total expected bid to decrease when one player's
risk aversion increases, assuming the equilibrium with the same set of active players
still exists after the increase of the player's risk aversion.
Proposition 15. Assume an equilibrium with a set B of active players who ran-
domize continuously on the interval [0, 1]. For an active player i, if
Ki(x) >
|B| − 2∑
l∈B,l 6=iKl(x)
−1 , for all x ∈ [0, v] (3.13)
then, the total expected bid decreases in i's risk aversion.
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Note that the r.h.s. of (3.13) can be rewritten into the harmonic mean of the
K(x) functions of the rest of the active players multiplied by a constant:
|B| − 2∑
l∈B,l 6=iKl(x)
−1 =
|B| − 1∑
l∈B,l 6=iKl(x)
−1
|B| − 2
|B| − 1
Thus, condition (3.13) requires that player i be suﬃciently risk averse compared
to the rest of the active players to guarantee that an increase in her risk aversion
decreases the total expected bid. See example 13 for an illustration of Proposition
15.
Example 13. Assume there are three players B = {1, 2, 3} who have CARA utility
functions with β1 = 2, β2 = 1, β3 =
1
2
, and valuation v = 1. Then, K1(x) =
1−e−2x
1−e−2 ,
K2(x) =
1−e−x
1−e−1 , K3(x) =
1−e− 12x
1−e− 12
. Note that the condition (3.13) for i = 1 is satisﬁed:
K1(x) =
1− e−2x
1− e−2 >
(
1− e− 12
1− e− 12x +
1− e−1
1− e−x
)−1
=
(
K−12 (x) +K
−1
3 (x)
)−1
and the total expected bid in the equilibrium in which all three players are active and
randomize continuously on [0, 1] is:
3−
∫ 1
0
(K2(x)K3(x))
1
2 (K1(x))
− 1
2 dx−
∫ 1
0
(K1(x)K3(x))
1
2 (K2(x))
− 1
2 dx
−
∫ 1
0
(K1(x)K2(x))
1
2 (K3(x))
− 1
2 dx = 0.779
Assume now that we increase player 1's risk aversion to β1 = 3, then the total
expected bid decreases to 0.723.
Many real-life competitions are composed of participants with evidently diﬀerent
risk attitudes, e.g., mixed gender contests. We now analyze how the composition of
contests of two diﬀerent risk types aﬀects participation. Formally, assume there are
two sets of contestants in the competition: type 1 players with risk attitude deﬁned
by K1(x); and type 2 players with attitude deﬁned by K2(x). There are m players
in total. Let µ be the percentage share of type 1 players. Thus, the total number of
type 1 players is µm, and similarly, the total number of type 2 players is (1− µ)m.
Note that µ ∈ {0, 1
m
, 2
m
, ..., 1} so that µm and (1 − µ)m are always integers. All
players have the same valuation v for the prize and K1 (x) > K2 (x) for all x ∈ [0, v].
Type 1 players are thus more risk averse than type 2 players.
Based on Proposition 14, the feasibility constraints are the only conditions re-
quired for the existence of the equilibrium in which all m players are active and
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randomize continuously on [0, v]. The following result suggests that the feasibility
constraints are sensitive to the number of players and the diﬀerence between the
two types' risk aversion.
Corollary 11. There exists an equilibrium in which all m players are active and
randomize continuously on [0, v] if and only if the number of type 1 players satisﬁes
µm 6 lnK2(x)
lnK2(x)− lnK1(x) , for all x ∈ [0, v]. (3.14)
In other words, the number of the more risk averse players must be bounded
from above given K1(x) and K2(x), to ensure that all players are active. The bound
given by the r.h.s. of (3.14) depends on how diﬀerent the two types of players are
in terms of their risk preferences. The bound is lower when the diﬀerence between
the two risk preferences is larger.
Corollary 12. For any µ ∈ [0, 1], there exists an equilibrium in which all players
randomize continuously on the interval [0, v] if and only if
Km1 (x) 6 Km−12 (x), for all x ∈ [0, v]. (3.15)
Corollary 12 follows directly from Corollary 11. There always exists an equilib-
rium with all players active for any µ ∈ [0, 1], when (3.14) is satisﬁed for µ = 1,
which boils down to the inequality (3.15).
Corollary 13. When there are two risk aversion types of players with K1 (x) >
K2 (x) for x ∈ (0, v), assume condition (3.15) in Corollary 12 is satisﬁed. Then the
total expected bid is monotonically decreasing with the share of the K1(x) players,
µ, if
K2(x) >
m− 2
m− 1K1(x) (3.16)
Corollary 13 explicates the transition in terms of total revenue from the case
where all players are homogeneously less risk averse to the case where all players
are homogeneously more risk averse. As the share of the more risk averse players
increases, the total expected bid monotonically decreases. According to (3.16), this
is true if the two types of players are not too diﬀerent, as
K1(x) > K2(x) >
m− 2
m− 1K1(x)
has to hold.
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3.5 Discussion
Our ﬁndings suggest the possibility that the higher risk aversion of women can simul-
taneously lead them to avoid participating in all-pay auction type incentives, while
bidding higher and having a higher probability of winning than men, when they do
participate. Heterogeneous risk aversion, therefore, could be an important factor
in explaining most of the stylized facts about gender diﬀerences in competitiveness,
including women's greater reluctance to enter contests with all-pay auction incen-
tives, like elections, unless they have a good chance of winning (Fulton et al., 2006),
women's greater willingness to exert eﬀort in preparation (Duckworth and Seligman,
2006) and their higher odds of success in academic contests (Angrist et al., 2009;
DiPrete and Buchmann, 2013; Fortin et al., 2015), and women's greater reluctance
to enter laboratory contest (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), where either eﬀort does
not aﬀect performance or for which they cannot prepare.
Moreover, our ﬁndings imply that if women are more risk averse than men, they
will simultaneously work harder than men and decrease everyone's eﬀort in the ﬁrm
in personnel contests that have an all-pay auction structure. In these contests, if
men and women are not too diﬀerent in their levels of risk aversions, then a higher
share of women may lead to increased odds of women dropping out. This result itself
suggests an alternative and possibly more parsimonious explanation for the paucity
of women in the upper management of ﬁrms in highly competitive industries.
However, our ﬁnding that the more risk averse player bids higher, and therefore,
has a higher probability of winning, while at the same time depressing the bids of
others suggests a further possible reason. While women may be more likely to win
internal personnel contests, ﬁrms that promote women according to their individ-
ual competitiveness may suﬀer a general decrease in its competitiveness from the
competition diminishing externality that women's greater risk aversion imposes on
other personnel. Thus, ﬁrms which discriminate against women could do better
against ﬁrms that do not. This ﬁnding suggests a potentially important exception
to the intuition that competitive markets should eliminate taste-based discrimina-
tion (Becker, 2010). Moreover, our ﬁndings suggest that equilibrium discrimination
against women in such industries should be stronger in countries in which the gen-
ders are more similar, i.e., developed rather than developing countries. Thus, the
prospects for greater representation by women in competitive industries are not reas-
suring if women are indeed also less competitive than men (Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007). However, recent evidence suggests that when risk aversion is fully controlled
for, women may actually be more competitive than men (Chen et al., 2015).
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3.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 19
If player i becomes more risk averse (from U˜i to Ui), then the certainty equivalent of
winning v− x with probability KU˜i(x) and −x with probability
(
1−KU˜i(x)
)
is less
than zero, which is the certainty equivalent of this gamble with a utility function
U˜i. Therefore, the player can be restored to indiﬀerence between winning zero for
sure and the gamble above only if the probability of winning the larger prize v − x
increases. Thus KUi(x) > KU˜i(x). For loss averse players, we rewrite their KUi(x)
function as
KUi(x) =
−li(−x)
gi(v − x)− li(−x) = 1−
gi(v − x)
gi(v − x)− li(−x)
Thus, when player i gets more loss averse, li(−x) gets smaller and KUi(x) increases.
Proof of Corollary 8
If player s is more risk averse than player t, where s, t ∈ B, then we have Ks(x) >
Kt(x) for x ∈ [0, v]. Based on the equilibrium strategy given in (3.4), the diﬀerence
in the distributions of their mixed strategies is:
Gs(x)−Gt(x) =
( ∏
l∈B,l 6=s
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Ks(x)
− |B|−2|B|−1 −
( ∏
l∈B,l 6=t
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Kt(x)
− |B|−2|B|−1
=
(∏
l∈B
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1 (
Ks(x)
−1 −Kt(x)−1
)
6 0
Thus, player s's expected bid is higher than player t's and the cumulative distribution
function of player s ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution
function of player t. Therefore, the ranking of expected bids is the same as the
ranking of risk aversion.
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Proof of Corollary 9
The expected probability of winning for player s is given by (note that Ks (v) =
Kt (v) = 1): ∫ v
0
Ks(x)dGs(x) = 1−
∫ v
0
Gs(x)dKs(x)
For player t: ∫ v
0
Kt(x)dGt(x) = 1−
∫ v
0
Gt(x)dKt(x)
Thus, the diﬀerence between the probabilities of winning is:∫ v
0
Ks(x)dGs(x)−
∫ v
0
Kt(x)dGt(x)
=
∫ v
0
[Gt(x)dKt(x)−Gs(x)dKs(x)]
=
∫ v
0
(∏
l∈B
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1 [
dKt(x)
Kt(x)
− dKs(x)
Ks(x)
]
(3.17)
Therefore, the diﬀerence is non-negative if
dKt(x)
Kt(x)
− dKs(x)
Ks(x)
=
K ′t(x)
Kt(x)
− K
′
s(x)
Ks(x)
> 0
for all x ∈ [0, v].5
Proof of Corollary 10
To prove the corollary, we need to show that after the replacement of player i with
player j, the incentive constraint of player i and the feasibility constraint for player
j are both satisﬁed. Note that after the replacement of j and i, the l.h.s of the
incentive constraints and the feasibility constraints are weakened from
∏
l∈BKl (x) to
Kj(x)
∏
l∈B,l 6=iKl (x) 6
∏
l∈BKl (x). Thus, we only need to show that the incentive
constraint for player i:
Kj(x)
∏
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl (x) 6 K |B|−1i (x)
5 The reverse hazard rate dominance is not implied by the fact that Kt(x) ﬁrst order stochas-
tically dominates Ks(x). In fact, the reverse hazard rate dominance implies ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance. However, it is easy to show that the reverse hazard rate dominance condition is equiv-
alent to ﬁrst order stochastic dominance for CARA and CRRA utility functions. Readers can refer
to Appendix B in Krishna (2009) which provides a useful introduction of stochastic dominance.
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and the feasibility constraint for player j:
Kj(x)
∏
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl (x) 6 K |B|−1j (x)
are satisﬁed after the replacement. Furthermore, since j is inactive in B, her incen-
tive constraint must hold: ∏
l∈B
Kl (x) 6 K |B|−1j (x)
Therefore, player i's incentive constraint is satisﬁed since
Kj(x)
∏
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl (x) 6
1
Ki(x)
K |B|
j
(x) 6 K |B|−1
i
(x)
Player j's feasibility constraint in the new equilibrium is also satisﬁed since:
Kj(x)
∏
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl (x) 6
∏
l∈B
Kl (x) 6 K |B|−1j (x)
Proof of Lemma 20
When players are homogeneous, we have K1(x) = K2(x) = ... = Km(x). By the
equilibrium strategy given in (3.4), the strategy under homogeneous risk aversion is
given by
Gi(x) = K(x)
1
|B|−1 , where i ∈ B
It is then obvious that any active player i's bid is decreased in the sense of ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance when all players become more risk averse. The total expected
bid can be calculated as
R =
|B|∑
i=1
Ri =
|B|∑
i=1
∫ v
0
xdGi(x)
where
Ri =
∫ v
0
xdGi(x) = v −
∫ v
0
Gi(x)dx
is the expected bid of any player i. The second equality follows from integration by
parts. Since Gi(x) for i ∈ B is increased, Ri is decreased and thus the total expected
bid R is decreased when K (x) increases for x ∈ (0, v).
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Proof of Lemma 21
An active player i's expected bid is given by
Ri =
∫ v
0
xdGi (x)
where in equilibrium we have (from (3.4))
Gi (x) =
( ∏
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Ki(x)
− |B|−2|B|−1
Therefore, when Ki (x) changes to K˜i (x) > Ki (x) , then Gi (x) decreases for every
x ∈ (0, v), and therefore, Ri increases. Moreover, for any other active players k ∈ B,
k 6= i we have
Gk (x) =
( ∏
l∈B,l 6=i,k
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Kk(x)
− |B|−2|B|−1Ki (x)
1
|B|−1
Therefore, when Ki (x) changes to K˜i (x) > Ki (x) , then Gk (x) increases for every
x ∈ (0, v), and therefore, Rk decreases.
Proof of Proposition 15
As each player j's expected bid can be written as Rj =
∫ v
0
xdGj(x), we can write
the total expected bid R as:
R =
∑
j∈B
Rj = |B| v −
∫ v
0
∑
j∈B
Gj(x)dx.
Rewrite the second term:∫ v
0
∑
j∈B
Gj(x)dx =
∫ v
0
(
∏
l∈B
Kl(x))
1
|B|−1
∑
j∈B
Kj(x)
−1dx. (3.18)
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Thus, the marginal eﬀect of an increase of Ki(x) for every given x ∈ (0, v) on (3.18)
can be written as:
∫ v
0
d
(∑
j∈B Gj(x)
)
dKi(x)
dx
=
∫ v
0
1
|B| − 1
(∏
l∈B
Kl(x)
) 1
|B|−1
Ki(x)
−1
( ∑
l∈B,l 6=i
Kl(x)
−1 − (|B| − 2)Ki(x)−1
)
dx,
This expression is positive if
∑
l∈B,l 6=iKl(x)
−1−(|B|−2)Ki(x)−1 > 0 for all x ∈ [0, v],
which is condition (3.13). Therefore, the marginal eﬀect on R is negative if the con-
dition (3.13) is satisﬁed.
Proof of Corollary 11
Based on Proposition 1, the feasibility constraints in the current context are:
K1(x)
µmK2(x)
(1−µ)m 6 Km−1
1
(x) , for all x ∈ [0, v] (3.19)
K1(x)
µmK2(x)
(1−µ)m 6 Km−12 (x) , for all x ∈ [0, v] (3.20)
Rewrite the equation (3.19): (
K1(x)
K2(x)
)µm
6 K
m−1
1
(x)
K2(x)m
i.e.,
µ 6 1 + lnK
−1
1 (x)
m (lnK1(x)− lnK2(x)) (3.21)
Since the r.h.s. of inequality (3.21) is always larger than one, the feasibility con-
straint (3.19) always holds. Rewrite the equation (3.20):(
K1(x)
K2(x)
)µm
6 K−12 (x)
i.e.,
µ 6 lnK
−1
2 (x)
m (lnK1(x)− lnK2(x)) (3.22)
which is the condition in the corollary.
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Proof of Corollary 12
Let the r.h.s. of inequality (3.22) be no less than one:
1
m
lnK−12 (x)
lnK1(x)− lnK2(x) > 1
After rearrange, we have
Km1 (x) 6 Km−12 (x)
Therefore, whenever Km1 (x) 6 Km−12 (x) for all x, we have that for all µ there is an
equilibrium in which all players active.
Proof of Corollary 13
Let µ ∈ {0, 1
m
, 2
m
, ..., m−1
m
} be the current share of K1(x) players. Substitute a K2(x)
player with aK1(x) player. Then, by Proposition 15 the total expected bid decreases
if
K2(x) >
m− 2
µm
K1(x)
+ m−1−µm
K2(x)
(3.23)
It can be veriﬁed that the r.h.s. of the above inequality is increasing with µ, and
thus, is less than m−2
m−1K1(x). Therefore, condition (3.16) is suﬃcient for condition
(3.23), and we have proved that increasing µ decreases total expected bid.
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Chapter 4
Persistent Bias in Advice-Giving
Zhuoqiong Chen and Tobias Gesche
Abstract We show that a one-oﬀ incentive to bias advice has a persistent eﬀect on
advisers' own actions and their future recommendations. In an experiment, advisers
obtained information about a set of three diﬀerently risky investment options to
advise less informed clients. The riskiest option was designed such that it is only
preferred by risk-seeking individuals. When advisers are oﬀered a bonus for recom-
mending this option, half of them recommend it. In contrast, in a control group
without the bonus only four percent recommend it. After the bonus was removed,
its eﬀect remained: In a second recommendation for the same options but without
a bonus, those advisers who had previously faced it are almost six times more likely
to recommend the riskiest option compared to the control group. A similar increase
is found when advisers make the same choice for themselves. To explain our results
we provide a theory based on advisers trying to uphold a positive self-image of being
incorruptible. Maintaining a positive self-image then forces them to be consistent
in the advice they give, even if it is biased.
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4.1 Introduction
When making risky decisions, we often seek advice. Doctors, investment advisers,
scientists, and other experts have speciﬁc skills and knowledge to assess the potential
consequences of important choices. Their job is to use their specialized information
and skills to provide recommendations which are supposed to be in the best interest
of patients, investors, politicians, and other clients. However, advisers may face
a conﬂict of interest. Often, third parties pay commissions or create situations
such that advisers owe them and then bias advice in their interest.1 Advisers who
give in to such third-party incentives can morally accommodate this behaviour by
convincing themselves that they would have given the same advice, even if there
had not been such a conﬂict of interest. For example, when a ﬁnancial adviser
recommends an investment fund as opposed to a less risky asset because of a sales
commissions, this can later be justiﬁed by believing that it would have been the
appropriate advice anyway. However, to uphold such a justiﬁcation, the adviser has
to act consistently. That is, an adviser has to issue the same biased advice even
when the conﬂict of interest does not exist anymore.
This paper presents evidence for such persistent eﬀects from advisers' conﬂicts of
interest. In an experiment, we oﬀer advisers a bonus which pays if they recommend
less informed clients an investment option that is preferred only by risk-seeking
individuals. Among advisers in a control group without such a bonus, almost no-
one recommends this risky option. In contrast, almost half of the advisers to whom
the bonus was oﬀered do recommend it. Afterwards, advisers have to choose for
themselves among the same options and then make a second recommendation for
another client. For these tasks, it was explicitly stated that there would not be
any bonus. Our results show that advisers who were previously exposed to the
bonus were six times more likely to recommend the risky option than those who
were not. We also ﬁnd a similar increase in the probability that advisers choose the
risky option for themselves. In consequence, being exposed to a conﬂict of interest
in advice-giving in one single instance creates an externality on the advice which
another client receives and the adviser's own choices.
We present a behavioural mechanism which can explain such persistent eﬀects
1 For example, US ﬁnancial advisers administered more than $38 trillion for more than 14
million clients in 2011 (SEC, 2011). Despite laws like the Dodd-Frank Act which require them to
"[...]to act in the best interest of the customer" (United States Congress, 2010, Sec. 913g), they
receive sales commissions and bias their advice accordingly (Mullainathan et al., 2012; Malmendier
and Shanthikumar, 2014). Other experts face such conﬂicts of interest too: Although supposed
to be impartial, doctors reciprocate gifts from pharmaceutical companies (Dana and Loewenstein,
2003; Cain and Detsky, 2008) and scientists are dependent on industries sponsoring their research
(Hilgartner, 2000; Taylor and Giles, 2005).
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on repeated advice and advisers' own choices. It is based on the human tendency to
interpret own actions to infer one's own morality (Mazar et al., 2008; Benabou and
Tirole, 2011). To avoid a negative and immoral self-image, biased advisers can per-
ceive their recommendations as those which they actually should have recommended,
had they actually been impartial. However, when advisers morally accommodate
their corrupted behaviour in such a manner, they have to stick with their advice.
The reason is that changing it, in particular when the conﬂict of interest disappears,
would signal to themselves that their initial advice was corrupted, and therefore,
that they acted immorally.
Our results also show more exactly what advisers take as a reference for giving
impartial advice and thus, how they try to keep a positive self-image: In principle,
an adviser can internally disguise the fact that his advice was biased by forming a
motivated belief (Kunda, 1990) about the clients' preferences, for example that a
client is suﬃciently risk-seeking.2 In the adviser's view it is then in the client's best
interest and therefore moral to recommend the risky option, even though the actual
motive is the conﬂict of interest. This would not put the adviser under any pressure
to act accordingly for himself, since his motivated belief is only about the client's
risk preferences, not his own. However, prior research has shown that when forming
beliefs about others' preferences, in particular risk preferences, we do so by starting
from our own (Mullen et al., 1985; Faro and Rottenstreich, 2006). The question
"What would I choose if I were in the client's situation?" then also determines what
an adviser should recommend. Under such a rule, advisers who want to perceive
themselves as incorruptible should then also choose for themselves what they have
recommended to others. Our data indicate that this is the case: Having been exposed
to a bonus leads advisers to choose the risk-seeking option more often. This is in
line with the recent ﬁndings of Linnainmaa et al. (2016). In a large sample, they
show that ﬁnancial advisers hold the same expensive, under-performing portfolios
as their clients, even after having left the industry.
Related literature: Our work combines ﬁndings from self-signaling, motivated be-
liefs, and self-deception to obtain new insights about their implications in the con-
text of advice-giving. It captures the fact that people assign informational value to
their actions to infer about their personal traits (Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Benabou
and Tirole, 2004) and in particular their moral values (Benabou and Tirole, 2011).
Self-signaling then means that actions are also inﬂuenced by the consequences they
subsequently have on peoples' self-image. For example, Mazar et al. (2008) argue
2Without referring to any actual gender roles we will call advisers and clients "he" and "she",
respectively.
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that we often do not lie as much as we, in principle, could because strong, outright
lies would damage our self-perception of being honest and moral persons. Gneezy
et al. (2012) present the seemingly paradoxical ﬁnding that sales under a pay-as-you-
want scheme are lower than under a low, ﬁxed price. They explain the consumers'
reluctance to set a suﬃciently low pay-as-you-want-price with consumers' desire to
not perceive themselves as greedy. Related to this, Fallis et al. (2015) report that
the demand for goods which a share of the sales price is donated is increasing in this
price. They also present evidence that this is due to the decrease in social image
utility which consumer derive from purchasing such good-donation-bundles.
Prior research has also shown that when it comes to morally-ladden situations,
people form self-serving assessments about what norms should apply and about oth-
ers' preferences when it helps them to obtain a positive, moral self-image. Loewen-
stein et al. (1993) give subjects information about legal cases. These subjects then
diﬀer strongly in what they consider as appropriate, fair settlement values for these
cases after they argued in ﬁctitious roles of being the plaintiﬀ as opposed to the de-
fendant. Di Tella and Pérez-Truglia (2015) show evidence that people form beliefs
about others behaving anti-socially, i.e. that others steal from a common pot, in or-
der to justify their own anti-social behaviour of not splitting the pot equally. People
also employ uncertainty and ambiguity in a related manner to form self-serving be-
liefs and probability assessments which allow them to obfuscate their own immoral
behaviour (Haisley and Weber, 2010).
In this paper, we connect these ﬁndings to obtain insights about their lasting
implications in the context of advice-giving. Closely related to our results is Gneezy
et al. (2016): In several experiments, the authors show that advisers bias their
recommendations relatively strongly when they learn about their conﬂict of interest
before they receive the information about a client's decision situation. When they
ﬁrst learn about the situation, then consider what to recommend, and then about the
conﬂict of interest, their advice is less biased. Following Trivers (2011), they label
this behaviour self-deception. Our theory and results describe behaviour which is in
line with such self-deception, i.e. that advisers eﬀectively bias their own choices. We
make the point that the reason for this behaviour and the consistency in advisers'
biased recommendation is that advisers try to avoid a negative self-inference.3 This
also relates to Konow (2000), who examines a dictator game where the pie to be split
3 Falk and Zimmermann (2016) show that agents also act consistently to signal their skills to
a principal. In Falk and Zimmermann (2015), they provide evidence that people act consistently
without any external observers. The general idea which underlies the mechanism we propose also
applies in these settings: Acting inconsistently shows that one's ﬁrst action was somehow ﬂawed,
acting consistently therefore avoids such a inference to oneself and/or outside observers.
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is dependent on the dictator's and the recipient's prior joint eﬀort. He ﬁnds that
dictators who allocate themselves larger shares of the pie interpret their personal
contribution in establishing the common pot more favorably than outside observers.
Documenting the persistence of such a self-serving bias, these dictators apply their
persistent biased judgment about others' eﬀort when they act as outside observers
themselves.
Recent ﬁndings on actual advisers' behaviour by Linnainmaa et al. (2016) relate
to ours. Using matched data on about 5900 Canadian ﬁnancial advisers and their
more than 580,000 clients, these studies show that the most important determinants
of advice to these clients are not the clients' personal characteristics, but rather the
identity of their advisers. Even more important in our context, they show that these
recommendations to clients are also reﬂected by the choices which advisers make for
their own portfolios. For example, advisers prefer the return-chasing and actively
managed funds they sell to clients also for themselves. This is puzzling since these
investments do not perform better than the market. When fees are subtracted,
clients' and their advisers' investments even signiﬁcantly under-perform relative to
the market. Our results and the theory we propose resonate with these ﬁndings. In
addition, the experimental setup we use allows to abstract from concerns of advisers
self-selecting into suitable environments which may drive such ﬁndings (e.g. risk-
seeking advisers who choose to sell risky investments with sales commissions).
We identify a strong, causal, and lasting eﬀect of bonuses in advice-giving. Our
ﬁndings therefore contribute to the recent literature on the adverse eﬀects of bonus
payments (Agarwal and Itzhak, 2014; Bénabou and Tirole, 2016). We also point
out the role of self-signaling in such a setting which connects directly to the recent
research on the work culture and self-perception of those working in the ﬁnancial
industry (Cohn et al., 2014; Zingales, 2015). However, our ﬁndings apply also outside
this speciﬁc ﬁnancial context to advice on risky decisions more generally.
In the remainder of this paper, we present our ﬁndings in more detail. The next
section describes a mechanism of how moral and self-image concerns can lead to
persistent bias after advisers have faced a conﬂict of interest. Section 3 explains the
design and procedures of the experiment in which we investigate this mechanism.
Section 4 derives predictions and section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes
by reviewing these results with respect to their implications for the economics of
motivated beliefs, advice giving and its regulation. An appendix contains a formal
model in which the predictions are derived; it also contains further data analysis
and the experimental instructions.
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4.2 Mechanism
In this section, we describe a behavioural mechanism in which advisers' concerns
to appear impartial and moral can lead to the opposite behaviour  a persistent
bias in their advice. The framework presented here also provides the assumptions
that underlie a formal model which can be found in the appendix. To analyze
an adviser's behaviour, we assume his overall utility to depend on three parts: 1)
consumption utility derived from monetary payoﬀs, 2) the moral cost of not giving
impartial advice, and 3) diagnostic (dis-)utility of learning from actions which reveal
that one's previous advice was biased.
While the ﬁrst element of an adviser's overall utility is standard, the second
reﬂects the fact that advisers might feel compelled, and often are, to act solely in a
client's best interest. Not doing so then creates a moral cost. To determine when
such a cost occurs, the question then arises what constitutes a "client's best interest",
i.e. what constitutes impartial advice. We assume that an adviser can form a belief
about his clients' preferences and therefore about the utility that clients experience
when they follow his advice. Giving advice which does not maximize this assumed
utility of the client would then be a violation of giving impartial advice and creates
the moral cost. However, predicting others' preferences is inherently diﬃcult. This
applies in particular for risk preferences (Hsee andWeber, 1997; Eckel and Grossman,
2008; Harrison et al., 2013), even when the inference is conducted by trained ﬁnancial
advisers and there is no conﬂict of interest (Roth and Voskort, 2014). In the presence
of external incentives which creates such a conﬂict, the uncertainty in estimating
others' risk preferences can be instrumentalized in a self-serving manner: Advisers
may form a belief about their clients' preferences such that their, potentially biased,
advice is compatible with it.
However, there are limits to such self-serving beliefs. It is a robust psychological
fact that people base their inferences about others' preferences on their own (Marks
and Miller, 1987), in particular for risk preferences (Faro and Rottenstreich, 2006).4
In consequence, advisers' own preferences also play a role in determining what is
impartial advice. We capture this by assuming that advisers incur a moral cost
when they recommend an option which they would not choose for themselves if they
were in the client's position.
4Though initially coined by Ross et al. (1977) as a "false consensus eﬀect", the falsity of esti-
mates of others' preferences based on one's own is not evident. Works by Hoch (1987) and Dawes
(1990) demonstrate that such projection is not just statistically correct; they also show that people
can often improve their accuracy in predicting others' preferences by relying more strongly on their
own. Engelmann and Strobel (2000) show that subjects do so when they are incentivized to make
accurate predictions.
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The third factor which matters for advisers is the diagnostic (dis-)utility they
derive when they learn to have given biased advice, based on a model of self-signaling
(Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Benabou and Tirole, 2011). In contrast to the moral cost
of acting immorally, this dis-utility only occurs to an adviser after he has biased his
advice, at the point when his later actions indicate exactly this fact to him. This can
be captured by a dual-self model in which the "diagnostic self" of an adviser learns
ex post about the other self's motive for giving advice, e.g. whether prior advice
was issued impartially and therefore was morally sound or whether it was corrupted.
The important implication of such an inference is that advisers can only uphold a
positive and self-serving belief of their prior motives for giving advice as long as they
do not take actions which are incompatible with this.5 Dual-self models have been
used previously to explore how people infer about themselves, in particular their
moral behaviour (Benabou and Tirole, 2004; Grossman, 2015). Here, we use it as
a crucial device to describe the trade-oﬀ between keeping self-serving beliefs about
one's own motives and taking contradictory actions.6
These three components together then have implications for how and, most im-
portantly for how long, a conﬂict of interest aﬀects advisers' choices and their rec-
ommendations. To see this, consider an adviser who issued a biased advice, thus
an adviser whose pecuniary payoﬀ for biasing advice outweighed his moral cost of
doing so. If he is also concerned about the self-image, he then needs to continue
to give the same biased advice again, especially when the conﬂict of interest has
disappeared. The reason is that in order to later entertain the (counterfactual) idea
that his initial advice was unbiased, it should be unaﬀected by the presence of an ex-
ternal incentive. Changing advice when the the conﬂict of interest disappears would
then signal just the opposite. When an adviser's own preference stipulates what
he should recommend to a client, this mechanism has even further consequences.
This is because such a rule implies that in order to perceive oneself as unbiased, an
adviser has to act according to his biased advice for himself.
In consequence, a behavioural trait which generally seems to be desirable, the
preference to perceive oneself as a moral person, can lead to persistent biases in
the context of advice giving. In addition, it can have a lasting eﬀect on advisers'
5In essence, this reﬂects the desire to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959)
 a discrepancy between one's actions and one's beliefs about what is the norm one should follow
(for economic models of cognitive dissonance, see Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Rabin (1994)).
For a discussion about how cognitive dissonance and motivated (self-)perception relate see also
Kunda (1992).
6Apart from enabling us to capture this cognition, it also captures the fact that the inferring
self "forgets" about the other self's motives. This is in line with research showing that people
cannot perfectly recall their past decision motives nor foresee their future ones (Kahneman et al.,
1997; Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999)
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own choices to the degree that they assign diagnostic value to them. With this
behavioural mechanism in mind, we set up the following experimental design to
explore it in more detail.
4.3 Experimental design and procedures
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were allocated to computer terminals
in cubicles where instructions were shown to them on screen. Subjects acting as
advisers were then informed that they would get GBP 5.00 as a show-up fee for
participating in the experiment and that there would be further possibilities to earn
money. They were also informed that they would act as advisers for clients who
would be drawn from the same pool of subjects for a future experimental session
and that clients would also receive the same show-up fee.
It was then explained to advisers that they would have to recommend which out
of three investments, referred to as option A, B, and C, their clients should take.
They were told that clients would only know that option A's payoﬀ would depend
more on luck than option C's while option B is intermediate in this regard. They
were also told that clients would not know the options' payoﬀs or the associated
probabilities. Advisers were informed that they, as advisers, would soon learn these
exact parameters of the investment options before they had to make a recommen-
dation.
The advisers' superior information was then given to them on a paper sheet
which explained the three investment options in detail (for a copy of this sheet and
the experimental interface see the appendix). The text on the sheet explained the
following procedure of how an option's payoﬀ was determined: After an option was
chosen, a six-sided die would be rolled. Depending on the chosen option, this would
then yield either a safe payoﬀ or a lottery. This lottery was described as a (fair)
coin toss with heads yielding GBP 20 and tails nothing. The following table which
was also on that sheet summarizes how the die's result maps into these possible
outcomes, depending on the chosen investment option:
Die equal to: Option A Option B Option C
1 or 2 lottery: GBP 20 or 0 safe payment: GBP 12 safe payment: GBP 12
3 or 4 lottery: GBP 20 or 0 lottery: GBP 20 or 0 safe payment: GBP 8
5 or 6 lottery: GBP 20 or 0 lottery: GBP 20 or 0 lottery: GBP 20 or 0
Table 4.1: Description of the investment options as shown to advisers, "lottery" is
a coin toss.
The text explained this procedure in detail and also contained several examples.
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Note that a choice among the three compound lotteries which these three options
represent, allows to categorize the underlying risk preferences.7 Comparing the
diﬀerences between option A and B, only those who are willing to give up a safe
payoﬀ of GBP 12 to play a lottery with an expected payoﬀ of GBP 10 instead,
i.e. risk-seeking individuals, choose option A. Conversely, option C is preferred
to option B only by those who want to sacriﬁce an expected payoﬀ of GBP 10
for a safe payoﬀ of GBP 8. Thus, only risk-averse individuals choose option C.
Accordingly, Option B is chosen by individuals who are neither suﬃciently risk-
averse nor suﬃciently risk-seeking. Reﬂecting this ordering based on risk-preferences
we will henceforth, with slight abuse of the precise meaning, refer to option A/B/C
as the "risk-seeking/neutral/averse option".
Step 1  First recommendation R1:
After having studied the instructions and choice situations, advisers were asked
to make a recommendation to clients. For this, they had to write the sentence "I
recommend you to choose option A/B/C", depending on what they wanted to advise,
on a piece of paper which had their cubicle number on it. They were instructed to
put this recommendation into an envelope, close it, and then click on a button on
their screen. The envelope was then collected by an experimenter and put into a
box. Before they made their recommendations, they were told that at the end of
the experiment, one of the envelopes would be randomly drawn from the box to be
presented to a client and that the corresponding cubicle number would be read aloud.
An adviser thus knew that he would eventually know whether his recommendation
was chosen to a be shown to a client.
Step 2  Own choice O:
After all advisers had written down their recommendation R1 and all envelopes were
collected, they were informed that they would now have to choose an investment
option for themselves. Advisers were previously not informed about this step. The
procedure was the same as for issuing advice: Subjects had to write on a sheet "I
choose option A/B/C." and then put it in an envelope. An experimenter came by
and collected the envelopes and put it in a separate box. Again, they were informed
that at the end of the experiment, one of the envelopes would be chosen randomly,
its number would be announced aloud, and that the respective adviser would be
asked later to roll the die to determine his chosen option's payoﬀ. Ex-ante, the
choice situation and its implementation probability was thus the same as the one
on which they had previously advised a client on.
7 This choice between possible sub-lotteries within a compound lottery is essentially a stripped-
down version of a similar task used previously by Hsee and Weber (1997).
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Step 3  Second recommendation R2
After advisers made their own choice O, they were asked to make a second recom-
mendation. The procedure was exactly the same as for R1, including the collection
of envelopes in a separate box, sampling one from it and announcing its number.
Again, advisers did not know in advance about this step. Advisers were also in-
formed that this second advice, if it was sampled, would be shown to a diﬀerent
client in the same future session with clients.
Step 4 - Questionnaire and implementation:
After all recommendations were collected, subjects ﬁlled out a short questionnaire
which elicited personal characteristics. The experimenter then sampled one enve-
lope from each of the boxes which contained the envelopes for R1, O, and R2 and
announced the respective cubicle numbers. Subjects were then paid out in private
based on whether they were oﬀered a bonus and their recommendations; the subject
in each session whose own choice O was sampled also rolled the die and received the
corresponding payoﬀ.
NO BONUS versus BONUS treatment: The above describes the experimental
procedure in our baseline condition to which we will refer as NO BONUS. Our
experimental manipulation was to oﬀer some advisers a bonus for recommending
the risk-seeking option A in R1. We will refer to this treatment as BONUS. After
having been informed about the advice they had to give and how to do so, but
before seeing the sheet with the detailed information about the investment options,
every second adviser (in total 48) in a given session was randomly determined to
be in that treatment. These advisers were informed that they would get a bonus
of GBP 3 if they recommended option A. This bonus was only paid for subject's
ﬁrst recommendation R1. For those advisers who were oﬀered the bonus, there
were explicit notiﬁcations on the screens which explained the O and R2 tasks which
clearly stated that there would not be any bonus for these tasks.8 This within-
session, across-subjects intervention with regard to the bonus is the only diﬀerence
between our NO BONUS and BONUS.
Veriﬁability: In order to ensure that advisers believed that a recommendation,
if randomly chosen to be shown to a client, would be actually seen by the client
we allowed advisers to sign their recommendations and to address the envelopes
to themselves. Advisers were explained that if their recommendation was chosen
to be shown a client, the sheet would be signed by the respective client. In case
8Since advisers' payoﬀ in BONUS do not depend on the clients' decisions, they were not ex-
plicitly informed about whether clients would learn about the bonus. Also none of the advisers
asked for this information. In the session with clients, they were informed of the bonus when they
received a recommendation R1 from an adviser who had been in the BONUS treatment.
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that the corresponding adviser had provided us with his or her address, this subject
would then get a copy of the signed recommendation by post. In addition, they
were informed that this mailing would also contain information on how they could
see the original, signed receipts which were deposited with the lab's oﬃcial record
depository. Subjects were informed of this before making their ﬁrst recommendation.
Since an adviser knew that he would know whether his envelope was sampled, this
procedure pre-committed us to actually show the sampled advice letters to actual
clients.
General procedures: Throughout the experiment, we enforced a strict no com-
munication policy. We conducted eight sessions, each with 11 to 14, in total 99,
subjects acting as advisers. Advisers earned on average GBP 6.68 ($9.51 at the
time of the experiment) while no session lasted longer than 45 minutes. All sub-
jects were students across several degrees and ﬁelds of studies. Table 12 in the
appendix shows descriptive statistics. The experimental sessions were conducted
in late January 2016 at the London School of Economics's Behavioural Research
Lab with subjects from its pool. The experimental interface was implemented using
zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). A week after the eight adviser sessions, we invited 16
additional subjects from the same pool for an additional session. In this session,
they acted as clients and received the sampled recommendations from the previous
adviser sessions, made their choices, and were paid their resulting payoﬀs. In this
paper, we only focus on advisers and their recommendations.9
4.4 Predictions
In this section, we derive predictions for our experiment. They are based on the as-
sumptions which we described in section 2, thus on advisers maximizing their overall
utility from pecuniary payoﬀs, the moral cost of giving in-appropriate advice, and
the self-image concern. Given our treatment intervention, we make the predictions
with regards to how often the risk-seeking option A is recommended and chosen.
All predictions derived and presented in this section are also derived in the formal,
mathematical model which can be found in the appendix.
Predictions for R1: In NO BONUS, there is no pecuniary gain of issuing any
speciﬁc recommendation. Since this is the ﬁrst choice which an adviser makes it does
9With only 16 client observations which are not balanced over treatments (only three are even-
tually with recommendations from BONUS; recall that the probability of a recommendation being
chosen is independent of the treatment), any analysis of client would have limited statistical power.
However in the two experiments of Gneezy et al. (2016) which are in a related setting but have
much more client observations, clients followed advisers in 74% and 85% of all cases, respectively.
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not have signaling value with regards to past behaviour. Absent pecuniary motives,
only the moral cost of issuing inappropriate advice therefore remains. Beliefs about
client's preference can be formed in a self-serving way, i.e. such that they suit an
adviser's recommendation, up to the point that they contradict his own preference.
To minimize the cost from recommending something that one would not choose
for oneself, advisers thus recommend option A only if they prefer it. Thus, only
risk-seeking adviser recommend option A.
In the BONUS treatment this is diﬀerent: Advisers are now paid for recommend-
ing option A and derive pecuniary utility from the bonus when they do so. Clearly,
those who would have recommended it anyhow, i.e. risk-seeking advisers, also rec-
ommend it in this treatment and in addition, get the bonus. However, those who
would not have recommended it in the NO BONUS because they do not prefer it
themselves now face a trade-oﬀ: When the moral cost of recommending something
they would not choose for themselves are smaller than the pecuniary value of the
bonus, they recommend option A. Otherwise, they recommend their preferred op-
tion. In both cases, they hold self-serving beliefs about the client's preference which
is compatible with their issued advice. Assuming that some advisers have suﬃciently
low moral cost and follow the oﬀered bonus, we get the following prediction:
Prediction 1. There are more advisers in BONUS than in NO BONUS who rec-
ommend option A for the ﬁrst recommendation R1.
Predictions for O: In contrast to the ﬁrst recommendation, advisers now make
choices for themselves. The moral cost of giving inappropriate advice are therefore
absent. Since the NO BONUS did not feature a bonus, there was no incentive
to act immorally and to give biased advice. In consequence, there is no concern
about drawing any (negative) inference from the own choice about one's preceding
advice. The only relevant decision criterion is thus one's own risk preference and
only risk-seeking advisers should choose option A for themselves in NO BONUS.
The own choice situation in BONUS and the NO BONUS is identical. Diﬀerences
in behaviour must occur because advisers in BONUS have previously been exposed
to the bonus and, potentially, have given in to it. To the degree that they assign
diagnostic value to their choices, advisers' own choices can then reveal to themselves
that they were corrupted by the bonus: Advisers who recommended option A in
R1 should, in order to appear as having given appropriate advice, also prefer it for
themselves. In order to uphold the self-image that they were not corruptible, advisers
who recommended option A just for the bonus must then mimic the incorruptible
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ones by choosing option A for themselves.10 However, these advisers lose expected
pecuniary utility because they choose the option which they do not actually prefer.
In consequence, only those corruptible advisers who have suﬃciently high image
concerns, relative to their loss in expected pecuniary utility, choose option A for
themselves, in addition to the incorruptible, risk-seeking ones. Note, however, that
this only applies if own choices have suﬃcient diagnostic value, i.e. if advisers
acknowledge the reverse implication of "I should recommend to my client what I
would choose in her situation". Under the assumption that advisers assign such
diagnostic value to their own choices we predict the following:
Prediction 2. There are more advisers in BONUS than in NO BONUS who rec-
ommend option A for the the own choice O.
Second recommendation R2: The predictions for the second recommendation
combine insights from above. In NO BONUS, an adviser's pecuniary utility is
unaﬀected by his second recommendation. Also, absent any previous bonus to give
inappropriate advice, self-signaling concern do not play any role either. Accordingly,
only the moral cost for giving inappropriate advice matters, as in R1. A previously
formed self-serving belief coincides with the previous recommendation. For this
recommendation, an adviser's own preference was the determining factor so that
again, only risk-seeking advisers recommend option A (again).
In the BONUS treatment, the second recommendation does not entail any bonus
either. However, the bonus which was oﬀered to advisers in R1 opens the possibility
that this recommendation was biased and therefore, the concern for signaling one's
own corruptibility matters. Advisers who truly prefer option A can then minimize
the moral cost of giving inappropriate advice and the self-signaling concern by rec-
ommending option A again in R2. As outlined above, advisers who do not prefer
option A but recommended it in R1 for the bonus may mimic the incorruptible ones
by choosing option A in O to prevent dis-utility from learning that they gave biased
advice. Following the same logic, they can then mimic the incorruptible ones by
re-recommending option A in R2. Note that the situations in R2 and R1 are identi-
cal, except for the bonus. Therefore, an inconsistency is more directly attributable
10 In terms of a signaling model, this is an equilibrium where corruptible advisers pool with those
who truly prefer option A. In principle, there could be other equilibria where corruptible advisers
and those who truly prefer option A pool on choosing non-A options, together with incorruptible
advisers who actually prefer these options. However, in terms of self-signaling, these are rather
unrealistic equilibria. This is so because in such equilibria, those who behaved morally obfuscate
their behaviour while those who behaved immorally do not. We therefore exclude them. We discuss
this in more detail in the formal model in the appendix. There, we also show that these excluded
equilibria do not even need to exist. In contrast, the former one where corruptible advisers mimic
incorruptible ones by choosing option A does always exist.
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to one's corruptibility; the second recommendation should have higher diagnostic
value than the own choice. We thus get the following prediction:
Prediction 3. There are more advisers in BONUS than in NO BONUS who rec-
ommend option A for the second recommendation R2.
Conditional on a scenario in which at least some advisers are corrupted by the
bonus, thus that prediction 1 is true, our design enables us to investigate two main
questions. First, by testing prediction 3 we can ﬁnd evidence for self-image concerns
which cause repeated bias in advice-giving. If advisers are only steered by pecuniary
incentives and not by the diagnostic value of their actions, we would not expect
diﬀerences between BONUS and NO BONUS. In addition, comparing the own choice
O across treatments allows to test whether they also have diagnostic value. If they
do not, advisers should just implement their preferred choices which, due to random
treatment assignment, should not diﬀer between BONUS and NO BONUS. However,
if prediction 2 is also conﬁrmed, this indicates that advisers make choices which are,
from a purely pecuniary point of view, sub-optimal just to appear incorruptible. It
would therefore indicate that they assign diagnostic value to their own actions.
With this in mind, we will next examine the actual advisers' behaviour in our
experiment. Before doing so, it is noteworthy that the proposed mechanism is, in
principle, also capable of explaining the ﬁndings by Gneezy et al. (2016). They
report on an experiment in which they expose advisers to a bonus and to a decision
situation similar to ours. They then examine the eﬀect of when this exposure to
the bonus happens. They ﬁnd that recommendations are less aﬀected by the bonus
when advisers learn about it after they have ﬁrst considered what to recommend.
In contrast, when they know about the bonus before such a consideration, their
following advice is more biased. If the act of actively considering what to recommend
also has diagnostic value, then changing one's actual recommendation afterward,
once one has learned about the bonus, would also signal one's corruptibility. If in
contrast an adviser knows from the beginning about the bonus, this can already be
taken into account when initially considering what to recommend. He can then form
a self-serving belief which supports his biased consideration and therefore also the
actual recommendation. This would prevent a negative self-inference.
4.5 Results
Results for R1: This is where our treatment manipulation occurred. In the
BONUS treatment, advisers were paid a bonus to recommend option A. Accord-
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ingly, we expect some to give in to this incentive and recommend it. This is also
what we observe: In the NO BONUS only 3.9% of advisers recommend option A
in their ﬁrst recommendation. In contrast, about half of all advisers (54.2%) in
BONUS recommend this option  an increase by 50.3 percentage points which is
highly signiﬁcant (Fisher exact test: p = 0.000).11 Figure 4.1 shows the overall
distribution of choices across these treatments:
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Figure 4.1: Frequency for each option being recommended in R1, bars depict
standard errors.
We also employed a parametric approach via the following linear probability model
which allows us to control for the eﬀect of remaining heterogeneity across treatments
or sessions:
Prob[r1,i = A] = α + β ·BONUSi + δ · ci + γ · si + i (4.1)
In the above, r1,i is subject i's ﬁrst recommendation out of the set of possible rec-
ommendations {A,B,C} and BONUSi is a dummy indicating whether this subject
was randomly assigned to the treatment BONUS. The vector ci collects control
variables which indicate a subject's age, gender, monthly budget, dummies for re-
gions of origin, the highest degree a subject holds or pursues and his or her ﬁelds
of studies. Control dummies for each session are collected in si. The error term i
captures idiosyncratic noise in the decision for an adviser's recommendation. Table
4.2 presents the results when controls are successively added. It shows that the
increase of about 50 percentage points in the probability of recommending option
A is almost unaﬀected by the addition of these controls and remains highly signiﬁ-
cant. We also repeat the same estimation procedure by probit and do not ﬁnd any
qualitative diﬀerences (see table 8 in the appendix). We therefore note that our
treatment manipulation worked and that prediction 1 is conﬁrmed.
11Although we have directed hypothesis, the reported p-value here and in the the following
always refer to more conservative two-sided hypotheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
BONUS 0.502*** 0.497*** 0.489*** 0.481***
(0.078) (0.076) (0.093) (0.092)
Personal Controls no yes no yes
Session Controls no no yes yes
Observations 99 99 99 99
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.323 0.280 0.310
Table 4.2: OLS estimates of the probability to recommend option A in R1
robust standard error in parentheses, signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
personal controls: age, gender, monthly budget, subject's region of origin and ﬁeld
of studies
It is also noteworthy that our results indicate that when oﬀered a bonus, almost
half of our subjects do not recommend option A. If subjects were confused or in-
decisive we would expect them all to take the money. However, there is something
which stops a signiﬁcant share, 45.8% (t-test: p = 0.000), of all advisers in BONUS
from recommending this option, even for money. The notion of advisers refusing to
recommend it because they consider it inappropriate or immoral advice is consistent
with this observation.
Own choice O: For their own choice, no bonus is paid to advisers in both conditions.
Figure 4.2 displays their choices. In the baseline NO BONUS we observe that 9.8%
Option A Option B Option C
O − NO BONUS
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
Option A Option B Option C
O − BONUS
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
Figure 4.2: Frequency for each option being chosen in O, bars depict standard
errors.
choose option A for themselves. In BONUS however, when advisers were previously
oﬀered the bonus for their ﬁrst recommendation, 27.1% of all advisers, almost three
times as much as in NO BONUS, choose the risk-seeking option A for themselves.
This increase by 17.3 percentage point is signiﬁcant (Fisher exact test: p = 0.036).
This ﬁnding is also conﬁrmed when we re-estimate model (4.1) with a dummy
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indicating that an adviser chooses option O for himself as the dependent variable.
Table 4.3 reports the corresponding results when the same control variables as in
the preceding analysis are successively added. The eﬀect of being in BONUS even
increases and this pattern is again similar when the model is estimated by probit
(see table 9 in the appendix). Therefore, we regard prediction 2 as conﬁrmed.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BONUS 0.173** 0.178** 0.219** 0.218**
(0.077) (0.081) (0.095) (0.087)
Personal Controls no yes no yes
Session Controls no no yes yes
Observations 99 99 99 99
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.010 0.065 0.088
Table 4.3: OLS estimates of the probability to choose option A for oneself in O
robust standard error in parentheses, signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
personal controls: age, gender, monthly budget, subject's region of origin and ﬁeld
of studies
Given these ﬁndings, it is helpful to recall the mechanism which underlies our
prediction since we can examine this causal channel more closely. The mechanism
argues that if advisers assign diagnostic value to their own choice, they have to
act according to their (biased) advice in order not to self-signal that they were
corrupted. Our ﬁndings for R1 indicate that the bonus corrupted about half of all
advisers; it leads to an increase of recommending option A by 50.3 percentage points
for BONUS relative to NO BONUS. The ﬁndings on advisers' own choice O just
presented, show that there is an increase of 17.3 percentage points for those who were
potentially corrupted, i.e. those who were exposed to the bonus. These estimated
probabilities then imply the share of advisers who choose option A for themselves
because they have previously given in to the bonus but do not want to self-signal
their corruptibility is given by 34.4% (, 0.173/0.503).12 This estimate shows that
12 This follows from re-arranging the following: The observed increase between NO BONUS
and BONUS in own choices for A (17.3%) has, according to the described mechanism, to equal
advisers' propensity of feeling compelled to choose option A for themselves due to their previous
recommendation for it, multiplied with the increase in the probability of them recommending
option A as caused by the bonus (50.3%). To capture this eﬀect in our regression framework, we
implemented the following two-stage procedure: In the ﬁrst stage, we took our regression results
for (4.1) to obtain an estimate of how strongly the bonus lead advisers to recommend option A.
To see how this causal channel aﬀected their own choice, denoted by ci, we then estimated in a
second step the model Prob[ci = A] = α + β · ̂r1,i = A + δ · ci + γ · si + i where ̂r1,i = A is the
predicted probability of adviser i recommending option A because i is exposed to the bonus, thus
we take Bonusi and our ﬁrst-stage results to instrument r1,i. The estimate for β in the second
stage then reﬂects the causal eﬀect of the bonus on the probability of choosing option A for oneself.
The point estimates range from 0.344 to 0.452, depending on the speciﬁcation, and are signiﬁcant
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more than a third of those advisers who were put on the spot by biasing their
recommendations and then having to choose for themselves behaved consistently by
choosing option A for themselves.
We can also take our choice rate for option A in NO BONUS, which is 9.8%, as
an estimate of how many people actually prefer it independent of possible image con-
cerns due to the bonus. Adding this to the above estimate, we would expect that a
total of 44.2%(=34.4%+9.8%) of the advisers in BONUS who initially recommended
option A in R1 behaved consistently and also chose it in O. What we empirically
observe is that 42.3% of the advisers in BONUS who initially recommended option
A exhibit such a behaviour, a percentage which is not diﬀerent from the expected
one (t-test: p = 0.850). Furthermore, this observed frequency also means that a
signiﬁcant share of advisers in treatment BONUS who have initially recommended
option A, 57.7% (t-test: p = 0.000), do not choose it for themselves. Again, if
advisers were just confused and took the bonus as an indication of what they should
recommend, we would expect them all to also act accordingly for themselves.
Second recommendation R2: For their second recommendation, the decision
situation for advisers in NO BONUS is the same as for their ﬁrst. Accordingly, we
expect a similar pattern of recommendations. The left panel of ﬁgure 4.3 shows
the recommendation frequencies for each option. Comparing it to the left panel of
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Figure 4.3: Frequency for each option being recommended in R1, bars depict
standard errors.
ﬁgure 4.1 shows that this is largely the case: 82.4% of the advisers in NO BONUS
recommend again exactly the same option they recommend initially. In particular,
exactly the small minority of 3.9% of the advisers who recommended option A
(p < 0.05). Strictly speaking, the results of this two-stage procedure may however be biased
since the exclusion restriction for the instrument Bonusi could be violated (being in the BONUS
treatment could inﬂuence the own choice via channels other than the ﬁrst recommendation). Given
the ﬁt to our above estimates and observations, we however consider the results of this procedure
noteworthy.
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recommends it again.
This picture is very diﬀerent when we compare this to the recommendations
in BONUS. Although there is no bonus for recommending option A in R2 either,
the rate of recommendation for option A is almost ﬁve times as high as in the NO
BONUS: 22.9% of those advisers who had previously been exposed to the bonus rec-
ommend option A, a signiﬁcant increase by 19.0 percentage points relative to the NO
BONUS (Fisher exact test: p = 0.007). This is also conﬁrmed by a regression anal-
ysis which re-estimates model (4.1) when a dummy which indicates whether option
A is recommended in the second recommendation is the dependent variable. Table
4.4 presents the results and shows that this point estimate even increases. Again,
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BONUS 0.190*** 0.203*** 0.211** 0.213**
(0.067) (0.067) (0.092) (0.087)
Personal Controls no yes no yes
Session Controls no no yes yes
Observations 99 99 99 99
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.073 0.038 0.064
Table 4.4: OLS estimates of the probability to recommend option A in R2
robust standard error in parentheses, signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
personal controls: age, gender, monthly budget, subject's region of origin and ﬁeld
of studies
this pattern is also observed for probit estimates (see table 10 in the appendix). We
therefore treat prediction 3 as conﬁrmed.
As above for advisers' own choices O, we can estimate the causal eﬀect of having
given in to the bonus on the repeated recommendation for the risk-seeking option.
The initial eﬀect of an increase in the probability of recommending A in R1 due to
the bonus was estimated by 50.3 percentage points. The observed increase of 19.0
percentage point in R2 then implies that, in expectation, 37.8% (, 0.190/0.503) of
advisers recommend option A again just because they have previously given in to the
bonus.13 To estimate the frequency of advisers in BONUS who recommend option
A twice we add the 3.9% who do so in the NO BONUS treatment as an estimate
for the proportion of those who recommend it for reasons unrelated to the bonus.
The implied point estimate from this decomposition is 41.7%(=37.8%+3.9%). This
13We also repeated the two-step instrumental-variable-procedure as explained in footnote 12.
That is, we estimate the probability of recommending option A again in R2 when one's ﬁrst
recommendation R1 has been biased the bonus. With the same caveat as described there applying
here, the resulting IV-estimates of this causal channel range from 0.372 to 0.442 percentage point,
depending on the speciﬁcation, and are signiﬁcant (p < 0.01).
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estimate in the region of the actually observed frequency of advisers in BONUS who
re-recommend option A in R2: It is given by 34.6% which is not statistically diﬀered
from the above estimate (t-test: p = 0.417).
Further results: There are some further ﬁndings which support our theory and its
underlying assumptions. Given our previous results, we expect high consistency be-
tween advisers' own choices and their ﬁrst recommendation when there is no conﬂict
of interest. Our results are largely in line with this: Table 4.5a) shows the frequen-
cies of advisers choosing for themselves, conditional on their ﬁrst recommendation
in NO BONUS. Only the oﬀ-diagonal entries are not in line with this prediction.
They amount to a total of 17.7% of the observation in this treatment; 82.3% of our
observations in NO BONUS are therefore in line with the predicted consistency. In
O =
A B C
A 3.9% 0.0% 0.0%
R1 = B 2.0% 23.5% 11.8%
C 3.9% 0.0% 54.9
a) NO BONUS
O =
A B C
A 22.9% 8.3% 22.9%
R1 = B 0.0% 6.3% 0.0%
C 4.2% 4.2% 31.3
b) BONUS
Table 4.5: Frequencies of advisers' own choices O conditional on their ﬁrst
recommendation R1.
BONUS, our theory predicts that some of those who have previously recommended
option A stick to it in order to avoid a negative self-image. Other advisers who
have recommended it but who do not have suﬃciently strong image concerns choose
their preferred option instead. Accordingly, we can explain the diagonal entries in
table 4.5b) plus the oﬀ-diagonal ones in the ﬁrst row. Again, this leaves only a small
fraction of 8.4% of our observations unexplained.
We ﬁnd similar results with regards to the consistency between advisers' ﬁrst
and second recommendations. Table 4.6a) and b) show the respective conditional
frequencies across our experimental conditions. In NO BONUS, noise is somewhat
R2 =
A B C
A 3.9% 0.0% 0.0%
R1 = B 0.0% 35.3% 2.0%
C 3.9% 15.7% 43.1%
a) NO BONUS
R2 =
A B C
A 18.8% 16.7% 18.8%
R1 = B 0.0% 6.3% 0.0%
C 4.2% 8.3% 27.1%
b) BONUS
Table 4.6: Frequencies of advisers' second recommendations R2 conditional on
their ﬁrst R1.
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higher than for the previous comparison. We observe a total of 21.6% to be incon-
sistent, i.e. to be outside table 4.6a)'s diagonal. However, one should note ﬁrstly,
that these inconsistencies are primarily due to switches from having initially rec-
ommended option C and then option B, thus between neighboring, non-risk-seeking
options. Secondly, almost eighty percent of recommendations are consistent and
thus in line with our theory. With regard to variations in the BONUS treatment the
results are even stronger. In total, 87.5% of our observations fall into an explainable
pattern, thus are either on the diagonal or the ﬁrst row. Overall, the consistency
predicted by our theory can be observed in at least four ﬁfth of the relevant cases
and often, in even higher proportions.
Further evidence comes from our exit questionnaire. It contained a question on
advisers' general risk attitudes. More precisely, it asked subjects to indicate on an
11-point Likert-scale "How willing are you to take risk, in general?". Although this
question was not incentivized, answers to it has previously been shown to correlate
with peoples' actual choices under risk. While in NO BONUS, the average response
was 5.0 points, it increased by almost one point or alternatively, 39.8% of its stan-
dard deviation, to 5.9 points in the treatment BONUS. This increase is marginally
statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon ranksum-test: p = 0.059).14 This result becomes
even stronger, both numerically and statistically, in an OLS regression analysis when
additional control variables are included. Table 4.7 represents the results from es-
timating model (4.1) when the dependent variable is this self-assessed risk-measure
and controls are successively added. The results are also robust to estimation via
ordered probit (see table 11 in the appendix). This increase in an adviser's self-
stated risk measure is consistent with our theory: Advisers who have previously
given in to the bonus can self signal that this advice was appropriate from their
point of view when they consider themselves as more risk-seeking.15 Once again,
this is also consistent with advisers who are not just confused about their choices and
14Due to a data-glitch in the ﬁrst two sessions, we had to collect the risk-measure along with the
other post-experimental questionnaire separately. When we exclude these sessions, the increase
is 1.1 points, 46% of the measure's standard deviation, and is similarly signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon
ranksum-test: p = 0.062.). The same pattern (higher point estimates and slightly lower but still
signiﬁcant p-values) holds when we exclude these observations from the regressions reported in
table 4.7. Note that our primary data on the recommendations R1/R2 and own choices O were
not aﬀected by this data glitch since they were collected by advisers writing them on paper.
15We also repeated the two step instrumental variable procedure laid out along with its caveats
in footnote 12. This allows us to estimate the eﬀect on the risk measure through having recom-
mended option A by instrumenting this choice via an advisers' random exposure to the bonus. The
estimated coeﬃcient ranges from a 1.8 to 2.2, depending on the speciﬁcation and are signiﬁcant
(p < 0.05). Given the ﬁrst stage increase in the probability of recommending option A due to the
bonus of 50.3 percentage points, the implied causal increase of 0.9 to 1.1 (1.8×0.503 to 2.2×0.503)
is consistent with these estimates.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
BONUS 0.914** 1.030** 1.244** 1.306**
(0.453) (0.436) (0.576) (0.590)
Constant 4.961*** 3.534*** 5.185** 5.819*
(0.335) (0.634) (2.284) (3.090)
Personal Controls no yes no yes
Session Controls no no yes yes
Observations 99 99 99 99
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.199 0.374 0.415
Table 4.7: OLS estimates on the self-assessed preference for risk (Likert scale, 0 to
10)
robust standard error in parentheses, signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
personal controls: age, gender, monthly budget, subject's region of origin and ﬁeld
of studies
recommendations but who, on the contrary, do even understand the more general
behavioural implications of their recommendations outside the given set of options.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide experimental evidence that incentives to bias advice have
a lasting and causal eﬀect on both, advisers' future recommendations for risky de-
cisions and their own choices. When advisers are paid a bonus to recommend an
investment option which is only preferred by risk-seeking individuals, about half of
them recommend it. Without such a bonus only four percent do so. Prior expo-
sure to a bonus leads a signiﬁcant share of advisers to re-recommend this option
when there is no bonus anymore and even to choose it for themselves. We provide
a psychological mechanism which is capable of explaining these ﬁndings. It is based
on advisers' desire to not self-signal their corruptibility. This forces them to be
consistent in their recommendations and own choices, even when this means to bias
further advice and even their own choices. With this theory we can consistently
decompose the recommendation and choice pattern of advisers in our experiment.
We estimate that around 35 to 40 percent of those advisers whose advice has been
corrupted by the bonus engage in such continuing deception of advisers and also of
themselves in order to preserve a positive self-image.
A straightforward policy implication of our ﬁndings is therefore that removing
advisers' conﬂicts of interest does not necessarily eliminate their eﬀect on advice
giving. For example, the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) in the UK whose step-
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wise implementation started in 2013 bans commission-based ﬁnancial advice. Our
results indicate that, while it may improve such advice in the long run, its full eﬀects
may be considerably delayed. Experienced advisers, who have spent their hitherto
professional life in an environment which featured such incentives, will likely exhibit
persistent biases in their recommendations.
Our proposed mechanism also has profound consequences on how accountable
advisers feel. It implies that it is the desire to see oneself as a moral, impartial
adviser which can lead to exactly the opposite behaviour. Those who stop giving
biased advice after bonuses are removed identify themselves as having previously
been corrupted. In contrast, those who continue to give biased advice do so just
to avoid this inference and therfore, do not feel corrupted. In consequence, the
awareness of acting in a corrupted manner and actually giving biased advice do not
coincide, in fact they are asymmetric. This provides challenges for the remedy of
the biases resulting from conﬂicts of interest as those who do the damage might not
even feel culpable. Given the demand for advice in many situations, we think that
exploring these mental processes by advisers and the adverse consequences it has on
their job is a fruitful avenue for further research.
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Appendix A  A simple model of self-signaling and
corrupted advice-giving
In the following, we formally derive three predictions I to III which are analogous to
their respective counterparts, predictions 1 to 3 in then main text. These derivations
are based on a formal model presented below with assumptions capturing those
described in section 2.
First recommendation R1: We consider an adviser who recommends a client
which action out of a discrete set S to take. In our experiment, these are three
investment options A, B, and C, thus S = {A,B,C}. We denote an adviser's (ﬁrst)
recommendation by r1 ∈ S. In addition, there is a bonus b(r1) which depends
on the issued recommendation. In our experiment, an adviser gets a bonus b if
he recommends option A, otherwise he does not get any bonus. We thus have
b(r1) = b · 1[r1 = A]. We denote the utility which advisers get from a pecuniary
payoﬀ x by the strictly increasing vNM-utility function u(x).
In addition, an adviser i suﬀers dis-utility ki > 0 to the extend that he recom-
mends an option which is not in the client's best interest. What constitutes a client's
best interest is based on two factors: First, it is the choice c∗ which the adviser would
make if he had to make the client's decision for himself, thus c∗ = arg maxc∈S E[u(c)].
Second, we allow the adviser to hold a (motivated) belief about the client's prefer-
ences. This is captured by the vNM-utility function u˜ which denotes the adviser's
belief about the client's preference. We can then denote the implied optimal choice,
based on this ﬁrst-order belief, by c˜∗ = arg maxc∈S E[u˜(c)]. We let γ ∈ [0, 1] de-
note the weight which advisers assign to their own preference in determining what
it is the client's best interest as opposed to optimal recommendations based on
their ﬁrst-order beliefs about the client's preferences. An adviser's overall utility of
recommending r1 is then given by the following expression:
V˜ (r1) = u(b · 1[r1 = A])− ki
(
γ · 1[r1 6= c∗] + (1− γ) · 1[r1 6= c˜∗]
)
(2)
This allows several interpretations: When γ = 1, the question of what constitutes
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appropriate, morally sound advice is the same as "What would I choose if I were
in the client's position?". Conversely, γ = 0 means that only what an adviser be-
liefs about others' preferences, not his personal consideration, is relevant for issuing
appropriate advice. Values of γ within the unit interval can represent situations
in between or when an adviser believes that a client has utility represented by u
with probability γ and otherwise represented by u˜. The magnitude of ki then scales
concerns about issuing unsuited advice relative to pecuniary payoﬀs.
Advisers can form a belief about the client's preferences in a self-serving manner.
That is, whenever they issue a recommendation r1 they can maximize their overall
utility by self-servingly believe that the clients' preferences u˜ are such that c˜∗ =
r1. In this regard, γ can also be interpreted as how far such a self-serving belief
can be formed, independently of and adviser's own preferences. Therefore, the
recommendation r1 which maximizes (2) is the maximizer of the following, more
simple, expression:
v(r1) = u(b · 1[r1 = a)])− γki · 1[r1 6= c∗] (3)
We letKc∗ denote the cdf of the distribution of an adviser's moral cost ki, conditional
on this adviser preferring option c∗, e.g. KA(x) = Pr[ki ≤ x|c∗ = A]. For simplicity,
we assume that each of these conditionals cdf's has pdf which is strictly positive over
its support.16 We also let αc∗ > 0 denote the share in the population of advisers
who have preferred action c∗ ∈ S.17 For easier notiﬁcation, we let α = αA, i.e.
in our experiment α is the share of advisers who are suﬃciently risk-seeking to
choose option A. We assume the above distributions and parameters to be common
knowledge.18
R1  NO BONUS: Since there is no incentive to bias advice, only the second part
of (3) matters. This is maximized by r∗1 = c
∗. In consequence, the share of advisers
16Results do not change when the cdfs are allowed to be partially non-increasing, as
long as at least one of the pdfs has some mass on suﬃciently low values, i.e. that
Kc∗ (min{u(b)− u(0),E[u(c∗)− u(A)]}) > 0 for at least one c∗ ∈ S \ {A}.
17In consequence, the unconditional cdf Pr[ki ≤ x] is given by
∑
c∗∈S αc∗Kc∗(x).
18Note that when the signaling concern refers to a dual-self model where advisers ex-post infer
their own type from actions, this common prior only refers to these selves. A common prior between
individuals is not required.
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who recommend option A equals α.
R1  BONUS: For those who have c∗ = A, it follows from (3) that they should
also recommend it. For those with c∗ 6= A, they can either recommend option A
nevertheless to earn the bonus or they recommend their preferred option c∗ 6= A and
obtain a utility of u(0). Advisers who do not prefer option A then recommend it if
and only if γki < u(b) − u(0). By using the convention that Kc∗
(
u(b)−u(0)
γ
) ∣∣
γ=0
=
limx→+∞Kc∗(x) = 1 we can then deﬁne the following
β ≡
∑
c∗∈S\{A}
αc∗Kc∗
(
u(b)− u(0)
γ
)
= αBKB
(
u(b)− u(0)
γ
)
+αcKc
(
u(b)− u(0)
γ
)
> 0
Thus with a bonus, a share β of advisers is corrupted by the bonus and recommends
option A, in addition to the share α who would have recommended this option
anyhow.
Given the same expected population of advisers across BONUS and NO BONUS,
as achieved by random treatment assignment, we can then state the following:
Prediction I. Pr[r1 = A | bonus ] = α + β > Pr[r1 = A | no bonus ] = α
It will be helpful to categorize advisers along three behavioural types θ ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
These types reﬂect the motives underlying their recommendation r1 as follows:
Type 1 (θ = 1): Advisers who have c∗ = A and recommend r1 = c∗, share α.
Type 2 (θ = 2): Advisers who have c∗ 6= A but recommend r1 6= c∗, share β.
Type 3 (θ = 3): Advisers who have c∗ 6= A and recommend r1 = c∗, share
1− α− β.
Type 1 and 3 advisers give the same advice they would have given had the bonus been
absent. Type-2-advisers are corrupted: They recommend option A not because they
prefer it but because they were paid to do so. Note that this above categorization
of types also applies in the NO BONUS-treatment, the respective shares however
diﬀer: Share α also recommends option A without a bonus. Type-2-advisers do not
exist in this treatment thus we can treat β as if it were equal to zero and the share
of type-3-advisers is given by 1− α.
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Own choice O: The extent to which advisers take their own choice as a "diagnosis"
of the moral type in R1 is given by λ ≥ 0. A value λ ∈ (0, 1) would reﬂect that
choosing for one-self is not exactly the same as recommending to others but also
that is not unrelated; λ = γ is then a natural case. In general, we assume that λ
is some increasing function Λ of γ with λ = Λ(γ) = 0 if and only if γ = 0. This
means that own choices only have diagnostic value to assess an adviser's previous
recommendation when his own preference is, at least partly, relevant for issuing
appropriate advice.
When λ is positive, an adviser's own choice c ∈ S signals his underlying motives
for his previous recommendation in R1. In particular, an adviser can potentially
infer that he was a type-2-adviser according to the above classiﬁcation. The cost
of inferring that one is such a type, thus that one-seld is corruptible yield image
dis-utility li > 0. By denoting the expected utility from choosing a lottery c ∈ S by
E[u(c)], the overall utility of advisers is then given by
V (c|r1) = E[u(c)]− λli · Pr[θ = 2|r1, c] (4)
As before, we assume that li can be described by a family of commonly known
conditional cdfs (Lc∗)c∗∈S , e.g. LA(x) = Pr[li ≤ x|c∗ = A].19
O  NO BONUS: When there was no prior bonus, there are no type-2 advisers. In
consequence, Pr[θ = 2|r1, c] ≤ Pr[θ = 2] = 0 holds and c = c∗ maximizes (4) via
E[u(c)]. The share of advisers choosing option A for themselves is thus given by α.
O  BONUS: We start with the case that λ > 0. First note that type-3-advisers who
have previously recommended r1 6= A cannot infer to be type-2-advisers, i.e. Pr[θ =
2|r1 6= A, c] = 0. All type-3-advisers therefore choose c = r1 = c∗ 6= A to maximize
(4). Type-1 and type-2 advisers can however both infer to be type-2 and would
then suﬀer dis-utility li because they have the same initial recommendation r1 = A.
Denote the likelihood that a type-1-adviser chooses c = A with τc = Pr[c = A|θ = 1]
19This eﬀectively constitutes a intrapersonal signaling game where an adviser of type (ki, li)
sends a message (c|r1) and then gets dis-utility when he infers from this that his type is such the
he behaves according to the behavioural type θ = 2.
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and that a type-2-adviser makes the same choice with pic = Pr[c = A|θ = 2]. One
then gets the following for the corresponding posteriors:
Pr[θ = 2|c = A, r1 = A] = pic · β
τc · α + pic · β (5)
Pr[θ = 2|c 6= A, r1 = A] = (1− pic) · β
(1− τc) · α + (1− pic) · β (6)
It is easily veriﬁed that Pr[θ = 2|c 6= A, r1 = A] ≥ Pr[θ = 2|c = A, r1 = A] whenever
τc ≥ pic. If this condition holds, type-1-advisers who choose c 6= A suﬀer for two
reasons: First, they loose expected pecuniary utility by choosing a suboptimal choice
c = A 6= c∗. Second, they expect dis-utility from damage to self-image which is at
least as big as when they had chosen their preferred option. In consequence, there
is only one equilibrium with τc ≥ pic in which τc = 1 and all type-1-advisers are
consistent by choosing r1 = c = A. While other equilibria with τc < pic cannot be
excluded but also do not need to exist, the one with τc = 1 is a natural candidate: In
it, type-1-advisers who are not corrupted by the bonus do also not deviate from their
preferred choice just because of the fear of perceiving themselves as corruptible type-
2-advisers while type-2-adviser, who want to uphold a positive self-image, might do
so. Also, while there is always the equilibrium with τc = 1, those with τc < pic may
not even exist.20
Type 2-advisers then face a trade-oﬀ: They would not like to choose option A
for themselves, since for them c∗ 6= Aholds. However, if they switch from their ﬁrst
recommendation to their preferred option, they then generate a perfect signal of
being type-2 since all other types are consistent by choosing c = r1 and therefore,
Pr[θ = 2|c 6= A, r1 = A] = 1 holds. Using the posterior (5), a type-2-adviser
therefore chooses his preferred option c∗ 6= A if and only if
E[u(c∗)]− λli > E[u(A)]− λli · pic · β
α + pic · β
That is, an adviser reveals himself when his image concern is suﬃciently low, i.e.
20If the dis-utility of not choosing option A although one prefers it is too large, type-1 would
not choose another option just to appear less as a type 2.
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when li <
α+picβ
λα
(E[u(c∗)]− E[u(A)]). For this, they have to take into account that
by not choosing option A, they decrease pic. This in turn simpliﬁes pooling and
thereby raises the opportunity cost of such a choice. It follows that, in equilibrium,
the share of type-2-advisers who choose option A to uphold a positive image balance
this eﬀect. This share is therefore given by the solution to the following expression:
1− pic =
∑
c∗∈S\{A}
αc∗Lc∗
(
α + picβ
λα
(E[u(c∗)]− E[u(A)])
)
= αBLB
(
α + picβ
λα
(E[u(B)]− E[u(A)])
)
+ αCLC
(
α + picβ
λα
(E[u(C)]− E[u(A)])
)
(7)
Note that for all values of pic ∈ [0, 1], the above RHS is strictly positive and non-
decreasing in pic. Also note that from α = αA > 0 it holds that
∑
c∗∈S\{A} αc∗Lc∗ (x) <∑
c∗∈S αc∗Lc∗ (x) ≤ 1 for every x ∈ R++.21 The above RHS is therefore strictly less
than one. Since the LHS is strictly decreasing in piC and takes all values in [0, 1]
over that interval, there is a unique solution pi∗c ∈ (0, 1) to (12). Also note that since
the RHS of (12) is decreasing in λ, the implied consistency in own choice pi∗c is also
strictly increasing in this parameter.
Now consider λ = 0: The second part in (4) does not count then and irrespective
of their prior behaviour, all advisers choose c∗. This is equivalent to pi∗c = 0.
In summary, share α of type-1-advisers initially recommend and then choose for
themselves option A. Type-3-advisers initially recommend and then choose their
preferred non-A option. Type-2-advisers, whose total share is given by β, split in
two subgroups: Advisers in the ﬁrst subgroup who represent share pi∗cβ of all advisers
choose option A to uphold a positive image. Advisers in the second subgroup with
population share (1 − pi∗c )β put their own payoﬀ above image concerns and choose
their preferred non-A options. The ﬁrst sub-group then has mass only when they
advisers assign diagnostic value to their choices, thus if γ > 0. Assuming that this
is true, the following predictions can then be stated:
21This also holds under the condition for weakly-increasing cdfs laid out in footnote 16 (it is the
reason for the second expression in the min-term).
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Prediction II. Suppose λ > 0. Then Pr[c = A|bonus] = α + pi∗cβ > Pr[c =
A|no bonus] = α
Second recommendation R2: As before, the dis-utility of inferring to be cor-
ruptible, thus to be a type-2-adviser, is given by li > 0. Since the advice in R2 is
the same as in R1 we do not discount the diagnostic value by some λ < 1. The
recommendation does not aﬀect the adviser himself but the client. We thus assume,
as for the ﬁrst recommendation, that he suﬀers dis-utility from giving inappropri-
ate advice, measured by ki. Note that advisers initially formed a self-serving belief
about u˜. In consequence, they have to stick to it. This means that there is addi-
tional dis-utility ki(1−γ), of not living up to one's prior motivated belief to c˜∗ = r1.
An adviser's ex-ante utility from giving recommendation r2, given his prior actions
and beliefs, is then described by
V (r2|r2, r1, c) = −ki (γ · 1[r2 6= c∗] + (1− γ) · 1[r2 6= r1])− li ·Pr[θ = 2|r2, c, r1] (8)
R2  NO BONUS: Again, without a previous bonus type-2-advisers do not exist and
Pr[θ = 2|r1, c] ≤ Pr[θ = 2] = 0. Since r1 = c = c∗ was chosen initally, recommending
r2 = c
∗ then maximizes (8). The share of advisers recommending option A (again)
in NO BONUS is therefore α.
R2  BONUS: For type-3-advisers, their previous behaviour with c = r1 = c
∗ 6= A
prevents them from inferring to be type-2-advisers since Pr[θ = 2|r2, c = r1 6= A] ≤
Pr[θ = 2|c = r1 6= A] = 0. Since for them c = r1 = c∗ holds, they maximize (8) by
recommending r2 = c = r1 = c
∗ 6= A.
First, consider the case that own actions in O had diagnostic value, thus λ > 0
and therefore pi∗c ∈ (0, 1). Share 1− pi∗c of type-2-advisers has then already revealed
himself as such. For them, Pr[θ = 2|r2, c 6= r1 = A] = Pr[θ = 2|c 6= r1 = A] = 1
applies. Their second recommendation r2 is thus unaﬀected by image concerns.
Accordingly, r2 = c
∗ 6= A maximizes (8) when γ > 1
2
and r2 = r1 = A when it holds
that γ ∈ (0, 1
2
].22
22Note that when γ > 12 , their prior, self-serving belief leads even those advisers who have
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It follows that the mass of candidates for continued pooling with type-1-advisers
in R2 is given by the overall share pi∗cβ > 0 of advisers who has not yet revealed
themselves to be type-2. They, together with type-1-advisers have a history of
c = r1 = A. By denoting the likelihood that a type-1-adviser chooses r2 = A with
τr2 = Pr[r2 = A|θ = 1] and the corresponding probability for a type-2-adviser who
has not revealed himself by pir2 = Pr[r2 = A|θ = 2, c = r1 = A] we get the following
posteriors:
Pr[θ = 2|r2 = c = r1 = A] = pir2 · pi
∗
cβ
τr2 · α + pir2 · pi∗cβ
(9)
Pr[t = 2|r2 6= A, c = r1 = A] = (1− pir2) · pi
∗
cβ
(1− τr2) · α + (1− pir2) · pi∗cβ
(10)
Analogously to the comparison of (5) and (6), (10) is larger than (9) whenever
τr2 ≥ pir2 . Repeating the analogous reasoning for an equilibrium with τc = 1 in O,
there is an equilibrium where all type-1-advisers choose option A for their second
recommendation, thus with τr2 = 1. This is the equilibrium on which we focus (see
the above discussion on this selection for O, the same arguments carry over to R2).
Type 2-advisers who have so far not revealed themselves through inconsistent
actions (i.e. c 6= r1 = A) face again a trade-oﬀ: On the one hand, they could
recommend their preferred choice r2 = c
∗ 6= A to prevent the cost γki of giving
inappropriate advice, based on their personally preferred action. However, this
would then reveal them to be type-2s and get them dis-utility li. In addition, they
would give inappropriate advice based on their self-serving belief c˜∗ = A = r1 they
formed in R1 which would now create costs of (1 − γ)ki when they recommend
r2 6= r1. The alternative is to continue in recommending option A to pool with
type-1-advisers and therefore uphold a positive self-image. By using (9), together
with τr2 = 1, a type-2-adviser then recommends r2 = c = r1 = A 6= c∗ if and only if
− kiγ − li · pir2 · pi
∗
cβ
α + pir2 · pi∗cβ
> −ki(1− γ)− li ⇔ ki
li
(2γ − 1) < α
α + pir2
· pi∗c (11)
In consequence, a type-2-adviser who re-issues biased advice by recommending r2 =
already revealed themselves to re-issue their biased advice for option A.
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A has low concerns of giving inappropriate advice (ki) relative to their image concern
(li). To formalize this, it will be useful to denote the family of cdfs of the ratio
distribution ki/li, conditional on an adviser's preferred option c
∗, by (Rc∗)c∗∈S . For
example, a typical member is RB = Pr[ki/li ≤ x|c∗ = B].23
First consider the case that γ > 1
2
. Again, revealing one-self by recommending a
non-A option increases the opportunity cost of doing so as pooling becomes easier.
In equilibrium, advisers take this into account. From (11), it then follows that the
share pi∗r2 of hitherto not revealed type-2-advisers who continue to pool with type-1s
has to solve the following expression:
pir2 =
∑
c∗∈S\{A}
αc∗Rc∗
(
α
(2γ − 1)(α + pir2 · pi∗cβ)
)
= αBRB
(
α
(2γ − 1)(α + pir2 · pi∗cβ)
)
+ αCRC
(
α
(2γ − 1)(α + pir2 · pi∗cβ)
) (12)
By analogous reasoning as for the RHS of (12), the above RHS is strictly less than
one. It is also non-increasing in pir2 . Therefore, there has to be a unique intersection
pi∗r2 ∈ (0, 1) with the 45-degree line over the unit interval. We then get the following:
Prediction III.a) Pr[r2 = A|bonus] = α + pi∗r2pi∗cβ > Pr[c = A|no bonus] = α
when γ ∈ (1
2
, 1].
Alternatively, if γ ∈ (0, 1
2
] the second inequality in (11) is always fulﬁlled since
its RHS is strictly positive while the LHS is strictly negative. It then follows that
pi∗r2 = 1 and all of the unrevealed type-2s choose r2 = A. In addition, the share
1 − pi∗c who have previously revealed themselves also choose r2 = A (see above).
This prediction then follows:
Prediction III.b) Pr[r2 = A|bonus] = α + β > Pr[c = A|no bonus] = α when
γ ∈ (0, 1
2
].
Lastly, consider γ = 0. Own choices then have no diagnostic value as λ = 0.
The main diﬀerence to the preceding analysis is that not choosing c = r1 = A for
23Since ki and li are positively-valued and their distributions are commonly known, Rc∗ is deﬁned
and also commonly known.
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type-2-advisers does not necessarily reveal them to be of this type. In consequence,
there is no mass picβ of candidates for continued pooling but all type-2-adviser are
candidates for pooling with the moral type-1-advisers in R2 and none has previously
revealed. The mass of those who potentially mimic type-1-advisers is thus given by β.
The analogs to the inference posteriors (9) and (10) are equivalent to setting pic = 1
in these expression.24 Also, they are independent of the adviser's previous choice c
since it does not have diagnostic value because λ = γ = 0 applies. Expression (11)
then becomes
− li · pir2 · β
α + pir2 · β
> −ki − li ⇔ ki
li
> − α
α + pir2
(13)
and is always fulﬁlled, thus all type-2-advisers re-recommend r2 = A:
Prediction III.c) Pr[r2 = A|bonus] = α + β > Pr[c = A|no bonus] = α when
γ = 0.
From predictions III.a) through III.c) we get that for any weight γ ∈ [0, 1], option
A is more often re-recommended in BONUS than in NO BONUS, thus prediction 3
in the main text.
24Note that in slight contradiction to the initial deﬁnition of pic as the share of type-2-advisers
which behaves consistently in the own choice, setting this value equal to one does not mean that
all behave consistently. It is however mathematically equivalent to this situation since the choice
c has no diagnostic value. This is the same as if all type-2-advisers would have pooled with
type-1-advisers. In both cases, the mass for (continued) pooling is the same and given by β.
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Appendix B  Further data and analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BONUS 0.440*** 0.420*** 0.441*** 0.467***
(0.047) (0.041) (0.059) (0.060)
Personal Controls no yes no yes
Session Controls no no yes yes
Observations 99 99 89 89
Table 8: Average marginal eﬀect of probit estimates for recommending option A in
R1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BONUS 0.170** 0.175** 0.210** 0.217***
(0.074) (0.071) (0.090) (0.071)
Personal Controls no yes no yes
Session Controls no no yes yes
Observations 99 99 79 79
Table 9: Average marginal eﬀect of probit estimates for choosing option A for
oneself in O
For the above tables:
Robust standard error in parentheses, signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Personal controls: age, gender, monthly budget, subject's region of origin and ﬁeld
of studies.
Observations with : some combinations of the control variables predicted
outcomes perfectly which is why the respective observations are not used in the
ML-estimation.
143
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BONUS 0.194*** 0.251*** 0.182** 0.284***
(0.071) (0.072) (0.087) (0.107)
Personal Controls no yes no yes
Session Controls no no yes yes
Observations 99 87 81 66
Table 10: Average marginal eﬀect of probit estimates for recommending option A
in R2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BONUS 0.409** 0.508** 0.584** 0.624***
(0.206) (0.212) (0.230) (0.234)
Personal controls no yes no yes
Session controls no no yes yes
Observations 99 99 99 99
Table 11: Ordered probit estimates on the self-assessed preference for risk (Likert
scale, 0 to 10)
For the above tables:
Robust standard error in parentheses, signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Personal controls: age, gender, monthly budget, subject's region of origin and ﬁeld
of studies.
Observations with : some combinations of the control variables predicted
outcomes perfectly which is why the respective observations are not used in the
ML-estimation.
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NO BONUS BONUS OVERALL rank-sum/χ2-test
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. p-value
age 24.824 8.002 23.208 5.411 24.040 6.882 0.264
male 0.451 0.070 0.354 0.070 0.404 0.050 0.339
region of origin 0.194
UK or Ireland 0.196 0.401 0.063 0.244 0.131 0.034 -
other Europe 0.137 0.348 0.188 0.394 0.162 0.370 -
N. America/Australia/New Zealand 0.020 0.140 0.083 0.279 0.051 0.220 -
South America 0.039 0.196 0.021 0.144 0.030 0.172 -
Asia 0.608 0.493 0.645 0.483 0.626 0.486 -
other 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
degree 0.220
bachelor 0.607 0.493 0.500 0.505 0.555 0.050 -
master 0.353 0.483 0.479 0.504 0.414 0.050 -
phd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
other postgraduate 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.144 0.101 0.100 -
none 0.039 0.196 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.014 -
subject 0.261
economics/business/ﬁnance 0.216 0.415 0.375 0.489 0.293 0.457 -
other social sciences 0.353 0.483 0.229 0.425 0.293 0.458 -
psychology 0.059 0.237 0.021 0.144 0.040 0.198 -
public administration 0.039 0.196 0.062 0.244 0.051 0.220 -
math/sciences/engineering 0.157 0.367 0.083 0.279 0.121 0.328 -
arts or humanities 0.157 0.367 0.146 0.357 0.152 0.360 -
other 0.020 0.140 0.083 0.279 0.051 0.220 -
monthly budget (in GBP) 606.275 450.719 640.00 563.775 622.626 506.328 0.964
number of observations 51 48 99
Table 12: Summary statistics for advisers' personal characteristics and dummy variable based on categorical data.
The rightmost column provides p-values for a randomization check between NO BONUS and BONUS
(Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the variables age and budget; χ2-tests for the remaining categorical variables).
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Appendix C  Experimental instructions
The following pages contain screenshots of instructions shown to subjects in ztree
and on the information about the investment options printed on paper. They are
presented in the order as they were seen by the subjects in the experiment.
• Screen 1: Welcome stage and general instructions
• Screens 2a and 2b: Explanation for R1. Two screens which explain the client's
choice situation, the adviser's role, and the investment options.
• Information on the investment options shown to advisers, printed on paper
• Screen 2c: Instructions for giving the ﬁrst recommendation R1
• Screen 3: Instructions for making the own choice O
• Screen 4: Instructions for giving the second recommendation R2
• Screen 5: Exit questionnaire
The screens show the information shown to advisers in treatment BONUS. The parts
which are not shown to advisers in NO BONUS are put in square brackets.
Screen 1
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Screens 2a (top) and 2b (bottom)
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A risky choice 
One of the following options must be chosen. Then the following happens: 
Option A:  
 Roll die: for every outcome, play the lottery.  
Option B: 
 Roll die: if it shows 1 or 2, one earns GBP 12.00 for sure; 
 Roll die: if it shows 3, 4, 5 or 6, one has to play the lottery 
Option C: receive a chance to roll the same six-sided die:  
 Roll die: if it shows 1 or 2, one earns GBP 12.00 for sure; 
 Roll die: if it shows 3 or 4, one earns GBP 8.00 for sure; 
 Roll die: if it shows 5 or 6, one has to play the lottery 
The lottery: 
For the lottery one has to toss a coin. “Heads” then yields GBP 20.00, “Tails” nothing. 
 
Each row of the table below represents a possible result of the die. The columns 
describe the possible consequences, depending on the chosen option. 
Die equal 
to…. 
Option A 
is chosen 
Option B 
is chosen 
Option C 
is chosen 
1 or 2  lottery: GBP 20 or 0  GBP 12  GBP 12 
3 or 4  lottery: GBP 20 or 0 
lottery: 
GBP 20 or 0  GBP 8 
5 or 6  lottery: GBP 20 or 0 
lottery: 
GBP 20 or 0 
lottery: 
GBP 20 or 0 
 
Example: 
Suppose the die yielded 3: If option A or B was chosen before, one has to play the 
lottery. If option C was chosen, one would have gotten GBP 8.00 for sure instead.  
 
Suppose the die yielded 1. If option B or C was chosen before, one gets GBP 12.00 
for sure. If option A was chosen, one plays the lottery instead. 
 
Suppose the die yielded 6. Independently of the chosen option one plays the lottery. 
Information sheet shown to advisers
(It was placed face down on each adviser's table with the following print on its
back: "Information  do not turn until explicitly told so".)
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Screens 2c (top) and 3 (bottom)
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Screens 4 (top) and 5 (bottom)
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